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Preface
THIS BOOK PRESENTS the findings and comparative analysis of seven case
studies that were carried out under the research project 'Methodologies for
the design and delivery of business development services for small produc-
ers'.The purpose of this project was to carry out an analysis of approaches to
the design and delivery of various business development services (BDS) in
developing countries and gain insight into how this can be done cost effec-
tively, with high impact and sustainability.
The term 'business development services' refers to a range of non-financial
services provided to micro- and small enterprises (MSEs) at various stages in
their development, including before start-up. BDS focus on reducing poverty
by raising the productivity and the incomes of small and microproducers and
entrepreneurs. Contained within the broad concept of BDS are such activities
as group training, individual counselling and advice, the development of new
commercial entities, technology development and transfer, information pro-
vision, business links and policy advocacy. BDS are aimed at assisting MSEs
to overcome internal and external constraints to their start-up, development
and performance.
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) supported
research on seven BDS projects considered to be successful by their imple-
menting agencies, five non-governmental organizations (NGOs):
Intermediate Technology Development Group (UK), Enterprise Works
Worldwide (USA), TechnoServe Inc. (USA), Mennonite Economic
Development Associates (Canada) and Sarvodaya Sharmadana Sanamaya
(Sri Lanka). These NGOs were IDRC's partners in this project and con-
tributed significant in-kind support to the researchers. Representatives of
IDRC, the partner NGOs and a resource person formed the project steering
committee that guided the work of the researchers and engaged in the analy-
sis presented in this book.
Three services were given particular attention in the case studies:
marketing, access to technology, and acquisition of business and manage-
ment skills. The researchers conducted the seven case studies guided by
detailed terms of reference. The cases looked at the strategies and principal
practices employed by the five NGOs in providing the BDS through a set
of indicators to assess 'good practice' in terms of impact, cost effectiveness
and sustainability. Some of the projects reviewed included private sector
collaboration, or they began as NGO projects and evolved into private
companies.
This IDRC research project addressed BDS delivery questions within a
comparative framework. The comparative analysis of research findings
focuses on eight key variables:
1. Specialization or diversification of services offered: do the projects exam-
ined in the case studies offer a range of services, or only one? If a project
focuses on only particular services, are the others that are needed provided
by the private sector or through other assistance programmes?
2. Specialization or diversification in sector(s) of activity: do the projects
work with a particular product (for example, beans, or furniture), or with
enterprises engaged in a diverse set of activities (for example, all MSEs in
a particular locality)?
3. The roles that development NGOs and private providers play in service
delivery: do these case studies show them to be changing over time? What
are the reasons?
4. Nature of the BDS client - groups or individuals? How does client type
affect service design and performance?
5. Poverty alleviation versus growth orientation: to what extent do the serv-
ices address the challenge of poverty alleviation and to what extent does
the intervention focus on the potential for growth? How are enterprises
with growth potential identified?
6. Issues of scaling up: how did the seven projects studied in this project seek
to optimize and broaden their impact?
7. Approaches to needs assessment: how were client needs factored into
NGO programme design and service selection?
8. Flexibility of service response: how did the project change over its life-
time? In what ways did the project managers find it necessary to change
their approach in response to evolving circumstances or to improved
understanding of the needs of their clients?
The research findings that are presented in this book are intended to con-
tribute to the ongoing BDS debate. It is a debate that has been prompted by
the success to date in standardizing and commercializing microcredit pro-
grammes and by donors' interest in focusing their assistance on priority
sectors not readily 'privatized'. Donor agencies have been considering the
possibility of standardizing and commercializing the provision of non-finan-
cial BDS to existing and potential micro- and small entrepreneurs and
businesses.
We hope the case studies that follow and the discourse on each will throw
light on issues such as the development and implementation of BDS per-
formance assessment; alternatives in BDS design and delivery; BDS and
credit relationships; and subsidized and commercial provision of BDS.
This research project, the analysis of its findings and their presentation in
this book would not have been possible without the unstinting work and sup-
port over four years of the project steering committee. Members of this
committee were Anura Atapattu, Brent Herbert-Copley, Eric Hyman, Steve
Londner, Donald Mead, Julie Redfern and Andrew Scott. Special thanks go
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to Mike Albu, Jonathan Dawson, Pam Fehr, Eric Hyman, Steve Londner,
Donald Mead and Sandra Yu, all of whom stuck it out through the various
case study redrafts, providing fresh, valuable insights every time. I am also
extremely grateful to the field staff of the five partner NGOs who made their
offices, projects and data so readily available to the researchers. The first two
years (1998 and 1999) of this study were coordinated by Kenneth Loucks of
Dev-21 Consulting Ltd and the last two (2000 and 2001) by myself. Thanks to
Bill Carman of IDRC and Helen Marsden and Ginny Gilmore of ITDG
Publishing for actually bringing this book to print. Helen van Houten did the
technical editing of this work with great patience and good humour. To each






Sunita Kapila has worked in international development for over two decades, especially in
small enterprise development in South Asia and Africa. She has worked in the areas of
women's informal income generation, the acquisition of employable and entrepreneurial
skills, strengthening of micro- and small entrepreneurs' associations, and urban gover-
nance. She has worked both as a staff member and as a consultant with non-governmental
organizations and donor agencies.
Donald Mead has over 40 years of experience as a development economist, including sev-
eral long-term assignments in eastern and southern Africa. For the past 22 years, as
professor of agricultural economics at Michigan State University, he has concentrated on
prospects and problems of small enterprises and the design of effective interventions for
the support of such enterprises.
Jonathan Dawson has been a consultant for 15 years, specializing in the design and deliv-
ery of business development services for small-scale producers in Africa and Asia. He is
also involved as a teacher and consultant in the promotion of sustainable community
development in the industrialized world and is an adviser to the Global Ecovillage
Network (GEN) - Europe.
Pamela Fehr is technical adviser and consultant in microenterprise development at
Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA). She has worked in design and
delivery of BDS marketing programmes in Bolivia, Haiti, Nicaragua and Peru. She is cur-
rently based in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, where she is focusing on institutional strengthening
for MEDA's rural credit programme, which targets small producers.
Eric L. Hyman, currently with the African Development Foundation, was previously chief
of program evaluation at Enterprise Works Worldwide. Dr Hyman has 22 years of experi-
ence in microenterprise development, economic appraisal, monitoring and evaluation,
appropriate technologies and environmental impact assessment. He has worked in 23
developing countries and published two books and 73 journal articles.
Heather Rawlinson worked as an intern with the Mennonite Economic Development
Associates (MEDA) in Bolivia in 1998 and 1999, and later worked in the Canadian Red
Cross as the International Program Associate on the Americas Program (2000 to 2001).
She recently returned to Bolivia to work with a local organization on projects for home-
less children.
Lisa Stosch is the senior adviser for the Evaluation Unit at Enterprise Works Worldwide
in Washington, D.C. Ms Stosch has worked with microenterprise development for over 14
years, specializing in monitoring and evaluation, and financial and programme manage-
ment. She currently manages the Impact Tracking System, which gauges the effects of 28
projects in 17 countries. She has co-written and published several annual reports and pro-
gram brochures for Enterprise Works.
Sandra O. Yu specializes in small enterprise and informal sector support, with focus on
business and institutional development. She has been involved in research, community
development and training and has worked in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Her work
has been published by the ILO, in the Labour Education Journal, UN Economic and
Social Affairs, International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, and as editorial columns in
Philippine newspapers.
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADB Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana
ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AFC Agricultural Finance Corporation (Zimbabwe)
AgENT USAID-funded agency in Sri Lanka
AGRITEX Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (Zimbabwe)
ANACAFE Asociacion Nacional del Cafe (National Coffee Association of
Guatemala)
ASOFAM Asociacion Nacional de Fabricantes Artesanos de Muebles
(National Association of Artisan Furniture Makers) (Bolivia)
ASOHABA Asociacion de Productores de Haba (Association of Broad
Bean Producers) (Bolivia)
ASOMEX ASOPROF/MEDA Export Company (Bolivia)
ASOPROF Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Frijol (National
Association of Bean Producers) (Bolivia)
ASPECAGUA Asociacion de Pequenos Caficultures de Guatemala
(Association of Small-Scale Coffee Producers of Guatemala)
ATDP Agro-based Industries and Technology Development Project
(Bangladesh)
ATI Appropriate Technology International (former name of
Enterprise Works Worldwide)
ATZ Appropriate Technology Zimbabwe
BA business adviser
BDS business development services
BDT Bangladesh taka
BODC Bangladesh Organization for Development Cooperation
BRDB Bangladesh Rural Development Board
CCCH Central de Cooperativas Cafetaleras de Honduras (Coffee
Cooperative Center of Honduras)
CEFE Competency-based Economies through Formation of
Entrepreneurs (GTZ programme)
CENCAFES Central de Cooperativas de Caficultores de El Salvador (Coffee
Cooperative Center of El Salvador)
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
COMERCAFE Comercializadora Regional de Cafe (Regional Coffee
Marketing Company) (El Salvador)
CSC Consejo Salvadoreno de Cafe (Salvadorean Coffee Council)
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DTC Development Technology Centre of the University of
Zimbabwe
FACN Federation des Associations des Cafeieres Natives (Federation
of Native Coffee Farmer Associations in Haiti)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FASCOM Farmers' Service Company (Ghana)
FASCU Farmers' Service Multipurpose Co-operative Union (Ghana)
FEDEAGRO Federation de Asociaciones Agropecuarias (Federation of
Associations of Agricultural Producers) (Bolivia)
FFPED Forum for Food Processing Enterprise Development









































Global Investment Fund (a division of MEDA)
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Zusammenarbeit (German Technical
Cooperation)
Institute of Agricultural Engineering (Zimbabwe)
Inventory Credit Programme
Inter-American Development Bank
International Development Research Centre
Intermediate Technology Development Group
Intermediate Technology Development Group-Bangladesh
Lanka Jathika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sanamaya
Sri Lanka rupee
Mennonite Economic Development Associates
Microenterprise Development Assistance Service (Ghana)
Microenterprise Innovation Project (USAID-funded global
programme)
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Ghana)
micro- and small enterprise
Management Training Institute (Sri Lanka)
Mouchas Unnayan Sangstha (organization involved in bee
culture)
National Aquarium Research Agency (Sri Lanka)
non-governmental organization
Productive Employment Project (Bangladesh)
El Programa de Incentives y Soportes a las Microempresas
(Microenterprise Incentives and Support Programme - former
MEDA programme)
Fundacion Salvadorena para Investigaciones del Cafe
(Salvadorean Foundation for Coffee Research)
Proyecto de Comercializacion Rural (Rural Marketing Project
- a CIDA-funded project MEDA is carrying out)
Promotora de Desarrollo Cooperativo (Promoter of
Cooperative Development in Nicaragua)
Rural Associated Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd (Zimbabwe)
Rural Enterprise Development Services (a division of SEEDS)
Rural Enterprises Programme (a division of SEEDS)
Rural Employment Sector Programme (Bangladesh)
South-East Consortium for International Development
Sarvodaya Economic Enterprises Development Services
Sistemas Empresariales de Mesoamerica (Business Systems of
Central America)
Technology Consultancy Centre, Kumasi, Ghana
Union de Cooperativas de Cafetaleros de El Salvador (Union of
El Salvador Coffee Farmer Cooperatives)
Union de Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria de Productores,
Beneficiadores y Exportadores del Cafe (Union of Cooperatives
of Agrarian Reform Producers, Processors and Exporters in El
Salvador)
United States Agency for International Development
Village Education Resource Centre (Bangladesh)
Village Infrastructure Project (World Bank project)




JONATHAN DAWSON, SUNITA KAPILA, DONALD MEAD1
Research context: The business development services debate
IN RECENT YEARS, increasing attention has been devoted to business devel-
opment services (BDS) for micro- and small enterprises (MSEs), recognizing
that credit alone is not enough to result in sustainable increases in productiv-
ity and income. 'Business development services' refers to support other than
credit. Non-financial services include training; giving technical and manage-
rial assistance; developing, adapting and promoting new technology; assessing
markets and giving marketing support; providing a physical infrastructure;
and advocating policy.
Many early business development services were in the form of training
provided with microcredit by a microfinance entity. This training was driven
by supply rather than demand and was often required as a condition for a
loan. These early BDS projects were often characterized by high cost per
client, limited outreach and impact, and low cost recovery, needing continued
donor subsidy.
The past decade has seen important developments and innovations in the
design and delivery of business development services in an attempt to make
them more cost effective and sustainable. Some of these innovations drew
on the experience of the microcredit pioneers. Three aspects of the micro-
credit experience have proved especially valuable. First, microcredit
schemes built on existing informal credit and savings practices among the
poor. They strengthened, rather than replaced, traditional systems. Second,
they demonstrated that low-income people could pay commercial interest
rates on loans. Good practice could prompt repayment rates of 95 per cent
or more. The best microfinance programmes showed they could be sustain-
able. Third, the minimalist credit model was demand driven because it left
decisions on loan use to the entrepreneurs. All three principles have
affected recent developments in business development service design and
delivery.
Systems theory has also been important in forming new ideas for the
design and delivery of BDS initiatives. Subsector analysis or value chain
analysis has been a core tool in new BDS approaches. These approaches help
to identify 1) sectors in which large numbers of entrepreneurs are active, 2)
bottlenecks or constraints on the economic development of these entrepre-
neurs, and 3) measures to remove these constraints.
Evidence is growing that recent BDS innovations have in fact improved
impact and outreach, improved cost effectiveness and enhanced
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sustainability. However, a clear picture has yet to emerge about the precise
nature of these achievements and the key factors underlying them. Several
recent initiatives have sought to throw light on these questions.
In 1995, the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise
Development agreed on a framework for donor support of microfinance. The
framework proved influential in encouraging donors to support microfinance
programmes that were moving toward more businesslike approaches and
greater cost recovery. In 1997, this committee turned its attention to the more
complex task of reaching agreement on good practices for providing non-
financial services to small enterprises.
The committee sponsored regional conferences in Harare (1998), Rio de
Janeiro (1999) and Hanoi (2000) to discuss ways to achieve greater outreach,
cost effectiveness, impact and sustainability of business development services.
In late 2000, it released a set of guidelines called 'Business development serv-
ices for small enterprises: guidelines for donor intervention'.These guidelines
emphasized developing vibrant private sector markets for BDS and urged
donors to offer subsidies for activities that help to develop the capacity of pri-
vate providers of BDS.
In response to questions being raised in the donor and practitioner debate
on BDS for small enterprises, the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) of Canada developed a collaborative research initiative with
five major NGOs in early 1998. The research focused on methodologies for
the design and delivery of high-impact, cost-effective business development
services for small producers. This global project drew on experience from
Africa, Latin America and Asia and described factors that appear important
in good BDS design and delivery. This book presents the findings of this
research initiative.
Research partners
IDRC provided funding to bring together representatives of five major
NGOs engaged in providing business development services to small produc-
ers, and covered the research expenses. The NGOs provided substantial
in-kind support for the studies. Each NGO identified projects that they felt
represented 'good practice' in providing BDS to small producers. Case stud-
ies were commissioned, examining seven projects in detail. Independent
consultants hired by IDRC did most of the studies.
The case studies were reviewed by a steering committee, which included a
resource person and representatives from IDRC and the five partner NGOs.
Since the steering committee included BDS practitioners, considerable atten-
tion was given to project design and management, as mistakes can often occur
at the design stage. On the other hand, one main finding of the case studies is
that good business development support is evolutionary in nature, modifying
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in response to changing circumstances as well as a changing understanding of
the needs and opportunities for the clients.
Five NGOs participated in the project:
• Enterprise Works Worldwide, a not-for-profit development assistance
organization whose mission is to generate economic growth and alleviate
poverty through business development programmes. Its headquarters are
in Washington, D.C., with field offices in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Enterprise Works supports local partners and small-scale producers of agri-
cultural and other commodities to build more competitive enterprises.
• Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), an agency that
works to provide practical answers to poverty. Founded in 1966 by econo-
mist Dr E.F. Schumacher (author of Small Is Beautiful), its vision is of a
more equitable and just world in which technology enriches and benefits
the lives of poor people in a sustainable way. ITDG, through its offices in
seven countries in Africa, Asia and South America, concentrates its efforts
on research and facilitating technical change and on building knowledge
and skills, particularly among small-scale producers.
• Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA), an association of
Christians committed to applying biblical teachings in the marketplace. It
promotes developing business for the benefit of the disadvantaged of low-
income countries and in partnership with them. MEDA works in Latin
America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia, developing pilot projects and
programmes that establish businesses by providing credit, business training
and interventions addressing production and marketing barriers.
• Sarvodaya Shramadana Sanamaya, a Buddhist voluntary organization in
Sri Lanka. Its programme of economic support is implemented by
Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development Services (SEEDS). This
comprises three specialist units: the Rural Enterprises Programme, the
Management Training Institute, and the Rural Enterprise Development
Services (REDS).
• TechnoServe, which focuses on low-income rural people, helping them to
build commercial skills and create and strengthen local businesses and
commercial activities. TechnoServe works in Africa, Latin America and
Poland. Its current business development services focus on private sector
market links, business planning and operations, and entrepreneurial
development.
Case study characteristics
Much recent donor debate has focused on the need to develop vibrant BDS
markets. This discussion has assumed the existence of discrete small enter-
prises, often urban, making decisions on the services they wish to purchase.
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Services are seen as being delivered separately and not as a diversified
package.
That model is unquestionably valuable. But the case studies in this book
suggest there are small enterprises (or prospective small enterprises) where
that approach, for several reasons, does not apply. First of these reasons is
that in several of the case studies, the 'enterprise' is not clearly defined. It is
one among many livelihood strategies used by poor households. The orna-
mental fish farmers of Sri Lanka, the oil press entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe
and the grain farmers of Ghana, for example, all had various sources of
income. The unit of analysis for identifying opportunities and constraints was
not the individual enterprise but the subsector. The BDS were aimed at
changing systems and institutions to benefit subsector participants rather
than individual enterprises. Second, many implementing agencies delivered a
package of assistance, involving several different BDS and also in several
cases included credit. Third, in these case studies, an NGO played a key role
in identifying and initiating the project. Moreover, even in those cases where
independent and financially self-sustaining institutions were created by the
project, the NGO had a long-term supporting role. Recent discussions on
small enterprise development assume that NGOs should have only a short-
term, facilitative role. Fourth, a primary concern of all these projects was
promoting entrepreneurial activity among the rural poor, in many cases
including groups and clusters of microentrepreneurs.
It is from these enterprises that the current case studies were drawn. They
focus on the opportunity for many microentrepreneurs, or for farmers still
limited to primary production, to move into higher-value processing or man-
ufacturing. However, they also recognize the inability of many of these
microentrepreneurs to pay for the services that add value.
Case study projects
The projects reviewed in the case studies started from identified market
opportunities. In most cases, these opportunities were tied to subsectors per-
ceived to offer good prospects for small enterprise income and employment,
and the assistance was carefully designed such that client enterprises could
take advantage of these particular market opportunities. The support services
offered were not all-purpose business development services. Seven case stud-
ies were chosen for analysis:
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide's El Salvador Small-scale Coffee Producers
Project. This initiative was to help smallholder coffee farmers in El Salvador
increase the volume and value of the coffee they grew. The project did this by
helping farmer cooperatives to provide extension services, upgrade or build
processing facilities, improve quality control, and access more profitable mar-
kets. The project also operated a revolving credit fund for small farmers.
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Enterprise Works Worldwide's Zimbabwe oil press project sought to build
a new industry - small, rural oilseed processing in Zimbabwe. Project activi-
ties included developing and disseminating five oil press models; producing
and distributing improved planting seed; training manufacturers, repair arti-
sans and new oil-processing enterprise managers; establishing commercial
systems to distribute oil presses and peanut butter mills; and, in the early
stages, providing credit to promote purchasing the new processing
equipment.
ITDG's food processing project in Bangladesh aimed to help very poor
people, mainly women, establish small enterprises to process foods for sale in
local markets. The Bangladesh project provided training in production tech-
nology and simple business management and transferred training capacity to
other indigenous NGOs.
ITDG's light-engineering project in Zimbabwe sought to increase the avail-
ability of tools and equipment for small manufacturing enterprises. In
addition to working with small-scale engineers to increase domestic capacity
to manufacture new and appropriate machines, the project helped to estab-
lish marketing systems through which these capital goods could be bought or
hired by small enterprises.
MEDA's ASOMEX project in Bolivia provided marketing services to link
small farmers with export markets for their products, with a focus on edible
beans.
SEEDS's ornamental fish project in Sri Lanka helped small-scale produc-
ers to establish and operate ponds to raise ornamental fish and linked these
small producers with traders who purchased the fish for export, with smaller
amounts for sale in the local market.
TechnoServe's cereal storage, processing and marketing project in Ghana
helped small-scale farmers to increase the benefits they received from their
crops by improving grain marketing. It permitted participating farmers to
store grain, either for later consumption or later sale, when prices were more
favourable than at harvest.
Case study terms of reference
The terms of reference for the case studies included the following:
• a description of the business development services delivered; although the
projects had diverse services, the case studies focused on three: marketing,
acquisition of business and management skills and access to technology
• management of the project, with attention to its planning, organization,
supervision, monitoring and evaluation
• the approach of the project in measuring cost effectiveness, impact, and
sustainability
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an analysis of relationships between the design and delivery of the business
development services and the performance
lessons to be learned from the case study, with observations on aspects of
design and delivery worthy of emulation.
A principal goal was to identify success factors for the projects under
review - the characteristics that contributed to favourable results of the proj-
ects. Eight major issues were addressed in the analysis of the design and
implementation of the projects:
specialization versus diversification of services offered
specialization versus diversification in products or sectors
roles that NGOs and private providers played in service delivery
groups or individual business service clients
poverty alleviation versus growth orientation
scaling-up issues
approaches to needs assessment
evolution and flexibility of service response.
Lack of a common method among the different participating NGOs for
assessing impact made comparisons across projects extremely difficult.
Indeed, in several cases the lack of rigorous data collection and analysis made
even simple benefit/cost calculations impossible. Nonetheless, the case stud-
ies were able to identify and quantify the key achievements resulting from
the business development services and describe how these services worked.
Note
1 Although the authors jointly wrote this chapter, they drew on discussions with and
contributions by Anura Atapattu, Pamela Fehr, Eric Hyman, Steve Londner, Julie
Redfern, Andrew Scott and Sandra Yu.
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THE INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP (ITDG) promotes
food processing to help the rural poor in developing countries to secure sus-
tainable livelihoods. This is part of ITDG's goal to build the technical skills of
poor people in developing countries to improve their lives.
In Africa, Asia and Latin America, ITDG has provided support in food
production, energy, building materials, transport, manufacturing and food
processing using the principles of appropriate technology. ITDG provides
technical assistance to small-scale producers and non-governmental and gov-
ernment organizations through training, information dissemination, research,
market identification, policy advocacy and networking.
ITDG began operating in Bangladesh in the early 1980s, but the
ITDG-Bangladesh (ITDG-B) programme was not formally established until
1990. ITDG-B provides technical assistance to small producers and local
organizations, including training, product research and development, dissem-
inating information, networking and policy advocacy.
It focuses its work on the poorest and most marginalized people, which in
Bangladesh includes the following:
 the functionally landless
 peasants with less than 0.02 acre landholdings1
divorced or widowed women, the most vulnerable in Bangladesh society
those having a very low income (less than BDT 200 or US$4 per month)2.
As part of its commitment to reach the poorest of the poor, ITDG-B has
focused much of its activity in the Greater Faridpur District, one of the least
developed districts. Here it works in food processing, food production, man-
ufacturing and small-enterprise development.
ITDG-B has a staff of 35. The food processing unit has four staff: manager,
project officer, food technologist and programme assistant. The programme's
average annual budget is £78 000 (for 1999 to 2002). It is funded by DFID (50
per cent), the national lottery (40 per cent) and ITDG-B's own revenues (10
per cent). The food processing programme itself accounts for nearly 35 per
cent of the ITDG-B total programme budget, or, if food production is
included, 68 to 70 per cent. ITDG-B works with 80 development organiza-
tions all over the country.
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After a 1989 study looked at the different subsectors within food process-
ing, local organizations and ITDG-B selected three subsectors on which to
focus: rice processing, gur (brown sugar) manufacturing and food processing.
ITDG-B introduced its food processing programme in 1990. Over time, it
specifically promoted processing snack foods, fruits and vegetables, and
phased out rice and gur processing.3
Food processing to promote sustainable livelihoods
Food processing benefits
ITDG believes that food processing could help the rural poor in Bangladesh,
especially women, who are among the most disadvantaged. Food processing
often requires only a little capital and can use local produce. It is an activity
in which women, who may be culturally restricted to their homes, can engage.
Many Bangladeshi women, ITDG-B found, were already processing rice
and making snack foods. Building on their own know-how, women could
increase their household income by using local resources to process foodstuff.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has pointed out that the value
realized from processing and marketing farm products can surpass primary
production (FAO 1995). Preserving food stretches the utility and productiv-
ity of farm produce, which is often wasted during peak seasons but scarce
during lean seasons. Food processing helps to make food available during
lean seasons and helps to stabilize household income.
Food processing can serve several development objectives for households:
increased income, greater savings, food security and better nutrition (ITDG
1999). Agro processing in the broad sense is important to the national econ-
omy, having shown a purported 32 per cent annual growth in past years
(Bangladesh Economic Review 1995). While large companies have now
entered the snack food market, small producers serve local markets and
boost local economies.
Constraints
While small-scale food processing offers numerous opportunities for improv-
ing livelihoods, several constraints that hamper development need to be
addressed. A major one is that large companies have begun producing myr-
iad processed foods, including snacks, pickles, jelly and jam. While 20 years
ago no large companies produced channa chur (a traditional product made of
fried noodles, nuts and spices, similar to 'Bombay mix'), the Bangladesh Rural
Development Board (BRDB) reported that by April 2000 approximately ten
large companies were manufacturing it.
Another problem is that small producers have limited know-how in the
technology of preparing food products. When ITDG-B started its programme
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in 1989, few Bangladeshi organizations had researched and documented food
technology. Furthermore, what documentation and recipes existed were writ-
ten in English and were therefore inaccessible even to NGO workers.
A number of other concerns that inhibit small-scale food processing in
Bangladesh (ITDG 1998) need to be addressed by the project:
• There is a significant difference between having the ability to produce for
home consumption and establishing a small business based on this product.
A range of skills (both technical and business) is needed to make the tran-
sition from home production to the running of a small-scale enterprise.
• Linked to this is the ability to locate and target markets. This is a dynamic
sector. Rural producers need to learn how to monitor change, develop mar-
kets and sell their products. Know-how in selling and locating wider
markets was a common limitation.
• Consumer perception is an important issue faced by small-scale processors.
There is a common perception that foods produced by small-scale opera-
tors are unhygienic and unsafe. This may be somewhat true but is
commonly exaggerated. Nonetheless, processors need to be more con-
scious of hygiene, quality and consistency in food handling, including
dangers of adulteration.
• Lack of access to raw materials, appropriate equipment and packaging
materials are obstacles that small-scale processors frequently face.
• Access to credit is lacking. Many of the small-scale processors belong to
the most marginalized sector of the population and do not have disposable
income. To enable them to put their skills into practice, most need access to
credit to purchase equipment and raw materials.
• They also lack access to appropriate and timely information on a range of
topics. To compete effectively, small-scale food processors need reliable
technological information and information on suppliers and prices of
materials, equipment and packaging, and marketing information.
• Recording transactions is a problem because of low literacy. In the 1990s,
only 34.4 per cent of Bangladesh's population was literate. Literacy among
women was 25.5 per cent. In rural areas it was as low as 13 per cent (BBS
1999).
Development organizations in Bangladesh involved in food processing often
focused more on products and inputs and less on markets. In 1996, ITDG-B
asked these organizations about the difficulties their beneficiaries encoun-
tered. Most problems were market related: competition with large
companies, inconsistent quality, inferior packaging and labelling, marketing
and selling, insufficient access to quality raw materials, and lack of confidence
among consumers in products of small-scale producers (Azami et al. 1996;
Chowdhury and Azami 1996).
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Market and beneficiary needs
A study was commissioned at the programme's outset to review food pro-
cessing in Bangladesh. It also assessed the market and the potential of each
activity (Chowdhury and Sarker 1989).4 The following crops were found to
have good processing prospects: paddy, jute, wheat, sugar cane, pulses,
oilseeds, cotton, tobacco, fruits, vegetables, potatoes, spices, tea, rubber and
silk. Snack foods were considered secondary food processing. Some interest-
ing findings included the following:
• Many crops were produced throughout the year. Yet because the farms and
production were small, the volume of crops that could be processed was
smaller than the capacity of even the smallest machines. In 1996, for exam-
ple, 52.85 per cent of holdings were small, 0.05 to 2.49 acres. Medium-sized
farm holdings, 2.5 to 7.49 acres, made up 11.65 per cent, and large holdings
were only 1.67 per cent (BBS 1999).
• Most crops, except jute and tea, were produced for the local market, but
production was still less than the country's total demand. Some crops,
therefore, were imported.
• Crop processing could provide employment for women and the rural poor.
However, without appropriate equipment, modern capital-intensive produc-
tion could overrun the industry and displace women and landless workers.
ITDG-B organized a national workshop where it presented the study results.
Over 30 development organizations attended. It was determined that while
some development organizations were involved in food processing, they were
not proficient in handling the commercial aspects of their work. This often
resulted in unviable products and continued dependency on subsidies.
During this meeting, snack foods were identified as a focus, along with rice
and sugar cane products. This meeting also determined that there was a need
to train fieldworkers on how to make snack foods so that they could guide
beneficiaries in running food processing businesses. Post-workshop consulta-
tions with development organizations emphasized the need to train
fieldworkers further in establishing sustainable small-scale food processing
businesses, particularly since the business orientation of these organizations
and their staff was inadequate. When ITDG-B looked at existing suppliers of
technology and training, it found that the existing training courses were ori-
ented towards large-scale operations.
Programme components
ITDG-B's food processing programme provides training, technology




The main type of training is in food processing, conducted as a 15-day field-
worker training course and as short courses on specific food products. The
15-day training course is now held annually, although from 1990 to 1996 it was
held twice a year. It includes ten days of technology training in food products
and five days of business management training (see topics listed in Table 2.1).
Trainees learn how to process channa chur, murally (a sweetened dry bread
stick), doughnuts, pickles (made from green chilli, garlic, brinjaf), chutney,
pulses, muri (puffed rice), jams and jellies, banana chips, vermicelli, milk tof-
fee, tomato ketchup, cheese, coconut balls and dried fish. Food topics chosen
depend on what the participants request.
Table 2.1 Topics in the ITDG-B 15-day fieldworker training course
Food technology topics Business topics
Food and nutrition Sales, cost, profit
Food processing techniques Gam, jelly, Stocks, accounts
channa chur, pickles) Depreciation costs
Causes of food spoilage Balance sheet: liabilities, assets
Food preservation Break-even analysis
Hygiene Cash-flow forecasting
Quality control Costing and pricing
Raw material preparation Bookkeeping
Packaging Market survey
Business plan writing and finalization
These training courses are usually held near a participating organization.
This has increased the ITDG-B outreach and its understanding of local con-
ditions. Partner organizations initiate short courses, to which ITDG-B staff
are invited as speakers. These courses span three to ten days and cover mainly
food technology training.
Twelve training courses for fieldworkers have been completed (Table
2.2). Around 145 fieldworkers from approximately 80 organizations
have been trained. Each fieldworker has trained from 20 to 125
beneficiaries (60 beneficiaries average per trainer). Approximately 21 per
cent of those trained have set up food processing businesses (Azami et al.
1996).
In 1997, ITDG-B began charging the sponsoring organization BDT 3000
per participant for the annual training. It estimates that each annual training
course costs BDT 60 000. From a class of 15 to 17 people, ITDG-B receives
around BDT 45 000 to BDT 50 000. The requesting NGO sponsors the short
courses, and ITDG-B does not charge the NGO for its experts, treating its
technical input as a grant.
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ITDG-B identifies and tests the food products that it plans to promote. It has
a small laboratory for testing and improving recipes and has some 50 to 60
recipes on hand. Since 1997, the laboratory has developed some 10 to 12
products. New technology and recipes are sought, and consultants are at
times hired to supply recipes for specific products. Some products have been
discovered in the field, since traditional foods in Bangladesh have rarely been
documented. Food items that can be produced in Bangladesh are further
developed in the ITDG-B laboratory.
The food processing unit spends approximately one week each month
researching and improving recipes. Its laboratory has a micrometer, refrac-
trometer, oven, micro-oven, and protein-content tester - all valued at around
BDT 24 000. It may also occasionally test food made by the beneficiaries.
Food is tested for moisture, acid and protein. Achieving a standard on these
counts is desirable when tapping city markets, and is crucial when venturing
into the international market. After the testing, the unit elicits feedback from
the NGOs, fieldworkers and trainees on what further improvements are
needed to the products.
ITDG-B also designs packaging materials and contracts out their produc-
tion. In special cases it designs and produces equipment; it has produced a
tomato and fruit crushing machine and three sets of channa chur equipment,
which were all given to partner organizations. The channa chur equipment
makes a product of a size different from that normally found - possibly for
differentiation in the market.The small fruit-crushing machine is the only one
in Bangladesh, created after an ITDG-B partner organization saw a similar
one in Sri Lanka.
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Although the channa chur equipment is available in public markets, ITDG-
B manufactured several units to save the partner organizations the trouble of
finding them and to save on cost. The cost of producing them, according to
ITDG-B, is half the market price. Since glass containers for food products are
not readily available, ITDG-B helps to produce glass bottles by manufactur-
ing the moulds. The bottles bear the ITDG-B name, and ITDG-B hopes that
its name will attract buyers to the beneficiary products. However, as it does
not match this intent with quality control, it runs the risk of besmirching its
name if substandard or spoiled foods are bottled. The bottles are sold at cost
to some of the ITDG-B partner organizations. Table 2.3 shows the cost of
producing the equipment and the glass containers.
Table 2.3 Cost of equipment and glass containers for packaging produced by
ITDG-B
Equipment Glass containers
Fruit-crushing equipment = BDT 73 500 BOTTLE - cost of dies PLASTIC CAP - cost of dies
Materials and labour = 72000 small = BDT 3500 small = BDT 850
ITDG-B staff time for design = 1500 medium = 4000 medium/large = 1500
large = 4000
Channa chur equipment = 2000 Cost of bottle manufactured by contractor
Materials and labour = 2000 (in BDT per bottle, including plastic cap, excluding
depreciation cost of dies)




ITDG-B has helped to form a network of partner organizations, called the
Forum for Food Processing Enterprise Development (FFPED), to facilitate
communication among the many development organizations involved in
small-scale food processing. FFPED is a venue for participants to meet and
exchange experiences, determine the needs of the industry, and lobby for
policies beneficial to small food processors. ITDG-B intends to reduce its role
as local organizations become more active.
FFPED has 40 NGO members, represented by their fieldworkers. The net-
work is headed by a central executive committee that meets once a month. To
be more effective, FFPED has divided its membership into two regional
chapters and plans to establish two more. The two regional networks are in
Netrokona and Gaibandha; the two additional regional networks will be in
Barisal and Dinajpur.
FFPED has held workshops and plans to link with large companies and
arrange regular visits among fieldworkers. It has organized two workshops in
which the participants, who were fieldworkers and small-scale producers,
identified the needs of the small-scale food industry and determined a plan of
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action. To ensure small-producer representation and to prevent NGO field-
workers from dominating in the workshops, FFPED made a point of having
twice as many small food processors participate as fieldworkers.
Forum members plan jointly to obtain low-cost equipment for packaging,
link with credit organizations, compile laws and policies that affect the sector,
and facilitate the application of members for government approval of food
products. Members realize that a network can achieve more than they could
on their own.
Policy advocacy
Since small producers need to know the applicable laws and standards,
ITDG-B plans to study current policies on food certification, marketing and
tariffs. It hopes it can also identify key local and international policies that
affect small food processors. Already, ITDG-B has educated small food
processors on product safety. By the end of the project, ITDG-B and local
stakeholders hope to articulate policy alternatives and to take well-informed
positions. Public attitudes need to change as well, mainly the common per-
ception that products made by small food processors are unhygienic and
unsafe.
Information dissemination
ITDG-B has produced illustrated booklets for fieldworkers and beneficiaries,
written in Bangla and detailing how to prepare a specific product. These
booklets are sold at cost to NGOs. Eighteen booklets have been published on
different processed foods, each with a 3000-copy run. Approximately 60 per
cent of the copies have been sold. The sale price of BDT 15 per copy covers





















ITDG-B's small enterprise unit has published a business start-up booklet
called 'Income-generating activity profiles', written in Bangla. It is a step-by-
step guide on how to start a business and contains tips on costing, marketing,
and calculating profit and loss. It also contains testimonials about the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the business. Similar 'IGA profiles' have been
written on how to start a channa chur business and a chatpoti (vegetable
salad) business.
ITDG-B has also published articles in a Bangla journal, Falak, and in
international journals such as the UK-based Food Chain and Appropriate
Technology. Through such articles, ITDG-B shares its technology and dis-
cusses policies locally and internationally.
Monitoring and evaluation
ITDG-B mainly monitors and evaluates its training programme. It realizes,
however, the need to evaluate its information dissemination and networking
activities as well.
Partner organizations are monitored first through the fieldworkers during
the annual training session. Participant experience is evaluated during and
after the training. Participants are asked what they learned most in each day
and which teaching techniques worked best and which least well.
Three ITDG-B staff visit partner organizations about four times a year.
During these 12 to 14 visits, which reach about 40 to 50 per cent of the 80 part-
ner organizations, they discuss technical and business concerns and
beneficiaries' progress. Expenses incurred during each field visit are approx-
imately BDT 5000, including transport and allowances.
Beneficiaries are also visited. ITDG-B recently began administering a
baseline questionnaire enquiring into beneficiary operations, including raw
material sources, equipment owned, packaging, hygiene, market information,
financing, record-keeping, revenue and profit.
In-depth reviews are done mid-term and at the end of a project by an
external consultant and ITDG staff, including the programme manager.
During the programme's first phase, 1990-96, evaluations were conducted in
1993 and 1996. The second phase of the programme, 1998 to 2002, underwent
a mid-term evaluation in 2000. Surveys are conducted for trainers and for
beneficiaries. The survey for trainers covers the usefulness of the training
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course, suggestions to improve the course, teaching quality, support needed,
problems that beneficiaries face, suitability of food products, support
received by trainers, number of people trained or advised, and businesses
established.
The beneficiary survey establishes beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in
food and non-food businesses and enquires into demographics, years in oper-
ation, food products, raw material sources, equipment, packaging, health and
safety, marketing and profitability. Results are compared between beneficiar-
ies and non-beneficiaries. The survey analyses the programme's impact and
benefit/cost performance, covering mainly the annual training.
Partner organizations and programme approaches
Three active partners among the 80 local development organizations
with which ITDG-B works were visited and interviewed in depth for
this study. These organizations illustrate different approaches in
promoting food processing activities. The first provided integrated support
to individual enterprises, the second established NGO-owned common facil-
ities for individual food processors, and the third supported group
enterprises.
Integrated support to individual enterprises
The Productive Employment Project (PEP) that BRDB runs is part of a
broader programme - the Rural Employment Sector Programme (RESP),
which covers four projects: one for infrastructure development, two for insti-
tution building and one for poverty alleviation. PEP, established in 1986, runs
RESP's poverty alleviation component.
PEP aims to provide the rural poor (defined as households having less than
half an acre of land and relying mainly on manual labour for sustenance) with
sustainable livelihoods. It is working in 27 subdistricts of five districts within
Greater Faridpur - Madaripur, Faridpur, Shariatpur, Rajbari and Gopalganj.
PEP reaches approximately 160000 beneficiaries. It supports its target groups
through savings and credit facilities, training, marketing assistance, legal aid,
and health and nutrition. It supports and monitors about 15 livelihood sec-
tors, categorized broadly into production, service and processing, as shown in
Table 2.4.
PEP's beneficiaries are organized into 15- to 20-member groups, regularly
visited by fieldworkers. PEP has 430 fieldworkers, 16 to 18 per subdistrict,
each handling about 20 groups. Fieldworkers collect loan payments from ben-
eficiaries and obtain feedback on the beneficiaries' progress. They respond to
the members' livelihood problems insofar as they can. Fieldworkers are sup-
ported by district extension officers, who provide more specialized technical
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Table 2.4 Livelihood sectors supported and monitored by BRDB
Production Service Processing,
transformational
Paddy cultivation Shopkeeping Carpentry and masonry
Other cultivation Other small trade Weaving and tailoring
Fish culture Rickshaw van pulling Artisan cottage industries
Dairy cow rearing Paddy and pulse husking* Food processing
Other cattle rearing Boat pulling
Poultry and duck culture
*PEP has reduced its support to paddy husking since it found that it benefits mostly middlemen who buy
parboiled rice from farmers and have it husked.
input to the fieldworkers and beneficiaries. A typical district office has four
extension officers, a fisheries officer, a livestock and veterinary officer, an
agricultural officer and a microenterprise officer, who is responsible for food
processing.
PEP started work with ITDG-B in 1992 when five PEP fieldworkers
attended the food processing training course. Since then, PEP has annually
sent fieldworkers for training. To date, 16 to 20 fieldworkers have attended
and they have trained their beneficiaries and other staff.
PEP realized that many women beneficiaries process food, or could easily
do so. While homestead cultivation and livestock rearing sustain many
households, food processing is the most common supplementary income-
generating activity. In Shariatpur, more women PEP beneficiaries engaged in
food processing than in other non-traditional business, as is shown in Table
2.5.
Table 2.5 Distribution of enterprise activities supported by PEP in Shariatpur
District (as of April 2000)






















Source: Mohammed Aminul Islam, Microenterprise Extension Officer, Shariatpur District, RESP-PEP
Food processing was profitable and a good job generator. A PEP survey
showed food processing as third in profitability, next to fisheries (no. 1) and
jute products (no. 2). It provided better jobs than fisheries and farming partly
because, unlike those activities, food processing and selling did not stop dur-
ing the rainy season and thus provided more workdays.
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Another study showed food processing had good growth potential.
BRDB examined the impact of the project after ten years, asking its
fieldworkers to select five to seven most successful beneficiaries. They
deemed that a successful enterprise was one that had at least three
permanent workers and earned BDT 25000 annual net income. Each
fieldworker, who covered a fairly wide range of beneficiaries, made a subjec-
tive selection. Thirty per cent of those selected were engaged in food
processing.
PEP supported food processing by providing training and financial serv-
ices, including savings and loans, to its beneficiaries. PEP also sold
polyethylene bags for packaging.
Food processing training spanned three to ten days using ITDG-B and
PEP experts. For a ten-day programme, PEP handled eight days while
ITDG-B had the remaining two. The training taught food product technology,
hygiene and business management. Food products covered were those that
were desired locally. For instance, in Shariatpur, channa chur, milk toffee,
doughnuts, murally, pickles (green chilli, garlic, and brinjal), solid pickles or
chutney, pulses, fried nuts and chips were preferred.
From 1995 to 1999, PEP's fieldworkers trained 844 beneficiaries. This did
not include the beneficiaries who were informally trained. In Shariatpur, only
60 of the 148 beneficiaries received formal training. The other 88 were infor-
mally trained and advised.
Beneficiaries received loans from the programme. They also deposited sav-
ings of at least BDT 4 per week. The loans had three tiers:
First loan = BDT 8000
Second loan = BDT 12000
Third loan = BDT 15 000
The loans matured in one year. Nominal interest rate was 20 per cent
charged on a diminishing balance. (Nominal bank interest rate was around 14
per cent per year.)
By early 2000, PEP had disbursed BDT 580 million in loans to 82000 bor-
rowers, with an average amount of BDT 7000. The plan was for the disbursed
amount to increase to BDT 650 million. In 2000, the estimated repayment
rate was around 99 per cent.
Few borrowers were into food processing. In 1996/7, food processors con-
stituted only 1.4 per cent of the borrowers and 1.3 per cent of the loans. Out
of 48000 borrowers in 1996/7, only 661 processed food; out of BDT 280
million disbursed, food processing accounted for only BDT 3.74 million. It
ranked a low 12th of the 15 activities that the credit programme supported.
Activities were ranked according to the number of borrowers, and loan
disbursement rank followed closely:
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Apparently, food processing required minimal investment. One could begin
with equipment costing as low as BDT 1000, plus some regular household
utensils. With BDT 2000 weekly capital, or BDT 350 daily capital, a processor
could earn about BDT 650 per week or BDT 120 per day. This can double
household incomes which, according to surveys conducted in rural Faridpur
and Rajbari by ITDG-B, averaged BDT 21390 annually for Faridpur and
BDT 29410 for Rajbari (or BDT 446 and BDT 613 per week, respectively)
(ITDG 2000).
A sample case (Box 2.1) from ITDG-B's 'IGA profiles' on channa chur
shows revenue and income that could be earned. Although interviewed ben-
eficiaries could not provide detailed calculations, income and capital
investment were similar.
Most of those interviewed took loans to build and improve homes and to
buy land. While they may have used part of their loan to purchase raw mate-
rials and equipment to begin processing food, most used their loans for larger
investments to improve their living conditions. Undoubtedly, food processing
income helped beneficiaries repay their loans, which otherwise would not
have been affordable. Pre-project income was generally sufficient only for
daily sustenance.
Other benefits from food processing support included the following:
• PEP introduced new products. For instance, those who had produced only
channa chur added pickles after learning how to make them from PEP's
training course.
• PEP introduced packaging, including polyethylene bags and glass and plas-
tic bottles. Traditionally foods were stocked in large containers, brought to
the streets, scooped out in small quantities, and served on small sheets of
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Box 2.1 Snack food processing, case example
Moor decides to make channa chur to earn extra income. She buys equipment
totalling BDT 1700, She also buys raw materials from which she can produce
180 kg of channa chur. She sells these in small packets costing BDT 5 each.
From the 180 kg of channa chur, she can make about 900 packets.
She spends approximately four hours per day making channa chur, and her
son goes around the neighbourhood and to the market to sell them. Below are
the estimated costs of equipment and working capital as well as the computa-
tion of Moor's earnings.
Estimated cost of equipment for
making channa chur



























































Source: IGA Profile: Channa Chur, ITDG Bangladesh
For 900 packets, MOOT receives a total revenue of BDT 4500. Subtracting the cost-of raw materials, which
amounted to BDT 3386, Moor's profit comes up to BDT 1115. This represents 12 days' earnings and thus
Noor earned an average of BDT 92 per day or approximately BDT 2230 per month. Noor's income can be
considered typical of many beneficiaries of ITDG-B. See income comparisons in Table 2.8.
aborax, used as a preservative
paper. Proper packaging improved hygiene since food was no longer
exposed to the elements. Storage life of the product also improved, result-
ing in higher income. In April 2000, the Shariatpur District RESP-PEP
microenterprise extension officer5 said that sales increased almost ten
times for some beneficiaries who began packaging their food, even though
they increased their price to cover the packaging cost.
PEP discouraged using harmful ingredients, most commonly orange textile
dye, often added to colour food such as channa chur. As natural food dyes
are expensive and generally unavailable except in Dhaka, processors have
turned to marketing their snack foods in their natural colour, and cus-
tomers have gradually accepted them.
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Common facilities for individual food processors
The Bangladesh Organization for Development Cooperation (BODC)
focuses on the subdistrict of Zanjira, Shariatpur, to support mainly the land-
less poor. It carries out child education, adult education, water and sanitation,
primary health care, and credit and savings programmes. It provides training
courses in awareness building, moral education, legal education, afforesta-
tion, women's development and training for couples. It has been im-
plementing these programmes under a five-year funding commitment from
the South Asia Partnership, Bangladesh. With a staff of 25, it has been train-
ing about 250 people a year.
BODC started its food processing programme in 1999 when it sent three
staff to the ITDG-B training course. Shortly afterwards, it invited ITDG-B to
conduct a five-day training course for 20 beneficiaries in two batches of ten
participants. ITDG-B then assisted BODC in setting up a training centre and
provided tools and equipment. It also provided continuous technical guid-
ance. A food processing unit was created. ITDG-B provided equipment
worth BDT 40000 and BODC provided equipment, land, building and work-
force, worth BDT 60000. Food processing was the only economic activity
BODC was promoting, but it hoped to diversify.
Part of the BODC training was a six-month period in which 15 women ben-
eficiaries learned all the steps involved in producing different foods at the
centre. They also got accustomed to hygienic practices at the centre, such as
wearing aprons and masks when preparing food. After that they were
expected to produce on their own. Ten of the women work in the training cen-
tre regularly and the other five occasionally. BODC purchases the raw
materials and packaging and the women take equal shares of these materials.
They produce and package the food and sell it on their own.
Most of these women spend six to eight hours a day, six days a week in the
centre, from 7 am to 1 pm or 9 am to 3 pm. Each produces around 5 kilograms
of channa chur and some pickles and murally a day. Afterwards, they sell these
in their shops or from house to house. Out of the earnings, they pay the raw
material cost back to BODC weekly. The women depend on the raw materials
that BODC provides. BODC tries to rotate products, providing for two to
three each time: channa chur, murally, milk toffee, pickles and doughnuts.
Table 2.6 shows the cost and prices of products produced and sold by
BODC beneficiaries.
BODC now hopes to phase out the first batch of 15 trainees and take on
another batch. Planning to evolve into a marketing and sales centre, it might
also continue as a common production facility for those who wish to produce
and package there.
BODC lent up to BDT 4000 or BDT 5000 in one-year loans to 2000 bene-
ficiaries. It charged 15 per cent interest. Payments were weekly, monthly or
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Table 2.6 Prices and cost of common food products produced and sold by BODC
trainees
Item Cost (BDT) Price (BDT)
Channa chur 30/kg 40/kg
Murally 30/kg 40/kg
Pickles 20/250 g 25/250 g
Milk toffee 0.50/pc 1/pc
Source: Jagadish Chandra Das, Director, BODC, 4 April 2000
quarterly, depending on beneficiary preference and cash flow. Food process-
ing beneficiaries had little need to invest direct, since raw materials and
equipment were at the centre and the women paid for them after they sold
the food. Those who did not go to the centre regularly worked at home at
minimal cost, as low as BDT 70 per day for raw materials, mitigating the need
for loans. Rather, as with PEP, they used their loans to improve their homes,
buy cattle and acquire land.
Among those interviewed, the food processing income ranged from BDT
70 to BDT 100 per day. For those who previously earned BDT 40 to BDT 100
per day, the addition of this amount doubled their household income. (See the
profit calculation in Table 2.7.)
Table 2.7 Profit calculation of a 60-year-old beneficiary who produced and sold all
her products in one day
Item (price per unit based Profit as stated by Revenue Total cost, based
on Table 2.6) beneficiary (BDT) (BDT) on Table 2.6 (BDT)
Pickles (4 bottles @ BDT 25/bottle)
Murally (1 .5 kg @ BDT 40/kg)














The beneficiary quoted in Table 2.7 normally earned BDT 20 from pickles,
BDT 15 from murally and BDT 50 from channa chur for a BDT 85 profit. She
added that summer was a peak season for snack foods and her income could
double. She had previously worked as a housemaid for BDT 100 per day and
had lived with relatives, but since she started her food processing business she
has been able to buy her own land, build a house and raise some cattle.
Food processing thus helped some of the poorest in Bangladesh to acquire
their own land. The income that they earned from food processing enabled
them to take out loans to purchase land, and repay them.
Promoting group enterprises - BRDB
Other food products such as jam and jelly cannot practicably be pro-
cessed by one person because they require expensive equipment, such as
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crushing machines. Also, very small farm holdings produce a crop
volume smaller than the capacity of even the smallest machines
(Chowdhury and Sarker 1989). Yet farmers periodically experience an over-
supply of crops during harvest, resulting in lower prices and substantial
spoilage. Some of ITDG-B's partners, concerned with the resulting
low income and crop wastage, began promoting processed fruits and
vegetables.
They set up small processing plants, grouped the beneficiaries into an
enterprise, and tried to make processing available to microproducers and the
poor. These enterprises are owned either by the beneficiaries or by the NGO,
which pays its beneficiaries wages. The beneficiary-owned plant was imple-
mented by PEP in Zanjira, Shariatpur, while the NGO-owned plant was
established by MUS in Madhupur, Tangail.
Zanjira is a tomato-producing subdistrict. About 15 000 farmers produce
approximately 40000 tonnes of tomatoes annually, which was almost half the
93000 tonnes reported for all Bangladesh in 1996/7. Because tomatoes are
important to Zanjira, PEP, the Ministry of Agriculture and ITDG-B commis-
sioned a study from 1996 to 1998 to assess the industry. It was found that
during harvest the tomato oversupply would drop the price by as much as 50
per cent. PEP then sought the assistance of ITDG-B to process tomatoes in
Zanjira.
PEP and ITDG-B signed an agreement that between 1998 and 2001, three
batches of women (50 women in all) would be trained in food processing. In
1998, the first batch of 15 women was trained, and they subsequently formed
an association to pioneer a tomato processing enterprise.
The enterprise was established with ITDG-B assistance. It committed BDT
450000 to cover land (BDT 50000), building (BDT 300000), and working
capital (BDT 100000). The 15 women also contributed BDT 50000 (BDT
3000 to BDT 4000 each) for working capital. ITDG-B fabricated and pro-
vided fruit-crushing equipment worth BDT 73500 (Table 2.3).
Since tomatoes are seasonal, the food processing association produces and
sells other food as well: channa chur, pulses, milk toffee, murally, fried nuts,
doughnuts, pickles, her chutney, tomato chutney, tomato ketchup and tomato
sauce for making tomato ketchup. It also uses the tomato-crushing machine
to crush pineapple and guava.
The typical production timetable of the association was as follows:










production of channa chur, milk
toffee, doughnuts, murally,
fried nuts, pickles, chutney,
pulses
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The 15 association members meet formally once or twice a month. The
fieldworkers and extension officers present production and marketing plans
and options to the women for their views and approval, since members are
not honed in these processes and their literacy is low. Because the women
cannot go to market themselves, their sons and PEP officers help them. To
improve sales and increase production volume, the association has agreed to
hire a male marketing officer who is to receive a sales commission.
Half the association's BDT 50000 working capital represents the cost of
finished products, the other half is for raw materials. From sales worth BDT
25000, they realize BDT 35000 in monthly revenue and earn BDT 10 000 net
income. During the summer, when pickles are much in demand, they can net
up to BDT 20000.
The turnover from tomato products is relatively small. The association sells
60 per cent of its tomato products to the wholesale market and 40 per cent to
the retail market. It costs BDT 20 to produce a 300-g bottle of tomato
ketchup - about BDT 5 for the bottle and label, BDT 12 for raw materials,
and BDT 3 for labour and utilities. The wholesale price for a 300-g bottle is
BDT 24 and the retail price BDT 30. The association's average profit is BDT
6.40 per bottle, taking into account the proportions sold to both wholesale
and retail markets.
The association produces two to three metric tons of tomato products dur-
ing the three-month season, which can mean a BDT 50000 profit. The
estimated monthly net income from all products hovers around BDT 27000,
which is expected to increase gradually to BDT 40 000 within three years.
Only 30 per cent of the equipment and labour capacity is now being used,
since each person works for only two to three hours daily. According to the
extension officer, at maximum capacity the association could have two shifts
a day. Under the agreement between PEP and ITDG, the number of associa-
tion women will increase from 15 to 50 within three years.
The income earned from processing food, about BDT 27000, is distributed
equally among the 15 association members, about BDT 1850 each per month.
Many members had been homemakers whose families earned about BDT
1600 a month. The income from the food processing association has doubled
their household income.
The women speak of sending their children to school and improving their
homes after joining the project. Some say they now earn more than their hus-
bands and that they have bought land and built homes for their grown
children. Some land purchases were funded out of loans, but the loans were
paid back from the income from the food businesses.
Other costs, however, have not been considered. These include utilities, the
service of the extension officer who functioned as manager or consultant,
depreciation of the equipment, land and building, and amortization of assets
that had been sold to the association rather than donated. If these were
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deducted from the net income, then the women's share would be eroded.
Table 2.8 compares sample incomes.
Although the women earn substantial income, the comparison supports the
extension officer's view that their time is underused. The income they earn
from what they have invested is less than that of those who operate individ-
ually. It would be even less if other costs were included. Also, their capital
turnover is monthly compared with that of individual operators, who can turn
over their capital every week or two - thus their return to working capital
investment is higher.
The association's operation may be part of the learning curve to develop
markets and organize work. Accordingly, expansion is planned to increase
production value by BDT 50000 to BDT 80000. It is hoped that the recruit-
ment of a marketing officer will support higher production.
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Promoting group enterprises - MUS
MUS was founded in 1986 to help the landless poor in Madhupur (Tangail
District) and Muktagachha (Mymensingh District). It covers 51 villages in the
two districts and reaches 10 000 beneficiaries.
MUS's support strategy comprises group formation, water and sanitation,
child and adult education, motivational family planning, beekeeping, food pro-
cessing, credit, and a trickle-up programme. MUS has 56 staff: two involved in
food processing, five in beekeeping, six in credit and 43 in education.
The food processing programme began in 1996 to assist the pineapple
industry in Madhupur. Pineapples were spoiling in the fields because the
market was glutted. MUS sought ITDG and ATDP (Agro-based Industries
25
and Technology Development Project, a USAID-funded project) assistance
to process pineapple juice, jam and jelly.
ITDG-B provided funds to MUS to purchase equipment, including a
crushing machine and a sealing machine. ITDG-B also provided training in
making jam, jelly, pickles, juice, channa chur and murally, through a five-day
training course that 20 beneficiaries and one staff member attended. ATDP
trained 150 beneficiaries in making jam and jelly.
MUS owns and manages the factory, which for four years was in the house
of the executive director. The factory produces mango pickles, jam and kash-
miri achar (pickles made of fermented mango); pineapple juice, jelly and jam;
garlic pickles; green chilli pickles; jhal moori (snack made of rice husk) and
channa chur.
The production cycle of MUS is as follows:










jam (out of season)
The factory runs on BDT 50000 working capital. Over BDT 100000 has
been invested for the equipment, and the executive director is not paid rent
for his own home space.
MUS uses two salesmen and three agencies to market its products. The fac-
tory earns BDT 19000 in a fair month, 20 per cent of which is profit. Sixty
women beneficiaries, five at a time, work at the factory. Each works two to
three days a week and earns a BDT 20 daily wage.
Their involvement in food processing gives them a minimal wage of BDT
20 per day or around BDT 240 per month, which is a small addition to their
income. Most beneficiary households earn BDT 100 to BDT 200 per day
from pulling rickshaw or sewing kampa (embroidered blankets). Others have
only their tiny homestead to work on and occasionally sew kampa to earn
about BDT 100 per month.
MUS hopes to expand its jam production, but it was using a specially
shaped bottle for the jam, and the manufacturer's supply ran out. MUS has
proposed that ITDG-B assist it in making moulds and equipment for glass
bottles.
Programme assessment




Programme outreach is moderately successful. The 1996 ITDG-B evaluation
of the food training course indicated that the 103 fieldworkers trained from
1990 to 1996 reached over 6000 beneficiaries, 21 per cent of whom have estab-
lished businesses. The average reach per fieldworker was therefore 60
beneficiaries. Extrapolating these figures to the 145 trained as of November
1999, it may be assumed that 8700 beneficiaries were trained and advised and
1830 started businesses. This extrapolation, however, is based on only 22
trainers out of 103, a 15 per cent sampling.
The programme's outreach has been good mainly because of the
favourable supply and demand condition for snack foods. Food processing
requires minimal investment, little working capital and indigenous skills,
making it easy for landless poor and women to do. Good local demand for
snack food and processed fruit (though to a lesser degree since jam and jelly
are more expensive) allows processors to sell right in their own neighbor-
hoods. As women cannot go to the market to sell because they are
constrained by cultural norms, their sons help them to sell the food.
Still, it is not uncommon to find only 5 per cent of an organization's mem-
bers engaged in food processing. This should not be surprising since the
population prefers the traditional activities of cultivation and livestock rear-
ing. Commercial food processing, even on a small scale, requires more daily
responsibility and risk (for example buying raw materials, producing, selling),
a pace many rural people are not used to. Compared with other non-tradi-
tional trades, however, food processing ranks high (Table 2.5).
Food processing helps the poorest of the poor. Some beneficiaries reported
a pre-project BDT 1600 monthly household income, well below the poverty
threshold. Many beneficiaries are landless. In remote areas where markets
are far away, development organizations may take a stronger role in supply-
ing raw materials, packaging and marketing to reach the poorest. By having
services closer to them, women who traditionally are confined to their homes,
without any previous business experience, have easily engaged in this new
trade and have doubled their household income.
Impact
Those interviewed averaged BDT 2240 monthly from food processing (Table
2.8). The 1996 evaluation found the average income was BDT 880 per week
or BDT 3520 per month, an 82 to 140 per cent addition to the BDT 2500
monthly average rural household income for those owning small pieces of
land (ITDG 2000).
Food processing brought in more money than the traditionally preferred
livestock rearing (BDT 7364 annually) or chicken and duck raising (BDT
2000 annually) (Box 2.2).
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Box 2.2 Impact assessment based on the 1996 evaluation
The 1996 evaluation study based its findings on data applying to 1993-96. tt
estimates that the 57 fieldworkers trained during this period have each trained
around 60 persons and that 21 per cent of those trained have set up their enter-
prises. Given a total of 57 trained fieldworkers, the study assumes that 3420
beneficiaries have been trained or advised during the period 1993-96 and that
718 have set up their food processing activity.
Looking at the net income generated by the programme, it was calculated that
each successful operation earns an average profit of BDT 872 per week or
BDT151 per day (calculated based on a 300-day work year) or a total of
BDT 45 344 per year or £756 (using the exchange rate applicable to the period
evaluation was made: BDT 60 - £1).
Considering that the 57 trained during this three-year period have in turn
trained or advised 3420 beneficiaries, 719 (or 21 per cent) of whom set up a
business, the project was able to generate a total income of BDT 31 million or
£515 611 in one year as shown in tire table below. (Note that incomes were
computed for only one year, thus underestimating possible income generated













































Source: Azami et at. 1996 and additional calculations
aThe average inflation rate of 7.8 is applied (average of the 1994/5 and 1995/6 rates) since the
beneficiaries may have been trained or they may haw set up their enterprises any time during the two
years following the 1993/4 training,
"adjusted to inflation rate
Beneficiaries reported that they could send their children to school,
improve their homes and buy land. This is significant, since the projects seek
to improve the lives of landless poor. Women also reported feeling more dig-
nified, with increased income and better homes. Land and houses were
directly funded from loans rather than from income earned from processing
food. However, it was the income from food processing that repaid the loan.
The loan therefore represented advanced income from food processing,
'withdrawn' to finance larger investments.
Food processing training has improved food preparation practices to bene-
fit all consumers. As mentioned, ITDG-B has convinced beneficiaries to stop
using textile dyes, and now channa chur is often marketed in its natural colour.
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At the BODC training centre and the food processing association in
Zanjira, women wear aprons and masks and handle food properly. The intro-
duction of polyethylene bags and glass bottles has improved hygiene since
food is no longer exposed to the elements.
Impact can be improved in group enterprises, however. While the Zanjira
women have realized a 100 per cent increase in income, they do not earn as
much as individual food producers. Their facilities are also underutilized. At
MUS, the volume of production is too little for its 60 beneficiaries, who can
work only two to three days a week and have to look elsewhere for additional
work. This reflects a need for improved business development skills from the
partner organization. ITDG-B might provide such assistance through its
small enterprise unit, as they set out to address this lack of business know-
how at the programme's outset.
Cost effectiveness
The 1996 evaluation calculated the cost effectiveness of the training from
1993 to 1996. Cost was calculated assuming all staff spent 80 per cent of their
time conducting training, except for the project coordinator and the small
enterprise unit, who contributed 10 per cent of their time. Indirect costs, such
as rent, utilities, communication and stationery, were 80 per cent of the total.
Direct costs, such as equipment and meetings, were charged in full.
International travel was omitted since it was not related to the training. From
these assumptions, the calculations shown in Table 2.9 were made:
Table 2.9 Food processing training cost and benefit/cost ratios, 1993-96
1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 Total
Number trained
Total budget (in £)
Cost per trainer (in £)
Cost per beneficiary (in £)
Cost per enterprise (in £)






























Source: Azami et al. 1996; benefit/cost ratio recalculated
The cost per trainer ranged from £632 to £1000. Assuming each trainer
trained an average of 60 beneficiaries, the cost per beneficiary was £10.50 to
£16.80. If 21 per cent of the trained beneficiaries established businesses, then
the cost of training one business was £50 to £80. The programme generated
BDT 31 million or £515600 total income from 1993 to 1996. Against the
£41290 total training cost, the benefit/cost ratio during this period was 12.5
to 1. This demonstrates a positive rate of return for a training programme,
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although it should be noted that it excludes certain costs such as technology
development and monitoring.
The annexe shows the cost of running the food processing programme,
using data from 1998/9, the first year of the programme's second phase and
the only year in the phase with complete data. Costs were estimated for each
activity: technology research and product development, training, monitoring
and evaluation, networking, information dissemination and administration.
Some costs are directly related - for example, as technology research and
product development are inputs to training and information dissemination,
the cost of the research can be divided equally between these two activities.
Monitoring followed up training and can be added to training costs. Only in
the area of training are benefits readily identified. Information dissemination
and networking improved people's knowledge of food processing, but this
cannot be readily measured. The benefit/cost analysis therefore focuses on
training. In 1998 to 1999,15 fieldworkers were trained (Table 2.2). Using the
same assumptions as in the 1996 evaluation, that is, that fieldworkers each
trained 60 beneficiaries, the total number reached was 900 people, of whom
21 per cent or 190 set up their own successful operations (Table 2.10).




Total training expenses (in £) 17374
Cost per trainer (in £) 1158
Cost per beneficiary trained or advised (in £) 19
Cost per enterprise (in £) 92
Total income generated in 1 year (in £) 125668
Benefit/cost ratio 7:1
Given an estimated BDT 49785 per successful producer annual income
(from BDT 45 344 with 1997 inflation rate at 2.63 per cent and 1998 rate at
6.98 per cent), the year 1998/9 generated a total income of BDT 9.4 million
or approximately £125000, based on the 1998 exchange rate of BDT 74.875
to £1 (BBS 1999).6
With the adjusted cost of training at £17 374, the training benefit/cost ratio
was 7:1. The figures were less favourable than those computed for 1993 to
1996 because the training costs included the technology development and
monitoring costs.
Sustain ability
Sustainability can be viewed in terms of the improved capability of local
organizations to run the programmes, the financial viability of the pro-
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grammes, and the growth prospects of the industry being promoted. When
the programme began, few organizations provided training and technical
assistance in food processing, especially secondary food processing. Since
then, more organizations have developed short training sessions for their
beneficiaries, and two have begun conducting the trainers' training course
(BRDB-PEP and the Centre for Mass Education and Sciences). Importantly,
one of these is a government organization with a mandate for rural develop-
ment, with a wide reach and some institutional security and sustainability. It
could replicate the promotive work that ITDG-B now does.
In addition, ITDG-B has facilitated an institution to represent small-scale
food processor interests. It is hoped the FFPED will continue ITDG-B's work
of convening stakeholders, disseminating information and technology, and
advocating for policies.
From 1997 until June 2000, ITDG-B collected fees from partner organiza-
tions at BDT 3000 per participant. For 15 to 18 people, ITDG-B could collect
BDT 45 000, recovering 75 per cent of the cost (see the annexe).
Development organizations trained their beneficiaries for free. However, as
mentioned, some organizations do not favour charging fees to beneficiaries
who are the poorest of the poor.
They argue that training produces long-term payoffs in the form of mar-
ginal income spread over time. Therefore, an organization cannot expect to
cover all its training costs up front. Since the food processing beneficiaries in
Bangladesh were the poorest of the poor, even if they were able to double
their income, they might still be below the poverty line. In April 2000, the
ITDG-B small enterprise unit manager argued that because of the dire
poverty of their beneficiaries, most did not yet have the capability to pay. It is
this capability the enterprise unit hopes to develop.
Food processing seems promising, its purported growth rate being 32 per
cent yearly. Urban eating habits are changing in favour of traditional products
such as channa chur. Many express doubt, however, about the extent to which
small producers can sell their product in the market, given the lack of com-
petitive packaging and the public notion that their products are not hygienic.
Still, there seems to be a niche for small-scale producers. Their snack foods
are important in the local economy and markets. The small operator serves
rural consumers who are not willing or able to buy the big packs that the large
companies produce and sell at BDT 16, but they will buy small quantities at
BDT 8. Children buy even smaller packets, at BDT 2.
Lessons learned
Specialization versus diversification of assistance
ITDG-B provides training, mainly in food processing and some in business
management. It supplements training with field visits where a food
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technologist or project staff member discusses with the partner organizations
any concerns with the product, packaging or marketing. Other business
development services, such as financial assistance, marketing assistance and
raw materials acquisition, are provided mainly by the partner organizations.
ITDG-B mostly focuses on food technology, but considers markets as well.
Marketing is not a problem with the individual operators, who can sell in the
neighborhood or public markets; rather, it is a concern for group enterprises,
which produce and sell in bigger volumes.
ITDG-B could play a bigger role in strengthening partner organizations'
group enterprises. For example, the women with MUS were not earning as
much as they wished. Taking in fewer women to increase the income per per-
son could be considered. In Zanjira, association members received the same
income share despite different management roles. Also, several cost compo-
nents seem to have been overlooked before income is distributed. These
considerations are part of a business analysis, which partner organizations
and their beneficiaries may learn and apply more rigorously.
The small enterprise unit of ITDG-B could play a larger role in improving
business development services of the partner organizations. It now runs a
capability-building programme for NGOs in which it regularly monitors busi-
ness support services and advises on how to improve them. This approach
could be extended to the food processing programme. The small enterprise
unit was assisting 21 NGOs, and only two overlapped with the food process-
ing programme. ITDG-B could use the small enterprise unit to complement
the technical expertise of the food processing, food production and manufac-
turing programmes.
Specialization versus diversification of products
The food processing unit of ITDG-B focuses on snack foods. Each of the many
products developed, however, has its own technology to learn and pass on.
ITDG-B and its partner organizations concluded that a fieldworker can mas-
ter many products, since they learn by doing and the technology is not difficult.
Fieldworkers monitored many livelihoods in addition to making snack
foods (Table 2.5). PEP's approach is notable in that it supported fieldworkers
with district technical experts covering fisheries, livestock, agriculture, veteri-
nary and microenterprise development. Some workers have in fact gained
enough experience to establish their own food processing businesses, or
hoped to do so. These constituted perhaps an overlooked middle-class entre-
preneurial sector emerging from among NGO professionals.
Institutional and market development approach
ITDG-B seeks to develop partner organizations as effective providers of
food processing training. It has identified two organizations that could con-
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duct the trainers' training courses. It has also helped to form a network of
food processor enterprises and NGOs to carry on its networking, advocacy
and information dissemination.
Individual versus group approaches
Group approaches were promoted when large investments were required
to manufacture food products. Processing fruit into jam, jelly and juice was
too expensive to carry out individually. In some communities raw materials
were wasted. Efficiency therefore dictates whether a business will be oper-
ated by an individual or a group. However, group enterprises require stronger
business support since they have more complex business and organizational
needs.
Poverty alleviation versus growth orientation
ITDG-B aims to lift out of poverty the poorest of the poor - peasants having
no or very small landholdings, divorced and widowed women, and those hav-
ing very low income - by bringing technology within their reach.
A product with a large local market, snack food, suited the objective of
reaching more people. By introducing mainly the technology and finding raw
materials and packaging, the beneficiaries could run their own operations and
find their own markets. Because of this, the programme reached many bene-
ficiaries, increased their income, and achieved a reasonably high benefit/cost
ratio.
Some difficult situations required stronger support. Those living in remote
areas had little access to raw materials. Widows with no male helpers did not
have access to markets. Some products, such as jam and jelly, were less suit-
able for individual operations. ITDG-B and its partner organizations have
assisted in purchasing raw materials, setting up common facilities or estab-
lishing group enterprises so that operating costs could be borne by a group of
beneficiaries. Group enterprises have had to achieve a certain scale to be
viable and effectively raise the income of the beneficiaries. Therefore, growth
orientation is essential. ITDG-B and its partners must upgrade their skills for
the more sophisticated requirements of these larger business enterprises.
Notes
1 In 1996 statistics, those with no cultivated area (or functionally landless) and those
cultivating 0.01-0.04 acres of land made up 33.8 per cent of rural households (BBS
1999).
2 The official poverty threshold for Bangladesh was 2122 calories per person per day
or approximately BDT 4790 (£63) per person per year, or BDT 400 (£5) per month.
The food threshold was 1805 calories per day or BDT 2810 (£37) per person per
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year or BDT 234 (£3) per month. For a family of six, the poverty threshold was
BDT 2400 (£30) per month while the food threshold was BDT 1404 (£18) per
month.
3 These two subsectors have been completely turned over to partner organizations
(based on interviews with Shaheda Azami, 2 April 2000 and S.A. Wahab, 8 April
2000).
4 Other notable studies done under the project were the 1996 evaluation of the pro-
gramme (Azami et al. 1996), the field survey of NGOs enquiring into training needs
and preferred training methods (Chowdhury and Azami 1996) - the preparatory
research done for the 1998 project document (ITDG 1998).
5 Mohammed Aminul Islam.
6 Exchange rates for Bangladesh taka (BDT):





Azami, S., S. Brough and M. Battcock (1996) Training for livelihood security: a report
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[BBS] Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1999) Statistical Pocketbook: Bangladesh
1998, Bureau of Statistics, Bangladesh.
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Annexe: Programme expenses by component
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3 Creating export markets for Bolivia's dry
beans
HEATHER RAWLINSON and PAMELA FEHR
Introduction - the history of ASOMEX
THE STORY OF HOW the commercial marketing company ASOMEX came
about begins several years before the company was established. In 1986
MEDA helped to develop a new crop among smallholder colonizer farmers
in the eastern Bolivian lowland province of Santa Cruz.1
Edible beans were previously barely known in the Santa Cruz region. By
adopting bean cultivation as a winter crop, smallholder farmers found an
excellent complement to their existing crops grown in the summer. They were
able to nearly double their incomes. Part of MEDA's work with the bean
project was to take the lead in opening a first-time export market for Bolivian
beans in Brazil. This new market resulted in a great deal of interest on the
part of small-scale rural producers in the region. In 1990, various producer
groups who came together to build economies of scale formed the National
Association of Bean Producers, ASOPROF.
ASOPROF is made up of 17 farmer cooperatives and the National
Women's Federation; it represents 1800 members, all engaged in bean pro-
duction.2 ASOPROF became an important body for agricultural marketing in
the Santa Cruz region. However, under Bolivian law its status as an associa-
tion soon brought it into conflict with legal limitations that prevented it from
exporting for profit. Facing this predicament, the plan arose to create an
independent for-profit marketing company that could service all of
ASOPROF's export orders and eventually diversify into other products.
At the same time as this need for a marketing company arose in ASO-
PROF, MEDA was deepening its understanding of and interest in the
marketing needs of small-scale producers. MEDA has a long history in
Bolivia of offering credit, technical assistance and marketing services to rural
and urban small-scale entrepreneurs. Through examining this history, it
became clear that marketing was an important element for assistance pro-
grammes. Limited market access was preventing small entrepreneurs from
reaching their potential. MEDA saw the need to create a marketing service
for small producers - a service that would help them find new markets, par-
ticularly export markets, provide them with crucial market information, and
assist them with the logistics involved in marketing and exporting.
In 1993, ASOPROF and MEDA came together to form a company that
could respond to both sets of needs. ASOMEX was legally incorporated in
Santa Cruz, Bolivia, on 3 May 1993.
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ASOMEX began with two primary objectives: 1) to export everything
ASOPROF produced, and 2) to search out markets for new products and
provide marketing services for other small-scale producers.
MEDA's goal for ASOMEX was to increase the income of small-scale
urban and rural producers by offering competitive and profitable marketing
and exporting services.
The start-up funds for ASOMEX were raised entirely by selling company
shares. ASOMEX was approved for the sale of US$40000 worth of shares.
ASOPROF purchased 58.09 per cent of the shares, MEDA held 17.45 per
cent and individual shareholders owned the remaining 24.46 per cent.
From day one, ASOMEX has been financed entirely by equity and debt as a
private sector company. Fees for marketing services are set to include a profit
margin.
As the primary shareholders in ASOMEX, MEDA and ASOPROF
worked together in designing the structure of the new company and devel-
oping a business plan. With its wealth of experience in business development,
MEDA provided vital guidance in structuring the company, designing its
internal statutes and sparking the initial planning. ASOPROF, having already
worked in export marketing, provided practical experience that got the
company off the ground (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Getting started: ASOMEX activities in the first three years
1993 1994 1995
ASOMEX formed
Beans exported to Brazil
and Japan
Acted as marketing agent
for certified corn seed
Continued bean exports
to Brazil and Japan
Continued bean exports to
Brazil, Japan and Colombia
New bean variety exported Continued work with PRISMA
to Colombia
Continued work marketing
Marketed local rice broad beans







In 1993 ASOMEX began by exporting ASOPROF edible beans to Brazil
and Japan - an activity that has continued each year since. In its first year
ASOMEX also acted as a marketing agent for certified corn seed, another
operation it took over from ASOPROF. In 1994 ASOMEX began exporting
haba beans (broad beans) for new producer clients and sent new red bean
varieties to Colombia for ASOPROF. That year also marked the beginning of
37
ASOMEX's work in local rice marketing when it assisted a group of rice pro-
ducers in supplying rice to a major supermarket outlet in Santa Cruz.
MEDA's PRISMA programme (Microenterprise Incentives and Support
Programme) launched a marketing project through ASOMEX in 1994-96,
focusing on small furniture and textile producers.3 Currently MEDA is
involved in a project called PROCOR (Rural Marketing Project), which
works with a number of small producer associations around Bolivia.
ASOMEX is helping these associations to identify markets for their target
products and is bringing market information to the producers. This work has
opened up many possibilities for ASOMEX to develop new producer-client
relationships for the future.
ASOPROF remains the largest client, but ASOMEX is actively seeking to
diversify through new producer clients in new product lines. ASOMEX has
developed strength in marketing agricultural products, but it remains open to
working in other product lines as well. Past experience with other products
has been somewhat profitable; however, not all of the variables have existed
to make these products as lucrative for ASOMEX as beans have been (lack
of market knowledge on ASOMEX's part, insufficient supply and economies
of scale, and inability or unwillingness of the producer to pay for service, for
example). Through experience, ASOMEX has learned that one strategy con-
tributing to its success is to work primarily with associations of small
producers rather than with individuals. Nonetheless, working with goods and
services of small producers remains a challenge.4
The business development services package
Package content
ASOMEX provides specialized business development services, with the goal
of increasing incomes of small-scale urban and rural producers by offering
competitive marketing and export services. In responding to the needs of its
producer clients, ASOMEX has designed three different types of customized
marketing services:
• Export processing service. ASOMEX currently serves its client ASOPROF
by handling all the details of transferring the sale-ready product to its final
destination. ASOMEX completes the necessary steps required for success-
ful exporting, including documentation, logistics, transport arrangements
and financial arrangements with the buyer. The sale occurs between the
client and the buyer, with ASOMEX providing the export processing serv-
ice. Depending on the need of the client, ASOMEX may or may not be
involved in identifying foreign buyers.
• Intermediary service. ASOMEX aims to bring a fair price to producers.
Acting as an intermediary, ASOMEX buys the producers' product and in
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turn sells it (usually exports it) for a higher price. ASOMEX has this type
of relationship with ASOHABA, the Asociacion de Productores de Haba
(a Bolivian association of broad bean producers, completely unrelated to
ASOPROF). The intermediary service was adopted in response to the
demands of clients who wanted a lower risk option and freedom from
responsibility in the export process.
• Brokering service. The service facilitates the process of buying and selling
by doing market research and developing contacts to bring buyers and sell-
ers together. In this situation, ASOMEX does not buy the products but
simply facilitates the process, collecting a commission on sales that result
from its work. This is the latest of the three services to be adopted,
responding to the demand of new clients who want research and contact
information while maintaining complete autonomy and control over the
sale of their product.
The above three services are moderately flexible, and ASOMEX negotiates
appropriate services to meet the unique needs of each new client.
It is important that ASOMEX continues to develop and strengthen its
service package. To reduce the risk that depending on one client (ASO-
PROF) created, to stabilize cash flows, and to provide a better return to
shareholders, ASOMEX has devoted considerable effort to diversification.
Clients, product lines and forms of marketing services have all been examined
and various modifications made, such as adding intermediary and brokering
services, taking a more active role in market research, identifying buyers, pro-
viding market information and assisting in the formation of new distribution
and operations systems.
All ASOMEX stakeholders agree that it is far more difficult and costly to
work with small producers than with large producers. Many problems can
arise with small-scale producers, including unpredictable quantities of pro-
duction, poor product quality, product storage problems, non-standardized
products and poor administration. To cope with these costly challenges,
ASOMEX works primarily with producer groups and associations.
Specialization versus diversification
Much thought has gone into the service package that ASOMEX offers. Over
the years, the company has learned that diversification of product lines is
essential to meet buyer-client demands (that is, offering intermediary services
as well as brokering and export processing). ASOMEX also has plans to
diversify its producer-client base and is looking into marketing some new
agricultural products. These are all important strategies towards developing
good service, although ASOMEX has in fact remained focused or specialized
primarily in agricultural commodity trading and marketing. It consistently
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provides services in one area of the production and marketing process -
exporting. It expects to remain specialized in this area, wherein lies its knowl-
edge and expertise and where it feels it has the most to offer.
The local development context
ASOMEX is playing an important development role in several ways. In the
past decade, there has been a boom in the number of programmes and com-
panies in Bolivia serving urban micro- and small enterprises. In fact,
microcredit has become so prevalent that competition is stiff among the
providers. Technical and business management assistance has also become
common, yet marketing services remain an area nearly void of intervention.
ASOMEX plays another role in local economic development by bringing
fair prices to small producers. It is common for other intermediaries to col-
laborate in setting the producer prices very low. Though operating on a
for-profit basis, ASOMEX maintains a concern for the welfare of the pro-
ducers and works to offer them the best possible price for their products
while still maintaining a profit margin.5 Providing the best possible price
helps generate demand for the service and promotes longer-term producer-
client loyalty towards ASOMEX. It can also introduce competition into the
intermediary market, often forcing up producer prices.
ASOMEX is contributing towards reducing rural poverty by focusing its
efforts on agricultural marketing activities - the rural poor are primarily
small agricultural producers.6
Marketing and delivering the business development services package
Competitive and complementary services
Various export companies existed at the time that ASOMEX started, and
they are still operating. However, none specialized in serving small producers.
ASOPROF's experiences with these competitors motivated it to form its own
marketing company. The new company, ASOMEX, would be guaranteed to
have at least the business of its shareholder-client ASOPROF, providing
ASOMEX with a competitive advantage.
Pricing strategy alone is often not sufficient to win the business of rural
clients in the face of competition from other intermediaries. ASOMEX has
found that its agricultural producers often face the dilemma of another inter-
mediary arriving before them and offering to buy the product on the spot. In
impoverished regions, the first offer of immediate cash can be very appealing.
Intermediaries, however, generally buy only one bean variety, carioca, to sell
to the Brazilian market. ASOPROF began working with different bean vari-
eties that would be destined for markets other than Brazil. Intermediaries
were unable to secure export channels to distant countries, and so producers
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sold their new varieties to ASOMEX. ASOMEX tried briefly to work with
intermediaries; however, it was not a positive experience.
Currently two new companies are in direct competition with ASOMEX -
Bolsemilla and Bolivian Shoji. These companies export a number of products,
including beans; they have developed advanced services and maintain a strong
financial base. Both companies opened after ASOMEX, with beans as their
initial product. While ASOMEX has no direct relationship with this competi-
tion, it can be inferred that by demonstrating a feasible market for edible
beans, ASOMEX has sparked improved system capacity. It can be further sug-
gested that this has positive effects for producers and the industry itself.
Complementary services exist for ASOMEX and its producer clients.
Credit and technical assistance are often provided to the producers through
their associations and are sometimes also available through NGO projects
such as MEDA's PROCOR project. Within the marketing and exporting
process, complementary services are also available. ASOMEX contracts out
various elements of the marketing process to other companies, including land
and port transportation services and customs paperwork.
Promotion strategy
ASOMEX strives to be a demand-driven company, demand for its services
coming from both buyers and producers. Buyer demand is essential, as with-
out market interest in its products, ASOMEX would not exist. Producer
clients are also important because they supply the product to meet buyer
demand. The key for ASOMEX is to search continuously for new buyer
clients, ensuring an end market for its products, while at the same time main-
taining good relationships with its producer clients.
ASOMEX is developing a new source of clients through another MEDA
project, PROCOR. MEDA is working with a number of rural associations
and cooperatives of small producers to help them develop new crops with
export potential. ASOMEX is helping to carry out market research for the
project and is also the channel through which many of these producer groups
are choosing to market their products.
Pricing strategy
ASOMEX sets the price for its services with the goal of cost recovery and
profit in mind, but at the same time it tries to maintain longer-term loyalty of
the producers. In the export order processing service, ASOMEX sets its price
as a percentage of the sales made - 3 per cent of sales with ASOPROF.
When ASOMEX provides brokering services, it walks a fine line with the
price it can charge. Once ASOMEX has brought a buyer and a seller
together, the two can be tempted to cut themselves off from ASOMEX and
continue their business independently. Therefore, in brokering, ASOMEX
attempts to set the price low enough to maintain client loyalty but still to
make money. The aim is to make a profit by turning over a high volume.
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Local and international market effects
International markets affect ASOMEX in many ways. Other countries' tariffs
and import regulations are important factors. For example, Venezuela has
recently dropped its tariff on imported soybeans from Brazil and Argentina,
which puts Bolivian soybean producers at a significant disadvantage and
could cause Bolivian companies previously involved with soybeans to shift
their interest and production to areas in which ASOMEX has found a niche.
Exchange rate movements also affect ASOMEX. Last year, a change in the
Colombian rate affected the country's level of bean imports from Bolivia,
thus having a direct impact on Bolivia's export prices. These changing market
conditions play a significant role in ASOMEX's profits or losses. To protect
itself against major losses incurred from market shifts, ASOMEX has diver-
sified its services and is pursuing diversified bases of client and product, to
reduce the risk further.
The work of ASOMEX can also have an impact on local markets. Producer
prices are affected, usually positively, by the fact that ASOMEX is exporting.
Although ASOMEX offers direct competition to local intermediaries, it is
furthering its goal of meeting the needs of small producers and increasing
their incomes.
ASOMEX management and its stakeholders
ASOMEX and MEDA
MEDA has played an important role in starting ASOMEX and in guiding it
towards meeting its objectives, becoming a stronger more stable company
and achieving profitability. Here we examine the philosophy, objectives and
approach of MEDA, to better see ASOMEX in the context of its NGO
support.
The mandate of MEDA's International Economic Development division is
'to serve the poor through the development of businesses'. MEDA aims to
work with the poorest of the economically active. A central goal of the
MEDA Bolivia Country Management Unit is 'to serve the marketing, finan-
cial and economic needs of small rural and urban producers'. MEDA aims to
establish sustainable businesses. While recognizing that the development
agenda is much more than economic development and that businesses are
not always the best vehicle for achieving development goals, MEDA believes
that in many cases establishing a profitable business can be an invaluable
foundation on which to build other social and economic gains.7 This is the phi-
losophy behind MEDA's involvement in ASOMEX.
MEDA's projects typically move through a progression of three stages.
First is a project stage, where MEDA tests, usually for two years, the project's
assumptions and potential for becoming a business. The programme stage,
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usually three to five years, develops the project to the point where it can
become an independent business, testing its capacity to recover its own
costs. The business stage works to balance the different goals of profitability
and development. The company assumes financial responsibility, and
MEDA terminates its role as a donor and takes on the role of a business
partner.8
In examining the history of ASOMEX, it can be seen that the marketing
work of ASOMEX underwent its transition through the project and pro-
gramme stages while still a part of ASOPROE Thus, with the birth of the
company ASOMEX, MEDA moved this small-producer marketing idea into
its business stage.
MEDA's initial investment in ASOMEX was carried out through MEDA's
Global Investment Fund (GIF), based in North America. The fund provides
investment funds to small and medium-sized businesses in developing coun-
tries that serve the needs of the poor. North American investors affiliated
with MEDA provide the investment funds. Many of the businesses in which
GIF invests are former MEDA programmes that have graduated to the busi-
ness stage; thus ASOMEX was an obvious candidate.
MEDA has also played an important role in developing ASOMEX. Its pro-
grammes in agriculture and rural development provided a product - beans -
found a market for that product, and developed a solid base of producers and
production technology. In essence, MEDA contributed to the development of
a successful system, which ASOMEX has taken advantage of and benefited
from.9
At start-up, MEDA placed an equity investment in ASOMEX and pro-
vided support for the company's legal formation. Further along in its life,
MEDA also extended a line of credit to the company through its revolving
loan fund, in the amount of US$30 000 over two years at 12 per cent, which
has already been paid back. MEDA sits on the ASOMEX board, thus assum-
ing an important role in guiding and advising ASOMEX on how to achieve
profitability. As a major shareholder, MEDA has a vested interest in
ASOMEX's future as a profitable business.
In demonstrating ASOMEX's contribution to the broad development
objectives of MEDA, it is best to examine data created in conjunction with
ASOPROF (Table 3.2). Although the impact indicators in the table were cre-
ated for ASOPROF, they describe ASOMEX's impact. See also the 'Impact'
section.
MEDA's exit strategy for ASOMEX involves waiting (while continuing its
guidance role as a shareholder) until the company achieves sufficient prof-
itability and stability to attract other investors interested in buying it out.
There is no specified period, and MEDA is waiting to see how ASOMEX
fares over the next couple of years. MEDA's GIF will ultimately decide when
MEDA sells its shares in the company.
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Table 3.2 MEDA's impact indicators for ASOPROF and ASOMEX
Impact FY1994 FY1995 FY1996
Families assisted (no.)
Full-time, year-round jobs created (no.)
Average client net equity increase (US$)a
Total client net equity increase (US$)b
Client net equity increase divided by
invested capital
Total MEDA programme cost (US$)






















Source: MEDA Bolivia annual evaluation, fiscal year 1996
a'Client' refers to farm family. Average client net equity increase represents the net margin that the farmer
receives from planting one hectare of beans.
bThe average client net equity increase multiplied by the number of families assisted
ASOMEX and its shareholders
All the investment funds necessary to start ASOMEX were gained through
the sale of shares in the company. Approximately US$40 000 in shares were
sold, with prices set by law and approved by the shareholders themselves.
These shareholders are the key source of external support for ASOMEX, as
they provide guidance, planning and management input for the company. In
theory, this of course is based not on donor mentality but on the shareholder's
self-interest in the profitability of the company. ASOMEX did in fact distrib-
ute dividends to its shareholders (in 1995), paying them 50 per cent of the
year's profits, and capitalizing the other 50 per cent. Currently, ASOPROF
owns 58.09 per cent of the shares in ASOMEX, MEDA 17.45 per cent, and
individual shareholders a total of 24.46 per cent.
The ASOMEX board of directors is made up of three shareholder repre-
sentatives: the MEDA Bolivia director, the ASOPROF director, and the
representative of the individual shareholders, who is also the current man-
ager of ASOMEX. Board of directors meetings are supposed to be held at
least once every three months but have occurred less frequently. MEDA is
committed to improving the coordination and quality of these meetings,
which are beginning to occur monthly. Meetings of all shareholders are set to
occur once a year.
Generally, the monitoring and planning processes have been weak.
ASOMEX management is responsible for providing its board of directors
with monthly financial statements and monthly export figures. On many occa-
sions there were no numbers to present, and meetings were not held. Similar
evidence of poor monitoring and planning is that the annual shareholders
meetings have not been held in several years. ASOMEX has not been pro-
viding a regular annual report to shareholders, as it should.
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A key weakness in the structure of ASOMEX's ownership has led to these
problems. Shareholders with any significant ownership in the company are a
small circle of four closely connected institutions and individuals. This situa-
tion is clearly not in the best interest of ASOMEX. Having a larger number
of independent individual shareholders with a greater share in company own-
ership could enhance the company's performance.
ASOMEX and its personnel
ASOMEX initially shared a management team with ASOPROF, consisting of
director, accountant and secretary. This gave the company the benefit of a
team with years of experience working in the bean business. However, the
shared staffing arrangement also had its drawbacks, and in retrospect was
probably a mistake. ASOMEX was held back from becoming independent,
and decisions were made that favoured ASOPROF, sometimes to the detri-
ment of ASOMEX. Staff loyalties naturally lay closer to ASOPROF; finances
were blurred, and ASOMEX suffered from poor financial records and
accounting.
Finally, in 1997, with encouragement from its board of directors, ASOMEX
established an independent management team. The biggest push came from
MEDA, with ASOPROF agreeing. ASOMEX acquired its own staff team of
three - manager, secretary-accountant and export specialist. In early 1998,
after having encountered several staff problems, ASOMEX hired a new
team. The manager, who owned close to 10 per cent of the shares in the com-
pany, was identified from among the shareholders.
Although it was a good move, transition to independence was difficult. It
became clear that ASOMEX had been absorbing some costs that rightfully
belonged to ASOPROF. ASOPROF was also collecting all the government
export incentive money for exports channelled through ASOMEX. In deal-
ing with this and other issues, ASOPROF exerted a great deal of pressure.
This pressure was compounded by the fact that ASOPROF was both the
majority shareholder and the largest client. MEDA found itself caught up in
trying to maintain good terms with ASOPROF for continued cooperation in
common projects and funding sources, while at the same time trying to act in
the best interests of its company, ASOMEX.
At present only the manager can qualify for any financial incentive based
on performance. The board of directors plans to change the current bonus
structure to a percentage of profit. The division of labour in the management
team does not make it appropriate to give other employees profit-based
incentives.10 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that anyone in that sector or
industry is paid on commission.
At this point, the manager has identified that job satisfaction is a far more
effective form of motivating staff. ASOMEX provides its staff with a pleasant
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work environment, good working conditions, a fair approach towards employ-
ees, and the opportunity to learn as part of the work. This is of significant value,
given the difficult conditions prevalent in many other workplaces in the area.
ASOMEX and its producer clients
Briefly introduced here are the major ASOMEX clients, their relationship to
ASOMEX, and key factors contributing to the success that ASOMEX has
had in marketing and exporting. Information on client impact and satisfaction
with BDS is detailed in the 'Impact' section in 'Best practices'.
ASOMEX clients are associations of producers. Current clients are:
• ASOPROF (Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Frijol - National
Association of Bean Producers), 1800 members. ASOPROF was started
through MEDA's work in introducing edible beans to the lowlands of
Bolivia as a winter crop. Its objective is to improve the socio-economic con-
ditions of small-scale peasant producers. All of ASOPROF's product is
exported through ASOMEX, and has been since day one that ASOMEX
was set up.
• ASOHABA (Asociacion de Productores de Haba - Association of Broad
Bean Producers), 304 members. ASOHABA is a newer association of
broad bean producers in the region of Potosi. Its producers live in 19 dif-
ferent highland communities. ASOHABA, which began in 1995 with
financial assistance from the European Union, works with MEDA's PRO-
COR programme. ASOMEX is confident that ASOHABA has a
high-quality product with good export potential despite the management
difficulties it has experienced.
• Fernheim (Paraguayan Mennonite peanut producers), approximately 5000
farmers. Fernheim has just begun to market through ASOMEX, which is
acting as its broker, setting up Fernheim with buyers in the Andean mar-
ket. With a potential for marketing 500 tonnes of peanuts annually,
Fernheim could become a very valuable client for ASOMEX.
• ASOFAM (Asociacion Nacional de Fabricantes Artesanos de Muebles -
Association of Artisan Furniture Makers), 26 highly skilled artisans who
construct high-quality, high-end furniture, is a past client. The association is
hoping to expand its exports in the near future and is again looking to
ASOMEX as one of its main possibilities for a marketing company.
Although no direct transactions have yet occurred, a relationship is develop-
ing with another potential client:
• FEDEAGRO (Federacion de Asociaciones Agropecuarias - Federation of
Associations of Agricultural Producers), 732 small-scale farmer members
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in approximately 15 different communities in the state of Chuquisaca. The
farmers produce corn, peanuts, beans and hot peppers, and FEDEAGRO
provides technical assistance and a common marketing entity.
Overall, ASOMEX believes that clients should have the following key fac-
tors for success:
ability to produce a high-quality product
dependability to meet ASOMEX and buyer deadlines
dependability to meet buyer demand and product specifications
a strong management system and an efficient production process
ASOMEX's contribution in bringing producers a fair price for their
product.
Although none of ASOMEX's clients has had a perfect record in all of
these areas, all are aware of these important factors and are working to inte-
grate them into their organizations.
Best practices
Financial strategy
ASOMEX's structural beginnings were an important element in determining
its financial strategy. The services that ASOMEX now provides were initially
carried out in a more limited form under MEDA's observation and supervi-
sion, within ASOPROE Thus, before the BDS package was developed to the
point of ASOMEX becoming a self-sufficient company, it had the benefit of
starting out and developing within an association, aided by grant money from
MEDA and other NGOs (Lutheran World Relief and Catholic Relief
Services). The feasibility of forming a marketing company to serve ASO-
PROF and others had already been shown to be financially viable. Debt
incurred in the development and learning stages stayed with ASOPROF,
enabling ASOMEX to begin with a clean financial slate.
ASOMEX's entire start-up capital was raised by selling company shares.
No grants or donations were incurred to finance it as a separate company. Its
six shareholders have forced ASOMEX to be financially accountable and
have put it under constant pressure to make a profit; development objectives
take second place.
The current financial strategy
ASOMEX's financial strategy comprises a variety of elements, some of which
the company has followed since its initiation and others that have been
learned along the way. One key element is its 'bare-bones' operation.
ASOMEX has minimal operating costs, a staff of three and a shared office.
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ASOMEX keeps its services focused. It sets prices to recover 100 per cent
of the costs and achieve a profit margin. Financial records show losses for
three of the six years for the company; however, this is not related to incor-
rect price setting. Rather, the losses can be attributed primarily to
ASOPROF's low production volume during several poor growing seasons
and a number of poor management decisions.
Maintaining its commitment to work with small producers, ASOMEX
relies on their associations to minimize costs. The association bears the cost
and effort needed to coordinate quality work of the individuals and to gather
the finished product. By choosing clients who have developed a good capac-
ity for marketing and exporting, ASOMEX can save itself the costs of trying
to work with ill-equipped producers.
ASOMEX presently faces severe financial constraints. It needs to diversify
yet needs significant funds to take advantage of new opportunities as an
intermediary and export processor, where capital demands are high up front.
In ASOPROF's special relationship with ASOMEX, ASOPROF allows
ASOMEX to make use of some of its own working capital in carrying out the
export processing, resulting in further financial dependence. Also, ASOMEX
exports follow ASOPROF's harvests, and it has incurred losses when ASO-
PROF did not produce as expected (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Its key strategy
to avoid seasonal lulls and losses is to pursue a broader product and client
base, focusing on agricultural products and adding medium-scale producers.
Analysis of profitability
ASOMEX has demonstrated an ability to recover costs and sustain itself
financially in three of its six years of operation. Its effectiveness, however,
is difficult to assess. Until 1997, ASOMEX was operated jointly with
Figure 3.1 ASOMEX's value of monthly exports, fiscal year 1997/8
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Figure 3.2 ASOMEX bean exports, fiscal years 1994-98 (volume)
Source: ASOMEX annual evaluation report 1998
ASOPROF; financial records were poorly kept and somewhat distorted
because of an unclear division between the two institutions.
A major factor making the financial records of limited value in providing
cost-effectiveness indicators is Bolivia's tax incentive and export bonus struc-
ture, which seems to promote some rather unconventional accounting
practices. The quantity of export bonus received is determined by the amount
of expense incurred in the export. This is an incentive to overstate costs of
export and weakens the incentive to minimize costs.
ASOMEX does not record costs and revenues as they pertain to each of
the three types of services offered, or the elements within each. It is therefore
not possible to discuss the cost effectiveness of each type of service individu-
ally. ASOMEX cannot say conclusively which of its services are most
profitable, or if some are incurring losses.
Company strengths in achieving cost efficiency lie in 1) a bare-bones oper-
ation, 2) the highly focused BDS package, 3) its history of a cost-recovery
pricing strategy, 4) carefully chosen producer-association clients, and 5) the
company's commitment to devising new strategies to improve itself.
Profits have been unstable, in large part because of the overdependence on
ASOPROF as the major client (Figure 3.3). The profit fluctuations of
ASOMEX reflect the trends of ASOPROF, as well as some poor interinsti-
tutional accounting and management practices. For example, in 1997
ASOMEX would have shown a profit; however, it was discovered that the
company had not recorded a past loan of US$40 000. The entire amount was
written down in 1997.
The value of total equity in ASOMEX started out strong with good profits
in its first full year of operation, 1994 (Figure 3.4). However, total equity
started to erode as the company failed to diversify its base of producer clients,
and it experienced losses.
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Figure 3.3 ASOMEX net profit, fiscal years 1993-98. Based on ASOMEX
Estados Financieros 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
The trend in ASOMEX's debt:equity ratio has been upward (Figure 3.5).This
is the result of the combined effect of assuming higher levels of debt, accu-
mulated to provide new operating capital in years of insufficient profit or of
losses.
Figure 3.4 ASOMEX total equity, fiscal years 1993-98. Based on ASOMEX
Estados Financieros 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
The company's return on equity has not fared well. Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3
show that ASOMEX has not been profitable in three years of negative
returns.
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Figure 3.5 ASOMEX debtequity ratio, fiscal years 1993-98, Source: ASOMEX
Estados Financiers 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
Figure 3.6 ASOMEX return on equity, fiscal years 1993-98. Based on ASOMEX
Estados Financieros 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998
Table 3.3 Financial indicator summary, fiscal years 1993-98
Year Net profit Total equity Return on equity Total liability Debtequity ratio





































ASOMEX has not fared particularly well in meeting its annual targets (Table
3.4). Because 1997 was the first year with a reasonably reliable accounting
system and with all financial data available, 1997 is taken as an example.11
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Table 3.4 ASOMEX target performance (all three categories of service are included)
Performance Indicators FY 1997 target FY 1997 actual Percentage of target
Value of sales (US$)
COG sold






































As reported in MEDA's annual evaluation report for 1997
ASOMEX faced considerable management challenges during the year
(MEDA financial year July 1996-June 1997), and only in the third quarter did
MEDA receive financial information from the company. This, coupled with
poor climatic conditions that negatively affected bean production, resulted in
less than desirable performance for the year (Table 3. 4).
It certainly would not be accurate to say that ASOMEX has operated at an
optimum of cost efficiency. In fact, the value of the company has been drop-
ping rather than increasing.
Evidently, a number of factors have contributed to why ASOMEX
has not achieved more financial success and better cost effectiveness.
All of ASOMEX's major stakeholders now agree that ASOMEX
would have run more efficiently if it had had an independent
administrative team much earlier in its life. A separate accounting
system would have helped the company immensely, and tighter supervision
and monitoring of the company's operation and costs would probably have
made ASOMEX more efficient, and might have helped to avoid some of its
losses.
ASOMEX now has its own accountant, who has greatly improved the
quality of the company's financial records. A much better financial monitor-
ing process is now in place, with more accurate, timely accounts. The
company continues to search for more producer clients and is exploring
avenues through which to secure more working capital. The current man-
agement is making considerable effort in many of the problem areas and is
confident that change will make ASOMEX profitable once again. Like many
young companies, ASOMEX has had its share of financial challenges and is
still on a learning curve. Its shareholders are willing to give it more time to
climb out of the business-cycle downturn that it has faced recently, and will





The associations that ASOMEX serves represent many small and medium-
sized producers who, in turn, represent entire families that are benefiting
from the marketing work of ASOMEX. Table 3.5 estimates the magnitude of
ASOMEX's impact, by multiplying the number of producer members
(mostly rural men) by a conservative estimate of the size of a Bolivian family.
Table 3.5 ASOMEX clientele









































aFernheim is not in the target group because it is made up of medium-scale producers and located outside
Bolivia, in Paraguay.
ASOMEX's target group is very broad - Bolivian small producers. The
company has decided to focus its efforts on agricultural marketing, which
reaches the majority of Bolivia's rural population. Table 3.6 gives a general
idea of the rural population in areas where ASOMEX is working, and the
percentage of the population with which it works.
Table 3.6 Percentage of target group served, by region
State Province 1992 rural 1998 rural
population population
(no.) (est. no.)
Target population Local target










































1992 rural population figures, with estimated population figures for 1998.
aTarget population served is based on the number of client association families in the region, multiplied by the
average family size. (Sources of statistics: PROCOR Diagnosticos Socioeconomicos, MEDA, FDC and CIDA,
1998; Estadfsticas Socio-Economicas 1996; Muller y Asociados 1997.)
It is also important to note that the outreach of ASOMEX goes beyond the
numbers of association members receiving its marketing services. Often the
producer associations will buy the produce of non-member producers to
53
bring their volume up, allowing more people to benefit from the marketing
service. Furthermore, when ASOMEX introduces a higher price for the pro-
ducers' product than other intermediaries normally offer, the effect is an
overall increase in the price for producers, thus indirectly benefiting non-
member small-scale producers as well.
Demographics and socio-economic condition of clients
ASOMEX has not studied the demographic variables of the population it
serves. As a profit-oriented company, it does not track client demographics or
socio-economic variables.12 ASOMEX is certainly generally aware of the
conditions of poverty that prevail in the areas in which it works, and this
awareness forms much of the motivation for the company's existence.
For this case study, general socio-economic indicators have been gathered
for some of the regions in which ASOMEX has active clients. Although the
statistics presented are not specifically based on ASOMEX producers, they
do help to paint a general picture of the conditions that people in those com-
munities face.13 The producer associations with which ASOMEX works
represent typical small campesino producers in the regions highlighted below.
Two communities and a province are presented as samples of socio-economic
conditions for each of three ASOMEX client associations (Table 3.7).14
Most producers in the rural areas of Santa Cruz where ASOPROF works
have more land than farmers elsewhere in the country. Average producers
being served in this region have between 20 and 50 hectares per family,
although not all of the land may be under cultivation at any one time. This is
in contrast to regions such as Chuquisaca, where average land ownership is
between 0 and 20 hectares. The members of ASOHABA and FEDEAGRO
are more representative of the level of poverty of the average Bolivian rural
small-scale producer. ASOFAM, however, although it had humble begin-
nings, has become very successful and is best classified as urban middle class.
Client impact and benefits
As ASOPROF is the primary client of ASOMEX and is the company's sus-
tenance, the following focuses principally on the impact on ASOPROF
farmers.
Economic impact
The trends and data presented here are taken from interviews with ASO-
PROF member farmers, a study done by CIAT (International Centre for
Tropical Agriculture) published in 1999,15 and ASOPROF statistical reports
and files. Seven variables were examined to glean an idea of impact: hectares
cultivated, number of farmers cultivating beans, yield, farmer income (look-
ing at price and cost per hectare), education, health and community change.
Measuring ASOMEX impact is a difficult task. Weather patterns play the
largest role in affecting crop production and yields. Overall, when taking into
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aHuman Development Report 1998, UNDP, 1998
NA - information not available
consideration the variables of weather, disease, market conditions, bean vari-
ety, season, location and inputs, the measurement of impact becomes
extremely difficult and potentially impossible.
When asked why they grow beans, the most common response was that there
was no other crop to grow in winter and that beans were an excellent option in
crop rotation, allowing farmers' yearly earnings to increase significantly.
Overall, the number of hectares cultivated for beans has increased since
1993 (Table 3.8). Some farmers are dedicating more land to beans, others are
cultivating more land overall, and more producers are beginning to plant
beans as a crop. Mechanization has also played a role; it is on the rise among
farmers and, in their opinion, it facilitates an increased amount of bean
cultivation.
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This table was compiled from data gathered by field research in January 2000. Sources included interviews with
farmers, ASOPROF, ASOMEX and MEDA Bolivia staff, and ASOMEX and ASOPROF records.
The shift to planned production is clear. Farmers are aware of prices and
market trends, and ASOPROF works to keep them informed of such.
Planned production can be seen as an indirect impact of ASOMEX, because
it provides the buyers for Bolivian beans, which in turn gives ASOPROF the
ability to offer price contracts and information, and to concentrate its time on
technical assistance and credit rather than marketing.
Another indicator of ASOMEX's impact is the number of producers culti-
vating beans. The number of associations working with ASOPROF, and thus
ASOMEX, grew from 16 in 1993 to 21 in 1998.
Overall, it is difficult to measure trends in yield. Among the many factors
that affect bean yield are of course weather patterns, disease and the crop-
management techniques of individual producers. In addition, the quality of
seed is key.
When examining incomes, prices and costs play the primary role (Figure
3.7). Costs for farmers have remained relatively stable over the past six years;
prices, on the other hand, have fluctuated. Two important factors are not vis-
ible in the figures in Table 3 8. First, the prices are an average, as are yields,
and farmers may have had a better harvest and better prices for the crop to
which they planted the most hectares - which would give them a better
income than shown. Second, beans fill a seasonal gap in the agricultural pro-
duction calendar, allowing cultivation during winter - commonly a fallow
season. The impact of a second crop is not evident in the income figures,
which look at income per unit of beans and over a specific time period.
Table 3.8 includes one other indicator of interest - bean varieties - which
was not discussed with farmers. This indicator demonstrates an overall
upward trend, which is excellent for ASOMEX. The fact that ASOMEX con-
tinues to find markets for increased quantities and varieties of beans has a
positive local impact.
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Figure 3.7 Net income estimate per hectare
Social impact
Measuring social change is a challenge. ASOMEX does not collect impact
data of any type, and ASOPROF does not record social indicators. The analy-
sis here is based solely on anecdotal evidence from interviews and
discussions.
It is possible that with the increase in income that farm families have
received through selling their beans, they have had the opportunity to
increase their education level.16 A few of those interviewed noted increased
opportunity for technical assistance and training courses for themselves, and
women mentioned the classes that ASOPROF has been providing. In
ASOPROF's opinion, when families have extra income, they will spend it
first on their production process (such as buying a tractor) and their second
priority is often education. Among those interviewed in the CIAT study, par-
ents had an average of two years of education and children 7.5 years.
Increased consumption of beans is assumed to improve nutrition. To exam-
ine the impact of beans on family health it is necessary to look at the adoption
of beans into the local diet. All families interviewed had either continued or
increased their levels of consumption. Many stated that beans had not been a
common part of the diet but that they were slowly becoming accustomed to the
food and it was being assimilated. In the study completed by CIAT (inter-
viewing 367 urban housewives and 261 rural housewives), results showed that
over 75 per cent of rural families and 84 per cent of the poorest families con-
sumed beans. In the rural sector, beans accounted for 30 per cent of the daily
protein requirements. In the urban context, beans have also been adopted, with
50 per cent of families consuming them, fulfilling 17 per cent of their daily pro-
tein requirements. This is a positive impact on health for both rural and urban
Bolivians, due in part to the work of MEDA, ASOPROF and ASOMEX.
Impact on other clients
The work that ASOMEX carried out with MEDA's PRISMA members in
1994-96 had a positive impact on many of the participants. ASOMEX did not
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simply act as an intermediary for the PRISMA microentrepreneurs but
involved them in the marketing and exporting process, educating them along
the way. Hie producers who were able to export their product felt this was a
major achievement, helping to build their confidence as entrepreneurs.
Unfortunately the work with PRISMA was not financially sustainable and
ended after the pilot project; however, the benefits of improved capacity
remained.
ASOFAM, which was formed by some of the most successful furniture pro-
ducers of the PRISMA programme, worked with ASOMEX in 1996 and 1997
but has not recently done so because members have been content to focus
their efforts on local marketing. However, ASOFAM is once again consider-
ing the services of an export company.
In its relatively short experience with ASOHABA, ASOMEX has been
helpful to the member producers. Before working with ASOMEX, the pro-
ducers faced selling their crops to intermediaries who often paid poor prices.
It is too early to obtain any impact information on FEDEAGRO, which is
currently adopting new crops, including peanuts, chickpeas, and hot chillies,
for which ASOMEX is carrying out market research and identification of for-
eign buyers.
Benefits on a broader scale
ASOMEX has also contributed to the wider society in a number of ways.
Already touched upon is the fact that it adds some much-needed competition
to the intermediary market. This has had a large-scale impact on the market,
bringing prices up among other intermediaries, thus benefiting many more
producers active in the same market. The local bean industry benefits by
encouraging more efficient practices, and producers benefit from having
additional options for selling their product.
Another contribution to the wider society is the foreign exchange earned.
Most of the marketing that ASOMEX carries out involves exporting, thus
earning important foreign exchange for Bolivia. The value of goods that
ASOMEX exports is an indicator of the foreign exchange contribution: in
1994/5, the foreign exchange earned was US$228000; in 1995/6, US$390000;
and in 1996/7, US$286494.
ASOMEX has also served as a valuable experience for MEDA and has
furthered MEDA's capacity to build sustainable delivery institutions. MEDA
has learned much in establishing ASOMEX and is working to improve its
services and operation.
Appropriateness of the service
ASOMEX has demonstrated innovation and flexibility in meeting the
diverse needs of its clients. ASOPROF needs a reliable export processing
service provider at a reasonable price. ASOFAM needs a company that can
undertake in-depth market research, identify appropriate foreign buyers and
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set up distribution channels. ASOHABA needs an intermediary with fair
prices that will handle the entire market research and exportation process.
Fernheim needs someone to put it in contact with potential buyers and assist
in negotiating with them. In exercising some flexibility in working out an
appropriate service for each client association, ASOMEX has been able to
maintain a relevant set of interventions for its clients.
Where ASOMEX's service can at times be less appropriate than desired by
clients is not in the types of interventions themselves but in how well they
have been carried out.17 One client association has voiced complaints about
ASOMEX's export process not always operating smoothly. There have been
problems in the timely passage of payment from foreign buyers to the speci-
fied bank accounts of the producer association, the slowness significantly
inconveniencing all involved. There are also complaints of poor coordination
along the product transportation route, causing missed connections and
delayed shipments - none of which convey a positive image to the waiting
buyer. Some of these problems are due to poor management on ASOMEX's
part. More strict and continuous monitoring of the process can reduce the dif-
ficulties. Sometimes things are beyond ASOMEX's control, such as flooding
causing impassable roads (very common in Bolivia) - and simply the nature
of the export business. ASOMEX management is working to eliminate as
many of these problems as possible.
Is ASOMEX achieving its maximum development impact? Despite some
of its problems, it is providing a much-needed service to an often-overlooked
group of people. Small-scale producers certainly have demand for the service;
only some can pay for it. There are some complaints from clients, but when
asked for an overall impression of how worthwhile it is to work with
ASOMEX, these same clients are pleased. Volume must be increased and
quality of service improved. The current level of impact is already impressive,
having benefited several thousand small-scale producers, and the potential
for much larger outreach in the future is high.
Sustai nability
Economic sustainability
Despite ASOMEX's less than impressive financial record, the company has
been able to survive its first six years of existence, through indirect assistance
from MEDA and profit from operations in 1993-95.18 The board is confident
that there is great potential for the company, with these early years serving as
years of building the company and learning. They see ASOMEX as being on
the brink of a new stage in improved performance. In looking at the possibil-
ity for continued sustainability of the young company, what is important is
ASOMEX's ability to identify weakness and mistakes of the past and
respond effectively to overcome them.
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The cost effectiveness section showed the company's economic position to
be unstable and, were these trends to continue much into the future,
ASOMEX would not be financially sustainable. However, the company
clearly recognizes the major reasons for its instability of recent years - the
failure to achieve its objective of a broadened producer-client base and the
lack of funds to take advantage of new opportunities. The current priority of
ASOMEX is to correct these problems. There is no guarantee that diversifi-
cation will be a winning strategy that will succeed in eliminating instability.
However, it appears to be a reasonable and necessary move, and when com-
bined with several other courses of action (improving financial management,
obtaining further sources for capital funds) it should improve the company's
performance.
The fact that ASOMEX has been highly demand driven contributes to its
sustainability. As originally designed by its clients, pursuing strategies of a
flexible marketing service tailored to client needs is a valuable factor in sus-
tainability. Also, the demand-driven strategy for identifying new producer
clients based on existing buyer demand should prove valuable. Sources of
revenue (both producer and buyer clients) are increasing and are expected to
continue growing. Table 3.9 shows that new producer clients have been added
each year.
Table 3.9 Active clients - product associations and export countries
Year Active clients (new clients in italics) Countries exported to (new markets in italics)
1993 ASOPROF Bolivia
1994 ASOPROF, PRISMA Bolivia, Colombia, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan
1995 ASOPROF, PRISMA Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Japan,
Spain
1996 ASOFAM, ASOHABA, ASOPROF, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Japan
PRISMA
1997 ASOFAM, ASOHABA, ASOPROF Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Italy, Japan,
Spain
1998 ASOHABA, ASOPROF, FEDEAGRO, Brazil, Colombia, France, Japan, Venezuela
FERNHEIM
ASOMEX's clients have demonstrated their willingness to pay by their con-
tinued demand for the service. The second column in Table 3.9 shows the
continuity in clients. Other small producers and producer organizations
would like to have access to a marketing service but cannot afford to pay
prices based on cost recovery, or are not export ready. Existing and potential
clients say they find ASOMEX prices for its services to be reasonable and
slightly better than those of competing companies.
The sustainability of ASOMEX depends on its capacity to maintain a good
working relationship with its suppliers, especially ASOPROE Good relation-
ships with clients involve ASOMEX looking for new buyer markets and new
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products, and meeting the demands that both its producer and its buyer
clients place on it.
Internal operation, and stakeholder communication and commitment
ASOMEX, between its board of directors and its management team, has
always intended to develop annual plans, strategize regularly, and constantly
innovate to keep services relevant and in demand. However, planning and
strategizing are generally not priority areas in the local Bolivian context,
making it a struggle for ASOMEX to follow through on its intentions in this
area. All of the shareholders are committed to maintaining their shares in the
company. Despite having some complaints in its dealing with ASOMEX as a
service provider, ASOPROF holds firm to its desire to remain a key share-
holder. It has a lot of interest in the company and sees good potential in its
future.
Company evolution, shifts and future prospects
ASOMEX has developed, modified and improved its marketing service
package over the past few years. Its business development service now offers
three variations of marketing services, along with market research and other
useful information. The client base is growing, and ASOMEX has begun serv-
ing the small producers in several new regions (Table 3.10).
Table 3.10 States where ASOMEX producer clients reside
Year State (expansion into new regions in italics)
1993 Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz
1994 Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Potosf, Santa Cruz
1995 Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Potosi, Santa Cruz
1996 Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Potosi, Santa Cruz
1997 Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Potosi, Santa Cruz
1998 Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi, Santa Cruz and Paraguay
Although ASOMEX's client base continues to focus on small producer
associations, the company is open to serving the marketing needs of larger
producers. The recent development of Fernheim as a producer client repre-
sents ASOMEX's move into the arena of medium-scale producers.
ASOMEX does not plan to make a major shift to higher-income producers.
Ultimately, the commitment to serving small producers is maintained by
MEDA's and others' positions on the board, as well as by the fact that
ASOMEX's key marketing activity is niche marketing for crops grown pri-
marily by small producers.
In addition to new clients developing on the brokering and export-pro-
cessing front, ASOMEX sees opportunities to take on further intermediary
activities. However, ASOMEX cannot fully take advantage of these opportu-
nities because it lacks working capital. It is looking for an equity investment,
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a loan or possibly a grant to provide it with the needed capital. MEDA, a pos-
sible loan source itself, is also actively searching for funding for ASOMEX.
This critical need must be resolved in the near future.
There is consensus among management and shareholders that ASOMEX
has good potential to grow as a company and to greatly increase its outreach
in the future. ASOMEX sees a number of opportunities to develop new
export lines for new products. Stakeholders agree that there is much
untapped demand for ASOMEX's services. With the new skilled and inde-
pendent management team, improved accounting procedures and greater
guidance from its board, all stakeholders are expecting successful years for
ASOMEX in the near future.
Conclusion
The ASOMEX study has highlighted many elements of programme design
and strategy that contribute to success in serving small producers by deliver-
ing a business development service. At the same time it is clear that
ASOMEX is a far from perfect company. Both ASOMEX's strengths and its
weaknesses provide valuable insights and lessons for others attempting to
establish self-sustainable programmes that deliver business services with pos-
itive development impact. In summary:
ASOMEX strengths
• initial development and learning phases done under parent association, so
that when the company started it had already shown potential for financial
viability and could start debt free and grant free
• access to NGO expertise in developing sustainable businesses
• NGO role as shareholder to push for development objectives
• shareholder structure to encourage efficiency and profit
• proof demonstrated that a market exists for edible beans, thus creating
competition in the industry (more companies serving small producers,
including Bolivian Shoji and Bolsemilla)
• major client input in BDS design (created in part by clients)
• pricing structure based on cost recovery
• ability to recognize financially non-viable extensions of service and refusal
to offer them
• keeping BDS small and highly focused on profitable elements only
• streamlined operation
• offering arm's-length service from a single location
• good working conditions, facilitating dedicated staff
• sufficient flexibility to meet service needs of different clients
• incorporation of demand-driven business strategies
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• work done with producer associations rather than individuals to minimize
difficulties and costs of working with individual small producers
• ability to reach large numbers of small producers
• associations' responsibility for needs of the individual small producer
• innovative in responding to new demand opportunities
• positive impact results on producer incomes, level of production, and indi-
rectly on education and health
• ability to fulfil the typically overlooked needs of small producers.
ASOMEX weaknesses
lack of working capital to take advantage of new business opportunities
failure to seriously pursue a broadened client base
overdependence on ASOPROF
insufficient overseeing by the owner
lack of well-defined goals and well-developed, feasible plans for achieving
them
failure to take full advantage of economies of scale
poor accounting procedures in the past
overly prolonged period of shared administration with ASOPROF
ongoing weakness in planning implementation processes
lack of control over accounts receivable
periods of poor communication between shareholders and management
practical problems in distribution channels affecting service quality
lack of capacity to give attention to special needs of disadvantaged groups
no collection of impact data or impact assessment
lack of division in recording costs and revenues between the various types
of services offered and various elements of each service; relative prof-
itability of various services unknown
• lack of price risk management by both ASOMEX and ASOPROF.
The trade-off between development impact and sustainability
Throughout the case study, issues have arisen that have involved a conflict
between achieving maximum development impact and attaining profit. As
with any company, the bottom line of sustainability through profit comes first,
and development must take second place as a priority. Time and resources are
not available in the company setting of ASOMEX to monitor impact, nor to
make special effort to serve the most disadvantaged small producers. Even
making the suggestion to the ASOMEX manager that it could incorporate
attention to special needs (such as gender considerations) met with an indig-
nant response that no profit-oriented company could be reasonably expected
to do so. Experience has shown that small producer organizations or small
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enterprises need to have achieved a certain level of success in their business
before they work with ASOMEX. This certainly does not mean that all are
well off. Many individuals in the client associations are in fact very poor. But
they must be a part of an association that is relatively efficient, stable and well
organized, has a high-quality product, has some understanding of market
dynamics, and has a profit margin large enough to justify paying for a mar-
keting service.
The trade-off between development impact and financial sustainability
does not mean to say that in focusing on cost effectiveness and profit
ASOMEX cannot have strong development impact. Through the dedication
of its shareholders and managers, ASOMEX has maintained its focus on
small producers, despite the more profitable alternative of larger producers.
Clearly ASOMEX plays an important development role in serving many
small producers with a much-needed marketing service that would otherwise
be difficult or even impossible for them to have access to. Thousands of small
producers have achieved exportation through ASOMEX, access to better
prices for their product, and higher income as a result. This valuable devel-
opment impact from a self-sustaining BDS delivery company makes
ASOMEX a fine model indeed for others to learn from.
Notes
1 'Colonizer farmers' refers to internal migrants from the high Andes. Some of the
existing settlements were established by the government and others were sponta-
neously settled. The 'beans' referred to throughout the case study are dry beans.
ASOMEX has worked with a number of bean varieties over the years including
negro, mantequilla, haba, rojo tinto and carioca. Most of the exports have been
rojo tinto and carioca, whose markets are found principally in Brazil, Colombia
and Japan.
2 Although it grew from MEDA's work in the region, ASOPROF is officially com-
pletely independent of MEDA and is no longer part of MEDA Bolivia's country
programme.
3 See the section entitled 'Marketing and delivering the business development serv-
ices-package' for further information on ASOMEX's work with PRISMA.
4 See 'The Bolivian bean industry' in the annexe for an overall view of the activity.
5 The struggle between maximizing profit and offering the most producer-friendly
prices possible is a debate that has come up in board meetings. The outcome of
these discussions has been that ASOMEX needs to keep in mind the satisfaction
of clients to maintain them over the longer term. The pricing strategy has an
important role to play here, although it is difficult to achieve an optimal balance
between company profit and client satisfaction.
6 Supporting data are presented in the 'Impact' section.
7 MEDA's 'Approach to Institutional Development in Microenterprise Finance
Programmes: From Project through Programme to Business' (internal publication).
8 Ibid.
9 See the timeline 'MEDA in Bolivia' in the annexe for more detail on MEDA's role.
10 This was the opinion of ASOMEX's general manager, as well as of the MEDA
Bolivia country manager at the time ASOMEX was formed.
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11 Financial data gathered from MEDA sources do not match data gathered direct
from ASOMEX sources because each operates on a different financial year.
MEDA's financial year runs from July to June; ASOMEX operates on the calen-
dar year.
12 Socio-economic variables are available in only a limited form through MEDA's
impact indicators of ASOPROF. These are presented in Table 3.2 in the
'ASOMEX and MEDA section.
13 Source of community profile data: PROCOR Diagnosticos Socioeconomicos,
MEDA, FDC and CIDA, 1998.
14 Community profiles are sketchy because the available data are limited.
15 The CIAT study conducted in 1997/8 was based on detailed interviews with 593
ASOPROF members and family members. Its focus was to measure the impact of
beans in Bolivia since MEDA introduced the crop in the mid-1980s.
16 The correlation between increased income levels and increased educational
opportunities is not proved in this case. Education levels may have increased over
the period for demographic reasons, for general economic reasons unrelated to
the initiative, or because of greater government and donor investment in educa-
tion.
17 Although clients have had some frustrations with ASOMEX, presumably their
choice to continue working with it means that it remains the preferred option over
export firms focused on big business.
18 See the section 'ASOMEX and MEDA' for a description of the indirect assistance
MEDA has offered ASOMEX over its lifetime.
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Annexe The Bolivian bean industry
Industry activity and value-added chain
Annexe MEDA in Bolivia
1975
MEDA loans money to El
Progreso Cooperative.
The loan was used to help
small farmers.
MEDA staff and farmers
began to study the use of the











The loan was used by
the co-op to buy
merchandise for resale to
members.
1985
At the request of Bolivian
group leaders, the
CCAB/Berlin programme
began. MEDA gave a loan to
this co-op of small farmers
and farmer groups.
The loan was used for crop
diversification [potatoes] and
credit. The programme was
expanded in 1986 with more
MEDA loans, and the new
crops examined were beans
and vegetables.
Beans proved to be the most
successful crop and enabled
farmers to plant 2 crops per
year, nearly doubling their
incomes.
The beans also improved the
soil, which then increased
summer crop yields. In this
way beans became a very
popular crop among Bolivian
small farmers, and a bean




programme led to an
increase in supply of beans.
Farmers began to think




exporting the bean. As a
result ASOPROF, the
National Association of Bean
Producers, was created.
ASOPROF is an association
made up of many smaller
groups of small farmers. Its




Its activities include seed
production, technical
assistance and marketing
through a guaranteed buyer.
1993
Because MEDA was gaining
a reputation for successful
rural development
programmes in the country,
they were asked to take over



















together to form ASOFAM,











funders wanted MEDA to do
additional work in other
regions, and Consulabona
was the vehicle created to
carry out this work.
• Consulting services are





• The company is wholly
owned by MEDA.
1974
• MEDA provided a large loan
to La Merced Cooperative.
• The loan was used for
capital in a loan fund, which
was then lent to small
farmers for production.




In 1976, at the request of
MOC, MEDA began work





animal traction equipment to
the initiative.
1989
In partnership with a local
savings and loan co-op (San
Luis), MEDA initiated
PRISMA, a Programme of
Incentives and Support for
Microenterprise.
The MEDA loan provided
capital that was used for




intended to export all beans
produced by its members.
Due to changes in the legal
environment, MEDA and
ASOPROF decided to
create a marketing company,
ASOMEX. ASOMEX exports
beans [from ASOPROF] and
other products from other
clients.
MEDA's investment in the






• MEDA provided a loan to
OCAVP cooperative. The
loan was used to revive the





• The intention was to
replicate the CCAB model,
but in 1996 MEDA made a
decision to focus on
developing sustainable








and loan fund capital to 8 •
savings and loan co-ops.




(PRISMA), and to develop
pilot marketing efforts





Progreso and La Merced,
two of MEDA's earliest
partners, as well as Trinidad,
San Roque, Caledral,




marketing project, began in
1998 with CIDA funding for
a set 5-year period.
PROCOR will assist small
farmers in finding new
export markets, identifying
the right products and
improving business
productivity.
PROCOR works with 4
producer associations, in 4
areas, focusing on 5 lead
products.
4 Increasing the volume and value of
smallholder coffee in El Salvador
LISA STOSCH and ERIC L. HYMAN1
Introduction
THIS CASE STUDY analyses a business development services project that
assisted small-scale coffee producers and processors in El Salvador. NGOs
played a facilitative role by assisting cooperatives that provided members
with services. For sustainability, the cooperatives recovered costs through
profit margins on processing and marketing and interest spreads on loans.
Key lessons learned include the importance of a subsector approach for
building capacity, the need to plan for external risks, appropriate roles of
service providers and facilitators, value of indirect cost recovery, validity of
subsidies in postwar reconstruction, advantages of centralized credit admin-
istration, profitability of some improved environmental practices, and how
expansion and replication increased cost effectiveness and impact.
The project was designed and implemented by Enterprise Works Worldwide
and its local affiliate, Servicios Empresariales de Mesoamerica (SEM).2 Coffee
is the leading export of El Salvador. The country had 9600 coffee farms in
1998, earning approximately US$1500 each.3 About 90 per cent of the coffee
farms were less than 14 hectares (CSC 2000). In the 1998/9 season, small-scale
producers grew 15 per cent of the country's total coffee production.4
The project focused on small-scale coffee producers because of the large
potential to improve their productivity, product quality, income and employ-
ment. The subsector was still recovering from 12 years of civil war in El
Salvador (1979 to 1990) and extensive government control over coffee prices
and sales during the 1980s. The project also had environmental objectives: 1)
promoting shade-grown varieties of coffee for biodiversity and income diver-
sification from the tree crops; 2) integrated pest management; and 3)
treatment and safe disposal of other processing wastes, which are a major pol-
lutant in El Salvador (Mencia 1995; Arturo 2000).
Most coffee produced in El Salvador consists of arabica varieties, which
grow well in shade and at high elevations. Arabica is used in gourmet coffee
and can be sold at a premium price if the quality is good. It is also mixed with
lower-quality robusta varieties in mainstream coffee. However, only about 1
per cent of Salvadorean coffee was sold to high-value gourmet or organic
markets.
Unprocessed ripe coffee fruits are called coffee cherries because of their
red colour. The coffee processing stages are parchment coffee, green coffee
and roasted coffee (whole beans or ground).5 Most of the coffee produced in
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El Salvador was exported as green coffee, but some low-quality, ground
roasted coffee was produced for the domestic market.
The domestic market price of coffee in El Salvador varied with the pro-
cessing, with the largest mark-ups occurring after the coffee was exported.
The wholesale price of ground roasted coffee in industrialized countries was
usually 63 per cent above the green coffee price in El Salvador. Here are the
prices per kilogram of intermediate coffee products in 1998/9:
Unprocessed coffee cherries (domestic market - buyers further
process the cherries into parchment or green coffee and export it) US$1.34
Parchment coffee (domestic market - buyers further process the
the parchment into green coffee and export it) US$1.85
Green coffee (export market) US$2.22
Ground roasted coffee in El Salvador (domestic market - low
quality and small quantities) US$4.54
Coffee processing is one of the most polluting industries in El Salvador.
Many small processing facilities dumped untreated waste on land or in water.
Coffee processing wastes exerted a high oxygen demand.6 More than 90 per
cent of the country's rivers were already contaminated (Kovaleski 1999). In
1998, the government required all industrial processors to prepare and
implement plans for reducing pollution.
The project was designed by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDE) with extensive input from Enterprise Works Worldwide. In January
1995, IDE provided a grant for a three-year project (later extended to
four and a half years) to SEM and UCAFES (a second-tier cooperative or
association of cooperatives representing both large- and small-scale coffee
farmers). IDB awarded a technical assistance contract to Enterprise Works
Worldwide.
The purpose of the project was to assist seven existing, first-tier
cooperatives that process and/or market coffee from 850 small-scale
farmers. The original seven cooperatives were Berlin, Cuscatlan, Grano de
Oro, Jucuapenses, La Esperanza, Nonualcos and La Union. However, La
Esperanza was dropped in 1995 because of its financial and managerial
problems. A new cooperative, La Palma, established with European Union
funding in 1996, was later added to the project.7 Also during the project
period, Grano de Oro folded and Siglo XXI was established as its smaller
successor.
Enterprise Works began the project with a subsector study that identified
the main constraints for small-scale coffee farmers in El Salvador:
• limited access to annual working capital credit and longer-term fixed
capital credit for expansion or renewal of plantings
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• insufficient extension services
• dearth of well-functioning, local processing facilities for small-scale
producers
• lack of timely market information (Amorin et al. 1995).
Before this project, four of the cooperatives sold unprocessed coffee cherries,
two sold parchment coffee to large companies that processed it into green
coffee for export, and one sold ground roasted coffee on the domestic mar-
ket. None produced significant quantities of export-quality green coffee. La
Union and Nonualcos previously produced parchment coffee and both
needed improved plant facilities. La Union's wet-processing facility was
bombed during the civil war and was not functioning efficiently. Nonualcos
needed upgraded processing equipment to improve efficiency and address
environmental concerns.
Project description
Table 4.1 lists the services the project has provided and the number of coop-
eratives receiving them. Table 4.2 lists the project funders and their financial
contributions, and Table 4.3 the partner organizations implementing the
project and their contributions. Figure 4.1 shows the relationships among
funders and partners, and the timeline in Figure 4.2 gives an overall history of
the project.
Business development services and credit provided
The business development services that the project provided helped the
cooperatives to improve their technical and management skills, build and
upgrade processing equipment, and gain access to new markets. They enabled
the cooperatives to increase member income by selling processed parchment
coffee instead of unprocessed coffee cherries to the large processing and
export companies. Member farmers also benefited from centrally provided
credit and training and extension services, and bulk purchases of farm sup-
plies through the cooperatives.
Technical assistance for coffee farmers
The project completed an on-farm diagnostic analysis for each member who
received a loan. This included soil analysis, examination of pest and disease
problems and harvesting practices, and recommendations for organic and
chemical fertilizer and integrated pest management techniques.
Since 1991, Salvadorean coffee farmers have paid for agricultural exten-
sion services from PROCAFE indirectly through a levy on coffee exports.
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Table 4.1 Business development services and credit provided by the project
Type of service and
recipients















• Prepared assessments and soil analyses 6
to determine specific needs of participating
farmers
• Provided customized extension services to help 7
coffee farmers in harvesting, pruning, pests and
diseases, and fertilizer use
• Promoted use of by-product pulp from processing 4
as organic fertilizer
• Supplied parasitic wasps to reduce pesticide use 7
• Conducted 1377 field visits and training events 6
• Offered farmers one-year loans for working capital 6
• Offered farmers long-term loans for rehabilitation of 6
unproductive coffee stands or expansion
• Improved wet-processing plant facilities 2
• Built new wet-processing plants 2
• Provided new or improved facilities to process 5
small quantities of parchment coffee into green
coffee for the domestic market
• Established new facilities for final processing of 4
green coffee and prepared operating manuals on
processing
• Upgraded a final processing facility 1
• Built biological control laboratories for production 3
of parasitic wasps to control coffee borers
• Provided new computers, customized software, and 6
training for accounting and loan administration
• Remodelled offices, agro-input sales areas, and 6
training areas
• Advised cooperatives on marketing parchment 7
coffee to export companies
• Provided advice to cooperatives on marketing 7
ground roasted coffee on the domestic market
• Linked the cooperatives to UCAFES through fax 7
machines for rapid communication of marketing
information
• Established a coffee marketing committee and 7
encouraged collaborative marketing by the
cooperatives
• Distributed materials on marketing and price 7
information
• Produced a marketing video 7
Source: G. Amaya and J. Gemeil personal communication 2000
The project funding gave members of six cooperatives access to more exten-
sion services than other farmers. Project funding enabled each cooperative to
hire an agronomist to provide these services. PROCAFE trained the agrono-
mists and the project provided each cooperative with a motorcycle for the
agronomist.
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Table 4.2 El Salvador project funders (March 1994 to December 1998)
Name Type of organization Funding (US$)
Inter-American Development Bank multilateral development bank
European Union
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide












Table 4.3 Counterpart funding for the El Salvador project (US dollars)
Name Type of organization Counterpart funding
SEM
Berlfn, Cuscatlan, Jucuapenses,
La Raima, La Union, Nonualcos,
Grano de Oro
COMERCAFE












government and industry council
that analyses and recommends
policies, distributes market
information and inspects quality
of coffee exports
private processing and exporting
companies













aCSC was funded by a US$0.0007 levy per kilogram exported.
bPROCAFE was funded by a government levy of US$0.02 per kilogram of coffee exported.
The agronomists advised farmers on coffee seedling propagation, pruning,
crop diversification and shade tree planting. Before the project, many small
farmers were frustrated because they could not afford to follow through on
many of PROCAFE's recommendations. Project credit has enabled farmers
to adopt many of these recommendations. The agronomists also served as
credit promoters, identifying and assessing potential loan clients and helping
farmers with loan procedures. PROCAFE provided assistance from more
experienced specialists as needed through a collaboration agreement with
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide and SEM. After the project ended, three of the
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Agreement signed between EnterpriseWorks, IDE, SEM, UCAFES and Grano
de Oro, launching the El Salvador project.
Project activities began.
La Union processing plant upgraded.
La Esperanza cooperative dropped because of its financial difficulties.
Credit component began.
La Raima cooperative created and the European Union contributed $200000 for
construction of its processing facilities.
Rotary Clubs of Stowe, Vermont and San Salvador donated US$8000 for La
Union's coffee-roasting plant.
Grano de Oro cooperative closed and Siglo XXI established.
Management of loan portfolio turned over to the individual cooperatives.
EnterpriseWorks created COMERCAFE, a for-profit company for export marketing
of coffee from small-scale producers in Central America.
El Nino reduced coffee harvest in El Salvador.
The IDB-funded El Salvador coffee project completed.
Hurricane Mitch devastated coffee production in El Salvador.
IDB approved regional project for coffee marketing and institutional development
of three second-tier cooperatives in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.
Evaluation of the El Salvador project completed.
USAID approved the new project in which SEM is to help the seven cooperatives
from the El Salvador project and two new cooperatives scale up green coffee
processing capacity through a joint facility.
Figure 4.2 Timeline of activities and events in the project's history
cooperatives retained a full-time agronomist, covering the cost from their
own resources. The other three cooperatives went back to relying on more
limited extension assistance from PROCAFE for their members.
Coffee bushes begin producing at around 3 years of age, reach peak
production after four to five years and remain productive until they
are about 30 years old. The project improved coffee production by
helping farmers to plant more bushes and improve harvesting
practice. Member farmers planted 56 additional hectares of shade-grown
coffee during the project, a 2.5 per cent increase. La Union and Grano de Oro
both had nurseries for coffee seedlings. PROCAFE provided them with
certified seeds and the nurseries grew the seedlings for six months before
sale. Farmers also replaced some old, unproductive stands. The project
promoted retaining or planting fruit trees to provide shade for coffee plants
and diversify farmer income. For maximum quality, farmers were instructed
to harvest only fully ripe coffee cherries, which required several pickings
through the stand.
The coffee borer, a serious pest that can destroy a coffee crop, can be con-
trolled with pesticides or parasitic wasps. PROCAFE installed biocontrol
laboratories at Cuscatlan, Grano de Oro and La Union to propagate parasitic
wasps. Parasitic wasps enabled participating farmers to reduce the use of
toxic pesticides by 25 per cent. The most widely used pesticide for the coffee
borer was endosulfan, which can be fatal to people.8
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Credit for farmers
The project included a revolving fund to provide coffee farmers with work-
ing capital loans (one year) and fixed capital loans (up to five years) to
rehabilitate existing stands and plant new ones. The loans were expected to
benefit at least 500 farm households in six of the cooperatives.9 For fixed cap-
ital loans, borrowers had to provide land, other collateral or a guarantee from
a co-signatory. The first loans were made in 1996 and UCAFES, the union of
coffee cooperatives, disbursed the loans and collected repayments with tech-
nical assistance from SEM (Royo Llop 1997).
From 1996 to 1998, the project made 325 working capital loans amounting
to US$231 000 and 133 fixed capital loans for more than US$272 000. At the
end of 1998, UCAFES had received full repayment on the loans due through
that date (SEM 1999).
At the end of 1998, UCAFES turned the credit portfolio, collateral and
guarantees over to the six cooperatives, as planned. At that time, the total
cash value of the loan fund was close to US$568 000. Borrowers had to make
subsequent loan payments to their cooperative, which was required to use the
money for additional working capital loans. Before the loan funds were trans-
ferred, each cooperative had to do the following:
• demonstrate the solvency of the existing loans
• establish written policies and rules for handling delinquent loans
• reach an agreement with its general assembly on how the credit fund
would be managed
• open a bank account exclusively for the loan fund
• obtain the credit committee's approval on new loans
• require borrowers who received new loans to pledge their coffee produc-
tion as collateral.
SEM trained the six cooperatives in loan administration. Each cooperative
signed a contract accepting responsibility and agreeing to specified loan
terms (duration, disbursements, interest rate, repayment schedule, and penal-
ties for delinquent borrowers). The cooperatives paid the administrative and
legal costs of decentralizing the loan funds. On new loans, they were expected
to charge borrowers an interest rate 2 to 3 per cent higher than their cost of
funds. The average interest rate was 24 to 26 per cent, well above the inflation
rate and the rates charged by most NGOs in the country.10 The cash trans-
ferred to the cooperatives was 132 per cent of the nominal value of the
original loan fund. After adjusting for inflation, the real value of the amount
transferred was US$524998, still 122 per cent of the original fund. In addition,
accounts receivable from loan repayments not yet due exceeded US$318000.
Unfortunately, the loan performance deteriorated after responsibility was
decentralized to the first-tier cooperatives. By the end of 1999, the
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delinquency rate for members of five of the six cooperatives ranged from 9 to
26 per cent and averaged 15 per cent. Loan performance was worse for the
sixth, Grano de Oro, which was unable to collect 70 per cent of its members'
fixed capital loans. External factors were very unfavourable in 1998 and 1999,
but the cooperatives' inexperience in credit management also played a role.
The world market price for coffee fell sharply in 1998 and Hurricane Mitch
devastated El Salvador's coffee production in the 1998/9 season. The poor
loan performance of Grano de Oro was a major factor in the cooperative's
closure and subsequent restructuring as a smaller cooperative, Siglo XXI.
Credit administration is a common problem for first-tier (primary) coop-
eratives because of the high administrative costs and the inherent conflicts of
interest between cooperative management and cooperative members.
Several other options might have been preferable for the post-project loan
fund.
• Creating one new entity staffed with experienced credit administrators to
manage the loan funds on behalf of all the cooperatives.
• Transferring the loan funds to each cooperative provisionally for one year.
Once a cooperative demonstrated a good track record, the permanent trans-
fer would take place. This might have resulted in some cooperatives gaining
loan management responsibility while others would not (Galvez 2000).
• Transferring the loan funds as planned, but with the project's credit com-
mittee providing continuing training and follow-up.
• Hiring a consultant to assist the cooperatives through the transition and
help them to develop a strategy for restructuring problem loans.
• Turning over responsibility for the loan funds to an existing microcredit
institution.
Capital investment and technology transfer for cooperatives
As a result of the project, three cooperatives (La Palma, Grano de Oro and
Cuscatlan) began selling parchment coffee for the first time, and two others
that had already been producing parchment coffee (Nonualcos and La
Union) were able to increase their production and efficiency. Project assis-
tance enabled five cooperatives (all except La Palma and Grano de Oro) to
begin selling ground roasted coffee on the domestic market.
The upgraded wet-processing facilities at La Union and Nonualcos
included investments in coffee-receiving areas, depulpers, water pumps, spin-
ners, fermentation tanks, washing tanks, predrying patios and mechanical
dryers that increased gains in efficiency. Fewer coffee cherries were needed
to produce the same amount of parchment coffee. Before the project, the
cooperatives used 6.96 kg of cherries to make 1 kg of parchment coffee. The
amount of cherries needed was reduced by 10 per cent through more efficient
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equipment and better-trained workers. Also in 1995, La Union lost 5180 kg of
potentially saleable coffee in its waste pulp. The project addressed this prob-
lem by installing a trap to recover this coffee before the pulp entered the
storage tank. New equipment and improved quality control at La Union and
Nonualcos also reduced the rate of damaged coffee from 15 per cent to 5 per
cent. The introduction of helicoidal conveyors, paddles, and gravity flow for
coffee transport and efficient washing and pulping reduced water consump-
tion by two-thirds.
The project enabled Grano de Oro to build one of the region's most mod-
ern and environmentally sound small-scale wet-processing plants. This plant
had the capacity to produce nearly 227 300 kg of parchment coffee per year
(in green coffee equivalent). To conserve diesel - a costly and dirty fuel - the
project supported construction of a 112.5-kilowatt substation for the plant.
Grano de Oro also received funding to build an irrigation system for water-
ing 25000 coffee seedlings. The cost of upgrading the La Union and
Nonualcos plants and building the Grano de Oro plant was approximately
US$101 000. The total processing capacity of these three plants increased 139
per cent (SEM 1999).
In 1996, a wet-processing plant was constructed for La Palma. This cooper-
ative now produced gourmet coffee and mainstream coffee. La Palma then
paid another processor to transform its parchment coffee into green coffee.
In its first year of production, La Palma sold gourmet-quality green coffee to
a foreign buyer at US$0.87/kg above the typical price for 'strictly high-grown'
coffee. As a result, La Palma was able to pay its members a premium price for
their coffee cherries, and this reportedly caused other coffee buyers in the
area to pay higher prices as well.
The project installed low-cost, wastewater treatment facilities for the four
cooperatives with wet-processing plants. The wastewater was channelled into
a lagoon and treated with lime to reduce its acidity. Over 24 hours, sediment
settled to the bottom and fine solids rose to the top. Then the sediment was
removed and added to the pulp removed earlier in the wet process. The
resulting pulp mixture was used as an organic fertilizer for coffee since it con-
tained nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium, but it could not completely
replace chemical fertilizer. The four cooperatives stored the pulp and gave it
away to their members. The marginal cost of pulp production was mainly the
labour required to store it and clean the storage facilities once a year, only
US$0.01/kg in 1998/9.
After the pulp was removed, the wastewater flowed through a series of pits
where it was oxygenated and gradually evaporated or percolated through the
soil. Organic matter remaining in the pit was removed at the end of the pro-
cessing season. The total cost of pollution control, including labour and
chemicals, averaged US$0.14/kg of parchment coffee (Mencia 1995). More
sophisticated biological treatment methods that relied on micro-organisms to
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dissect coffee processing waste were used in Costa Rica, but they were too
expensive for small processors in El Salvador.
Before the project, only Nonualcos had a dry-processing facility that could
produce significant quantities of green coffee and it needed an equipment
upgrade to meet export quality standards. Nonualcos also needed final
processing equipment to produce small amounts of ground roasted coffee for
the domestic market. The project provided Berlin, Cuscatlan, Jucuapenses
and La Union with equipment for dry processing, roasting and grinding. La
Palma and Grano de Oro did not receive processing equipment because La
Palma sells its parchment coffee to exporters and Grano de Oro was under-
going restructuring.
One of the most important issues the project had to address was quality
control. Common quality control problems before the project included the
following:
• Storage before processing and during sun drying. When coffee cherries
were stored or dried on the ground rather than on a cement patio, dirt and
debris were introduced. The coffee could also pick up undesirable odours
and flavours from the soil.
• Overfermentation. The wet process had to be carefully controlled to avoid
overfermentation since parchment coffee continues to ferment in storage.
Maintaining proper storage conditions and limiting storage time were
critical.
• Failure to do sun drying. Coffee would not mature properly if sun drying
were skipped before second-stage drying.
• Moisture content too high or low. The optimal moisture content of parch-
ment coffee after the second stage of drying is 11 to 12 per cent and it was
often too high or too low.
• Fuel vapours from the dryer. Fuel vapours from a mechanized dryer, if not
properly vented, can spoil the taste of coffee.
• Packaging for storage and transport. When parchment or green coffee is
transported in a container that holds or previously held other products, it
can pick up undesirable odours and flavours if it is not properly packaged.
Capacity building for cooperatives
Before the project, some of the cooperatives did not conduct annual audits
and had poor internal controls and financial systems. The project required
each cooperative to contract with an external auditor and undergo annual
audits. The project provided business management advice and training for the
cooperatives. All seven cooperatives received a computer; fax machine; and
customized software for accounting and loan administration and a database
on member production.
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Marketing assistance for cooperatives
Before the project, six of the cooperatives sold unprocessed coffee cherries to
intermediaries at a relatively low price. The intermediaries accumulated suf-
ficient coffee cherries to sell to large companies for processing into green
coffee and export. Lack of market information hindered the cooperatives'
ability to get good prices. The project increased the bargaining power of the
cooperatives with green coffee processors and exporters by creating a mar-
keting committee to negotiate prices and terms of sale for parchment coffee.
It also saw the potential for new products in the country, such as frozen cof-
fee drinks and coffee-flavoured foods and beverages.
La Union was the first of the cooperatives to sell its own brand of ground
roasted coffee on the domestic market. It explored new retail outlets at the
country's main airport, supermarkets, restaurants and food stands.
Coffee produced with environmentally sound practices could bring a bet-
ter price in niche markets. ECO-OK was an environmental certification
programme operated by a Salvadorean NGO (SalvaNatura) with an interna-
tional NGO (Rainforest Alliance), the Network of Agricultural
Conservationists and PROCAFE. It was funded by the Global Environment
Facility.11 SalvaNatura charged a sliding fee based on farm size for doing ini-
tial assessments of farms. In 1999, it sold ECO-OK coffee at a premium of
US$0.22 per kilogram.
Each farmer in the SalvaNatura programme received a socio-environmen-
tal management plan that he had to follow to qualify for the ECO-OK seal.
SalvaNatura also certified coffee-processing plants, charging cooperatives an
annual fee for use of the ECO-OK stamp on product packaging. La Union
paid the inspection fees for having all member farms certified by ECO-OK.
Many La Union members are in areas important for biodiversity, such as the
Apaneca-Ilamatepec corridor and the Central American biological corridor.
Berlin also started the ECO-OK process.
Outreach and impact
The number and type of producer participants who received at least US$20
in additional income as a result of the project includes owners and workers of
the farms belonging to the cooperatives, workers at the processing plants, and
non-member farmers who sold coffee cherries (Table 4.4). Non-members
received immediate payments based on the value of their unprocessed coffee
cherries, while cooperative members received an additional 10 per cent for
their coffee after it was processed and marketed.
Another goal of the project was to strengthen the cooperatives by expand-
ing the membership. The number of member farms increased by 246 per cent
in 1996/7 but fell by 37 per cent in 1997/8 and by an additional 29 per cent in
1998/9. The large increase in membership was mainly from the addition of the
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aBased on loan records, 21 per cent of member farm owners were women and 79 per cent were men.
bAssumes that each farm has one owner and one worker earning US$20 or more in incremental income per
year. On average, women provide 34 per cent of the total labour time in coffee production.
Includes only non-members selling coffee to La Union; estimate based on purchases from non-member farms
divided by an average of 727.3 kg per non-member farm.
new La Palma cooperative. The subsequent declines were due to the restruc-
turing of Grano de Oro and severe weather problems.
The workers included seasonal and part-time workers and paid labourers
as well as unpaid family members. Labour accounted for 65 per cent of the
costs of small-scale coffee farming. The total labour required to produce 100
kg of green coffee was 2.4 person-days, including harvesting and post-harvest
labour.12 More efficient technology resulted in a loss of 27 jobs at Nonualcos,
but since that processing plant was unprofitable it might otherwise have had
to close.
Production and sales
As with any agricultural commodity, coffee revenues varied from year to year
due to factors beyond a project's control. Figure 4.3 gives a picture of the fluc-
tuations in coffee production in El Salvador over a long term, from 1978/9 to
1998/9. Unfavourable weather (El Nino in 1996/7, La Nina in 1997/8, and
Hurricane Mitch in 1998/9) had a major effect on Salvadorean production.
Compared with 1996/7, the national coffee harvest fell by 16 per cent in 1997/8
and by 28 per cent in 1998/9. In 1998, the world market price of coffee fell by
22 per cent from the previous year due to excess inventories in the consuming
countries and bountiful harvests in the largest producing countries. The com-
bined effect made 1998/9 a difficult year for both producers and cooperatives.
Table 4.5 shows the quantities of coffee sold by the seven cooperatives and
their gross revenues from the 1995/6 production year through 1999/2000. It
shows how project assistance enabled the cooperatives to move along the
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Figure 4.3 Coffee production in El Salvador, 1978/9-1998/9
value chain, selling fewer coffee cherries and more parchment coffee and
ground roasted coffee. In 1996/7, Cuscatlan gained access to the Nonualcos
processing facilities for parchment coffee production. During its first year
(1998/9), Siglo XXI sold only unprocessed coffee cherries; it began producing
parchment coffee in 1999/2000. Five cooperatives sold some parchment cof-
fee in 1999/2000.












































Source: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide's annual Impact Tracking System
ND - no data
Table 4.6 lists the estimated incremental gross revenue that the project
brought in for the cooperatives. The income gain is calculated by multiplying
the average incremental production over the baseline by the average price of
each product in each year. Because of the annual variations in coffee harvests
and prices, the baseline production was the average of the two years before the
project's investments in establishing or upgrading processing plants - 1994/5
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Table 4.6 Incremental gross producer income gains from coffee sales by the seven
cooperatives, 1996/7 to 1998/9 (US dollars)





















Source: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide's annual Impact Tracking System
Incremental production over the baseline (average for 1994/5 and 1995/6) multiplied by the average price of
each product in each year
and 1995/6 for Cuscatlan, La Union, Nonualcos and Grano de Oro, and
1996/7 and 1997/8 for Berlin and Jucuapenses. Since La Palma did not exist
before the project, all of its production was counted as project impact.
Since investments in the processing plants were not completed until 1996/7
and farmers did not receive project loans until 1996, the first year of incre-
mental income was 1996/7. Producer earnings were high that year but
dropped in 1997/8 before rebounding somewhat in 1998/9. Some cooperatives
earned additional income by selling agro-inputs and coffee seedlings to mem-
bers, but this income was not counted in Table 4.6 because the revenue the
cooperatives earned balanced out the cost to the member farmers.
Producer cost savings
Table 4.7 lists the cost savings to the producers due to the project. Farmers
saved money through integrated pest management, reduced water use and
partial substitution of coffee processing pulp for chemical fertilizer. Most of
the pulp was given free to cooperative members, but they were responsible
for transporting it - usually at the same time they bought supplies from the
cooperatives or delivered their coffee cherries. Farmers also saved money by
buying supplies at lower prices through the cooperatives, but this was not
counted because of lack of information.
The processing plants saved labour through use of new equipment. Several
cooperatives saved money through more efficient water use. Helicoidal con-
veyors, paddles and gravity flow eliminated using water to transport coffee
through the plant. The average water saving was 9.16 litres per kilogram of
coffee cherries.
Total monetary benefits
Table 4.8 lists the total monetary benefits from the project - the sum of the
producer cost savings and producer income gains. Benefits first accrued in
1995/6, increased 151 per cent in 1996/97, fell 58 per cent in 1997/8 and
rebounded 49 per cent in 1998/9. Further economic benefits are expected for
the years to come.
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Table 4.7 Producer cost savings for the farmers and cooperatives, 1995/6 to 1998/9
(US dollars)
Item 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 Cumulative
Farmers
Reduced pesticide use
Reduced chemical fertilizer use
Subtotal for farmers
Cooperatives
Labour saved in processing







































Source: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide's annual Impact Tracking System
Table 4.8 Total monetary benefit, 1995/6 to 1998/9 (US dollars)
1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 Cumulative
Total monetary benefits 272520.00 683486.00 286418.00 426381.00 1668805.00
Benefits per participant 273.89 210.30 131.63 271.93
Source: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide's annual Impact Tracking System
Recognition of project achievements
The achievements of the El Salvador project have been recognized in several
ways:
• In 1998, PROCAFE recognized a member of Nonualcos as 'Small-Scale
Coffee Farmer of the Year' for achieving a high yield.
• In 1998, IDE cited the El Salvador project as one of its four most success-
ful small projects in Latin America and the Caribbean.
• La Union received an honourable mention for its conservation practices
from the Salvadorean Executive Secretariat of the Environment.
Parallel, expansion and replication activities
The El Salvador project did not have the resources to work with all the
country's coffee producers. Opportunities existed to expand, which would
benefit more cooperatives and farmers within and outside of the country.
During and after the initial project, EnterpriseWorks Worldwide and SEM
began other activities in the region: establishment of a for-profit export mar-
keting company; a regional project for green coffee marketing in El
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua; construction of a joint green coffee pro-
cessing facility for nine cooperatives in El Salvador; and replication projects
in Guatemala and Haiti.
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Regional coffee marketing company
In the last year of the El Salvador project, Enterprise Works Worldwide estab-
lished a for-profit coffee export marketing company to benefit smallholder
farmers throughout Central America and Mexico. EnterpriseWorks provided
the capital to start the company, Comercializadora Regional de Cafe
(COMERCAFE). The company began operations on a pilot scale in 1998.
Based in El Salvador, its first director was an expatriate businessman with
extensive contacts in the coffee industry. Although he left in 1999, his work
resulted in commitments for coffee purchases through 2002. The second
director was a Salvadorean national.
COMERCAFE served as a broker for green coffee exports, linking local
producers with international buyers. It had a cupping facility to test the qual-
ity of coffee and helped the parties to negotiate, prepared the necessary
paperwork for export, and arranged shipping. COMERCAFE did not sell
coffee produced by the cooperatives participating in the original El Salvador
project because none produced significant quantities of export-quality green
coffee. It provided the seven cooperatives with a marketing manual and other
market information.
The EnterpriseWorks Worldwide regional coffee project
Before the end of the El Salvador project, EnterpriseWorks Worldwide
began planning a regional project for export marketing high-quality, green
coffee from second-tier cooperatives in several Central American countries
(Amaya and Gemeil 1997). The IDB multilateral investment fund supported
this subsequent regional project covering El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua (IDB 1998; 1999). The US$2.3 million initiative (US$1.6 million
from IDB and US$0.7 million in local counterpart contributions) focused on
export marketing of organic and gourmet coffees in the USA and Europe.
This project extends from May 1999 to April 2002.
The regional project is strengthening one second-tier cooperative in each
of the three countries. The three are the Union of Cooperatives of Agrarian
Reform Producers, Processors and Exporters (UCRAPROBEX) in El
Salvador, the Coffee Cooperatives Center of Honduras (CCCH) and the
Promoter of Cooperative Development of Nicaragua (PRODECOOP). The
regional project also provides technical assistance for coffee processing,
emphasizing quality and environmentally sound technology.
The EnterpriseWorks Worldwide and USAID project in El Salvador
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide submitted a proposal to the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) El Salvador mission for a follow-on
project to establish a joint facility for processing green coffee that would
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serve nine cooperatives (Amaya and Gemeil 2000). USAID gave
Enterprise Works Worldwide a grant of US$400000 for the project in 2000.
This project is assisting the seven cooperatives from the first IDE-funded El
Salvador project and two others - San Pedro Puxtla in Ahuachapan and
Perquin in Morazan. The nine cooperatives joined forces in a new second-tier
cooperative, Central de Cooperativas de Caficultores de El Salvador (CEN-
CAFES).This second-tier cooperative serves only small farmer cooperatives.
UCAFES served a mix of large and small coffee farmers, which created some
internal conflicts. The project extends from July 2000 to July 2002.
The nine cooperatives will bring their parchment coffee to a single dry-pro-
cessing facility operated by CENCAFES. The two cooperatives not in the
earlier project will receive additional technical assistance and wet-processing
equipment for parchment coffee production. The nine cooperatives will
jointly market their coffee. A specialized microfinance provider, Ayuda-
ACCION, will administer loans for farmers belonging to these cooperatives.
The Guatemala project
A small project in Guatemala followed the model of the El Salvador project.
This US$96 384 project was implemented with US$75 000 from the Starbucks
Coffee Company plus counterpart funding. This replication project assisted
two small cooperatives in the Jalapa area of Guatemala - Las Flores and Los
Corteces. The cooperatives are members of the Association of Small-Scale
Coffee Producers of Guatemala (ASPECAGUA). The National Coffee
Association of Guatemala (ANACAFE) and EnterpriseWorks worked
together to design and build two new, small facilities for parchment coffee
production.
These facilities adopted the technologies employed in the El Salvador proj-
ect for water conservation, water pollution control, and by-product pulp
recovery. Construction was completed at the end of 1997. Both facilities were
able to overcome initial quality control problems and Starbucks purchased
their entire output from the 1998/9 and 1999/2000 seasons.
The two processing plants have increased the incomes of 213 smallholder
coffee farmers. The cooperatives were repaying the construction costs
through loans at an interest rate of 21 per cent per annum. The repayments
were made into a revolving loan fund managed by ASPECAGUA that will be
used to help cooperatives in the association build processing plants (Gemeil
2000; Stosch 2000).
The Haiti Bleu project
With USAID funding, EnterpriseWorks Worldwide collaborated with the
South-East Consortium for International Development (SECID) and the
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Federation des Associations Cafeieres Natives (FACN) on a coffee subsector
study in north and south-east Haiti in 1999. In 2000, as part of a US$704 700
project, SECID awarded Enterprise Works Worldwide a contract to train
FACN to apply the study's recommendations for improving the quality of the
crop and the grading, storage, dry and wet processing, and export marketing
of Haitian Bleu coffee.
Project strategy and sustainability
The El Salvador project combined business development services with
credit for smallholder farmers and capital investment grants for
cooperatives. EnterpriseWorks Worldwide was primarily a business
service facilitator.13 It designed the project, raised funding and provided
technical and managerial assistance to its local affiliate, SEM. In turn, SEM
served as a service facilitator providing primary cooperatives with techno-
logical and managerial assistance. All of the cooperatives offered farmers
extension services, recouping costs indirectly through a margin on process-
ing and marketing of coffee and membership fees averaging US$11 to
US$23 per year. Some cooperatives made a profit by selling agro-inputs to
members.
During the project, SEM provided credit. Afterwards, the loan fund was
transferred to the first-tier cooperatives. At the time of the transfer, no loan
defaults had occurred and the value of the loan fund had grown. However,
after the first-tier cooperatives assumed management of the loan funds, the
delinquency rate increased substantially owing to a severe hurricane, a sharp
decline in the world market price for coffee and the cooperatives' inexperi-
ence in loan administration.
The project used a subsector approach to identify and overcome problems
affecting small-scale coffee production, processing and marketing. SEM was
able to operate with a small staff because, rather than providing services to
farmers direct, it coordinated the services and collaborated with other donor
agencies, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, government
agencies and cooperatives.
The project developed relationships among the cooperatives for
economies of scale in processing, efficient provision of technical and mana-
gerial assistance, sharing of market information and collaborative marketing
to increase their bargaining power. Since three of the cooperatives were too
small for commercially viable wet processing, the project brokered process-
ing agreements between them and larger cooperatives.
The processing agreement between the small Cuscatlan cooperative and
the larger Nonualcos cooperative was mutually beneficial. Nonualcos
charged a fee of US$0.18/kg of parchment coffee to process Cuscatlan's cof-
fee cherries. Cuscatlan sold most of the parchment coffee to a dry processor
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and exporter, retaining a small portion for final processing for the domestic
market. Cuscatlan was able to add value to members' coffee without high
capital or operating costs. Nonualcos benefited from the extra income from
better use of its processing plant.
Unfortunately, another collaboration proved unsuccessful. Two small, iso-
lated cooperatives, Berlin and Jucuapenses, contracted with La Esperanza for
processing services. La Esperanza ran into financial problems early in the
project and creditors seized its assets, including the coffee that the two coop-
eratives had delivered. SEM's attempts to recover the value of the seized
coffee were unsuccessful, but it did help the two cooperatives renegotiate
their bank loans to avoid bankruptcy.
SEM removed La Esperanza from all further project activities and recov-
ered a project motorcycle and computer. However, Berlin and Jucuapenses
were no longer interested in collaborating with other cooperatives. Instead,
they paid private companies to process their coffee cherries. Problems like
the one with La Esperanza could have been avoided by insisting that the
larger cooperative post a financial guarantee for the coffee delivered for serv-
ice processing.
Sustainability of SEM
In November 1996, ATI/El Salvador was transformed from a branch office
of an international NGO into the Salvadorean NGO, SEM, enabling it to
receive funding direct from donors. EnterpriseWorks Worldwide covered
SEM's expenditures that were not funded by other donors, including the
costs during the interim between the two IDB grants. EnterpriseWorks
Worldwide's financial support to SEM amounted to US$43187 in 1997,
US$39329 in 1998, US$60093 in 1999 and US$23400 in 2000. SEM also man-
aged a revolving loan fund for coffee cooperatives, using funds contributed
by COMERCAFE. SEM will keep the interest earned on these loans to
cover general office costs and retain the principal repayments in its loan
fund.
As NGOs facilitating business development services, rather than private
companies delivering those services, EnterpriseWorks Worldwide and SEM
will continue to need donor funding to assist additional coffee cooperatives
in El Salvador and other countries. COMERCAFE, the for-profit marketing
company, is also expected to generate some operating revenue for the NGO
activities.
Sustainability of the cooperatives
All of the cooperatives had serious financial problems before the project
started, and some were facing bankruptcy, partly because of the 12-year civil
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war that had devastated public infrastructure, disrupted agriculture, industry
and domestic consumption, and damaged some of the cooperatives' process-
ing plants. The project's approach to ensuring sustainability of the first-tier
cooperative was primarily to improve its revenue from processing and mar-
keting, membership fees and interest on loan funds that it managed.
The cooperatives and their members received subsidized technical and
marketing assistance. The cooperatives received grants for fixed capital
investments to upgrade or build new processing facilities (ranging from
US$46 700 to US$161 300). The cooperatives were expected to repay the
fixed capital investments with interest into revolving funds for future loans to
member farmers. After the project ended, three cooperatives used their own
funds to retain the project agronomists. Members of the other three cooper-
atives returned to relying on PROCAFE for extension services.
Grano de Oro had serious debt problems before the project started, and its
financial position subsequently deteriorated further because of managerial
problems and the insolvency of many of its member farmers. The high default
rate in fixed capital loans to its members increased its financial problems and
created internal conflicts. In 1998, these problems made it necessary to close
Grano de Oro. A new, smaller cooperative, Siglo XXI, was created to replace
it, but only financially solvent members of Grano de Oro were allowed to
join. SEM was represented on the board of this new cooperative and
intended for it to become a model in systems, controls and management.
SEM took over responsibility for the loan fund that had been transferred to
Grano de Oro and later turned over the capital from this fund to UCAFES
to compensate for Grano de Oro's outstanding debts.
Sustainability of the marketing company
In its first year of operation, COMERCAFE's total costs were close to
US$123 000. In its second year, costs fell to around US$65 500, largely because
the new director received a lower salary and commission than his predeces-
sor. COMERCAFE sold US$5.5 million of coffee in its first year, earning
over US$53000 in gross revenue. In 1999, its gross revenue was nearly
US$57000 and it provided market-brokering services for 22 cooperatives in
El Salvador that produced export-quality green coffee.
Enterprise Works Worldwide and SEM used some of COMERCAFE's net
revenue to fund development in El Salvador and Bolivia. The eventual own-
ership of the marketing company has not been decided. One proposal is to
sell or give shares in COMERCAFE to the second-tier cooperatives in the
regional project. Profits earned before the transfer would be donated to
SEM's revolving loan fund. An alternative is for SEM to retain ownership of
COMERCAFE and use some of its revenue to support its not-for-profit
activities.
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Lessons learned and conclusions
Some important lessons can be learned from the initial project in El Salvador.
Enterprise Works Worldwide began the project design with a subsector study
with substantial input by the stakeholders. A whole-subsector approach can
have large economic benefits, but it often takes considerable time and effort.
After project funding was secured, Enterprise Works Worldwide and SEM
conducted a detailed assessment of needs for each cooperative. The assess-
ments found that establishing a new wet-processing plant would not be viable
for the smallest cooperatives. Farmers who received project loans also bene-
fited from individual site assessments.
Like other crops, coffee is subject to risks such as weather, pests, diseases
and changing world market price. Severe weather adversely affected the
impact of the project. The collapse of the International Coffee Organization's
quota and price mechanism in 1989 reduced world market prices. While the
project plan and needs assessment discussed risks, the project did not include
interventions that could have mitigated risks, such as establishing a reserve
fund for each cooperative, trying to obtain crop insurance from private com-
panies or government, or hedging by arranging advance sales at an agreed
price.
Although coffee farmers were not generally the poorest of the poor in El
Salvador, most smallholder coffee farmers lived below the poverty line. The
project targeted clients with the potential to substantially increase their pro-
ductivity, product quality, income and employment.
Enterprise Works Worldwide and SEM facilitated technical and managerial
assistance to first-tier cooperatives that provided business development serv-
ices to their members. This allowed the local NGO to keep its staff size small.
This was possible because coffee farmers had already been organized into
cooperatives (organizing new cooperatives is costly). Partnerships with other
organizations built on the comparative advantage of each partner.
It is often more efficient and effective for one organization to provide a
whole package of services to rural enterprises rather than relying on a sepa-
rate provider for each service. Collaborations between small cooperatives
and large ones can be cost effective and sustainable but can run into prob-
lems if any of them are having financial difficulties. Written contracts with
financial safeguards can be developed to protect all parties. Having a first-tier
cooperative represented on the project's advisory committee can help to
ensure that the interests of the other client cooperatives are considered, but
it can also result in conflicts of interest. Relying on second-tier cooperatives
may be preferable because it would keep beneficiary interests separate from
intermediary functions.
Integrated business service delivery by one provider can allow indirect
cost-recovery mechanisms that are efficient and sustainable. Charging
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separate fees for each service often elicits more resistance from low-income
producers and is less efficient because of higher administrative costs.
Six cooperatives that the project assisted were in a precarious financial
position when the project was designed and might have faced bankruptcy in
the absence of the assistance. Because of the special circumstances of recon-
structing a war-torn economy and the weak state of the subsector, IDE
provided its support as non-reimbursable grants through an NGO, rather
than loans to the government. In effect, the capital investments for the pro-
cessing facilities were also grants, although the cooperatives were supposed
to pay the amounts back to a revolving loan fund for farmers. The subsequent
regional project that IDE funded was also a grant, but it did not subsidize
processing investments, just technical assistance.
The Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development has
raised questions about donor subsidies for business development pro-
grammes because of concerns about economic efficiency, sustainability, scale
of outreach and possible displacement of private sector services. However,
reconstructing an economy after war or a natural disaster is a legitimate use
of donor subsidies that should not be considered in the same category as sub-
sidizing business development services under more routine circumstances.
Business development services and credit are complementary. Many farm-
ers would have been unable to take full advantage of extension services and
improved inputs without credit. Low-income farmers need long-term financ-
ing for large fixed-capital investments, but loans with a long repayment
period can cause problems for credit providers.
Small processing facilities can sometimes be upgraded and can be better
for the environment, affordable and even profitable. Adopting better tech-
nology can generate by-products for sale, or reduce production costs through
more efficient use of resources. Some international consumers are willing to
pay a premium price for a product with less negative environmental impact
or a positive impact on resource conservation or biodiversity. Although these
niche markets are small, they are growing rapidly.
By collaborating with the privatized agricultural extension agency funded
by an export levy, the project avoided duplicating services and kept costs
lower. Three of the cooperatives continued to provide the more intensive
extension services for their members after the project ended. The rest
received regular services from the privatized agency.
The project initially administered the loan fund with input from an advi-
sory committee. Loan loss rates were low during SEM's administration. At
the end of the project, responsibility was transferred to the first-tier cooper-
atives and default rates went up. Unusually bad weather and a large drop in
the world market price of coffee played a major role in the increased default
rates. However, SEM also thought that the cooperatives were not ready to
take on loan management. Credit administration was often problematic for
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first-tier cooperatives because the interests of management at times con-
flicted with those of the voting members.
It might have been more efficient and sustainable to provide credit
through a specialized microfinance provider, although the external risk fac-
tors would still have posed a problem. A larger and more diversified credit
portfolio that included loans for other agricultural crops as well as non-agri-
cultural purposes might have faced less risk.
While cost recovery from services is important, NGOs that facilitate or
provide business services for low-income microenterpreneurs and farmers
will continue to need funding from donors or private contributors to reach
more people in the future. It is much more difficult to recover costs for facil-
itating business services than for providing them. SEM earned some income
by contracting out its professional services in other countries.
A for-profit marketing company may have greater incentives and skills to
operate efficiently than an NGO marketing unit. It is also more likely to be
sustainable and taken seriously by private buyers. In an era of declining
donor funding, NGOs may increase their sustainability through entrepre-
neurial funding, such as operation or sale of a for-profit company. However,
the start-up costs and time required to achieve profitability in a business ven-
ture should not be underestimated and capital of the private company should
not be siphoned off to fund the NGO. An expatriate businessperson with sub-
stantial marketing contacts was essential in COMERCAFE's start-up phase.
Responsibility was successfully transferred to a host country national direc-
tor at substantially lower cost.
Expanding to other countries in the region can increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of export marketing. Replicating pilot activities in new locations
and expanding into other activities in the subsector can expand outreach and
scale up benefits. Although they involve more risk than the well-proven inter-
ventions, research, development and pilot activities are important functions
not filled by most NGOs or government agencies.
Worldwide, much work needs to be done to put the principles behind the
report of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (Agenda 21) into practice. Since then, globalization of the
world economy has increased and developing countries have sought greater
integration into international trade. Some of the opposition to globalization
has centred around concerns about the effects on low-income, small-scale
producers and the local and global environments.
This study shows a case in which increasing exports from a developing
country can raise the incomes of small-scale producers without negative envi-
ronmental impacts. To achieve these objectives, however, it was necessary to
increase the value added locally through further processing and boost the
competitiveness of small-scale production and processing by transferring
appropriate technologies and making training and technical assistance, credit,
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business management assistance, and marketing services available. NGOs can
help to bridge these gaps.
The case study also has some important implications for the donor guidelines
for business development services for small enterprises. To the extent that pri-
vate markets for BDS exist, building their capacity can be an efficient and
effective way to foster economic development. However, developing the market
for BDS should be viewed as a means to an end, rather than an ultimate goal.
Special challenges are involved in reaching rural microenterprises and the
agricultural sector compared to urban small enterprises, which are more
likely to be served by private sector BDS providers.
A systems approach with multiple, coordinated interventions and a greater
NGO or public role in service provision may be needed to develop a whole
subsector of rural production. Some of these services may be short term, but
others may require a longer, continuing role.
Increasing cost recovery in NGO programmes through direct fees for serv-
ices or indirect mechanisms is one element of sustainability. Another
approach may be for NGOs to spin off commercial ventures that provide
business services. The NGO can eventually either exit entirely or use some of
the profits generated to cover its own operating costs.
BDS and credit are complementary, but it may be best for BDS facilita-
tors or providers to link up with a specialized microfinance institution that
has greater expertise in loan administration, the volume of loans needed to
achieve economies of scale, and a more diversified loan portfolio.
Notes
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Victor Mencia (SEM) and
the staff of SEM. Helpful comments were received from Gilberto Amaya
(EnterpriseWorks Worldwide), Pam Fehr (MEDA), Jose Gemeil (EnterpriseWorks
Worldwide), Sunita Kapila (IDRC), Steve Londner (TechnoServe) and Don Mead
(Michigan State University).
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide received core funding from the US Agency for
International Development through Cooperative Agreement DHR 5455-00-
9082-00-PCE/A/00/96/90021/00.
2 EnterpriseWorks Worldwide was formerly known as Appropriate Technology
International (ATI) and SEM as ATI/El Salvador.
3 All monetary values are in US dollars using an exchange rate of 8.75 colones per
dollar. The exchange rate was stable between 1994 and 2000.
4 Since the coffee-processing season is November to February, a production year
spans part of two calendar years.
5 The first stage (wet processing) involves depulping, washing, drying and ferment-
ing the cherries, and results in parchment coffee. The second stage (dry
processing) includes cleaning, dehusking and sifting of parchment coffee to pro-
duce green coffee, named for the greenish cast of the beans. The third stage (final
processing) involves roasting and, in some cases, grinding and is generally done in
industrialized countries.
6 The 547 000 tonnes of coffee processed in Central America in 1998 resulted in dis-
charges of 1.1 million tonnes of pulp that polluted 110 000 cubic metres of water
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per day over six months. These discharges were equivalent to the sewage pro-
duced by a city of 4 million people (Rice and Ward 1996).
7 Subsequent references to seven cooperatives include La Palma.
8 Small-scale coffee farmers in Latin America generally did not use the recom-
mended protective masks, clothing and boots when applying pesticides. In 1993
and 1994, more than 200 human poisonings in Colombia, four fatal, were attrib-
uted to this pesticide (Rice and Ward 1996).
9 La Palma was not included in the credit component.
10 The inflation rate averaged 5.5 per cent per year from 1994 to 1999.
11 The Global Environment Facility is implemented by the United Nations
Development Programme, the United Nations Environmental Programme and
the World Bank.
12 One worker can harvest a 48-kg bag of coffee cherries in a day.
13 Tanburn et al. (2001) contains complete definitions of business development
service terms.
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Small-scale farmers make up 60 per cent of Ghana's farming population and
contribute nearly half of the country's GDP. Yet they have little economic
clout and remain classic 'price-takers', generally isolated from market infor-
mation and profitable market opportunities. According to a 1995 World Bank
report, the two most vulnerable occupational groups in the country are food-
and export-crop farmers, of whom 39 and 37 per cent respectively had annual
incomes below the poverty line.1
An important reason that the smallholders lack clout is that traditionally
they have been limited to being primary producers only. Without access to
storage and processing facilities, smallholders had little choice but to sell their
crops to traders, who then sold to large commercial firms that dominate high-
value processing and marketing. Moreover, the cash requirements of most
smallholders generally force them to sell their produce at harvest time when
prices are lowest. Later, many must buy back these same basic foodstuffs
from the traders, paying significantly more than they originally received.
Consequently, poor households are often unable to purchase enough to meet
their basic needs, and many end up hungry and malnourished.
The low prices that farmers receive for their produce also restrict the finan-
cial and human resources they are prepared to invest in farming. This is
because many farmers cannot afford adequate agricultural inputs for their
needs, and where they expect to receive only low prices for their crops, they
are unwilling to expend their limited resources on harvesting and post-har-
vest activities. As a result, post-harvest losses in Ghana are heavy, with grain
loss running as high as 30 per cent.
Farmers could increase their power in the marketplace by establishing
groups and cooperatives. Thus they could pool their resources, gain access to
bank credit, acquire production and processing equipment, purchase inputs in
bulk, and get higher prices for their produce through collective processing and
marketing. However, since the liquidation of the Alliance of Ghana Co-opera-
tives in 1957 and the transfer of its assets of over £4.5 million (much of which
was made up of members' savings) to a highly politicized rival body, farmers
have been understandably suspicious of formal cooperatives. Currently, the
cooperative movement in the country is weak, with relatively few groups active.
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TechnoServe
Established in 1968, TechnoServe promotes the creation and strengthening of
rural, agriculture-based enterprises by
• providing direct technical and managerial assistance to existing enterprises
• promoting and assisting the establishment of individual or cooperative
enterprises
• promoting links between client enterprises and large-scale commercial
marketing companies
• strengthening the capacity of local enterprise-support institutions
• providing financial intermediation to improve the access of client enter-
prises to credit.
TechnoServe has an enterprise-development methodology for all its activities
worldwide, based on subsector analysis, the delivery of integrated technical
assistance and financial intermediation to client enterprises, and replication
of successful models of assistance. In a recent change of strategy, and in addi-
tion to its traditional focus on group enterprises, TechnoServe has started
supporting individually owned enterprises that deliver services to the rural
poor. It is expected that the general capacity-building activities for groups,
which have been central to TechnoServe's approach, will be phased out over
a number of years through a process in which TechnoServe's roles will be
transferred to other support organizations in the country.
Established in 1971, the Ghana programme is TechnoServe's oldest pro-
gramme worldwide. It operates an annual budget of US$2 million and has
almost 100 staff, including two expatriates and a local team with specialities
in agronomy, engineering, marketing, finance, accounting, sociology and man-
agement information systems. Funding sources include the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the government of Ghana,
numerous private foundations, churches, and members of the communities in
which TechnoServe works.
For much of its history, TechnoServe-Ghana has implemented programmes
covering many activities, including charcoal making, sugarcane syrup produc-
tion, vegetable production, pottery making and rabbit rearing. In recent years
it has focused on a few subsectors to achieve greater impact. Core activities
at present are
• non-traditional export crop development
• cereal crop storage and marketing
• palm oil production and marketing.
TechnoServe-Ghana operates in 210 rural communities throughout the coun-
try, directly assisting 76147 clients and direct beneficiaries and an estimated
318437 indirect beneficiaries, half of whom are women.
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Business development services that the project provides
TechnoServe-Ghana's cereal crop storage and marketing programme - here-
after called 'the project' - has evolved in response to changing conditions and
lessons learned (see section 'Support to farmer groups'). The project intro-
duced inventory credit to Ghana, and since 1989 has focused on helping to
provide this financial service. Inventory credit uses stored produce as collat-
eral for commercial loans. The project acts as an intermediary between the
groups it supports and financial institutions. The groups receive a loan equal
to 75 per cent of the harvest-time price of the produce stored in group-man-
aged warehouses. This loan is distributed pro rata among members according
to the amount of grain they store. Group members can either redeem their
crop as food in the period before the next harvest or sell it at the higher, lean-
season price. The financial institution is repaid (capital and interest) after the
stored produce is sold or redeemed. The remaining income is distributed pro
rata among members after a fee is deducted for crop treatment and storage.2
The success of the credit scheme depends on other services that the proj-
ect provides. Capacity building is necessary to enable farmers' groups to
develop a constitution, elect officials, conduct regular meetings, keep records,
manage loans and undertake other activities. The project has also helped to
improve crop treatment and storage techniques, thus reducing post-harvest
losses and permitting farmers to hold their crops until market prices rise.
Previously farmers stored crops in their own houses, and infestation and
spoilage were common.
The project helps farmers to develop links with large-scale, formal-sector
buyers of their produce to maximize income from their crops. It is also sup-
porting a new umbrella organization of its client groups, the Farmers' Service
Multipurpose Co-operative Union (FASCU), to strengthen their capacity for
autonomous development.
One effect of inventory credit has been to increase the volume of grain
stored after harvest. The increased volume available, however, reduces the
value of grain in the lean season. Realizing that this would be the case, the
project seeks other value-adding activities for its cereal crop-producing
farmer groups. These activities include mechanically drying grains, introduc-
ing new maize varieties and grading maize for niche marketing.
This case study focuses on project activities in the subsector from the time
when the inventory credit model was introduced in 1989. It has been pre-
pared by analysing project documents, interviewing project staff and visiting
project sites in November 1999.
Rates of exchange
Sharp devaluation of the Ghanaian cedi (GHC) in recent years and the asso-
ciated price inflation make comparisons over time using this currency
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misleading (Table 5.1). Therefore, most values are given in US dollars.
Although using the dollar somewhat distorts the picture on the ground, since
smallholder farmers do not immediately or fully see their incomes adjusted
by the new rates, the distortion is usually not great.
Table 5.1 Value of the Ghanaian cedi against the US dollar and cedi inflation rate,
1992-99






















Cereal crop storage and marketing project: a description
Brief history of the project
Early TechnoServe support in the mid- to late 1980s was through participa-
tion in a programme with other agencies to disseminate 'green revolution'
technologies in an attempt to replicate Asia's success in increasing agricul-
tural production. Those technologies were immediately popular and farmers
doubled or tripled their yields. However, marketing proved a problem, and
the principal effect of the bumper crops, particularly maize and sorghum, was
to depress local prices and reduce farmer incomes. Consequently, credit
repayment was poor, and TechnoServe staff were compelled to assume debt
collecting and advisory responsibilities.
In response, TechnoServe discontinued facilitating access to production
credit and focused instead on helping farmers to obtain loans to store and
market their grain to earn greater profits and improve their food security.
This new model - inventory credit on stored produce - has remained the core
element of TechnoServe's support to cereal producers to the present.
TechnoServe's new support model was launched on a pilot basis between
1989 and 1992, working with groups in the Central, Volta and Eastern
Regions. Initially commercial banks were unwilling to provide credit for the
scheme without a full loan guarantee, having incurred losses in several previ-
ous credit programmes for smallholder farmers. The Dutch Ecumenical
Development Cooperative Service provided the necessary guarantee facility
and the Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana (ADB) provided loans for
the project.
The economic impact of the pilot project was limited, although it had some
achievements. TechnoServe's private sector approach of promoting
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commercial bank loans and market rates for inputs was not readily accepted.
This was because maize was a primary food crop for farmers in the target
areas, and getting them to adopt a commercial attitude towards its production
and marketing was difficult. Furthermore, many communities in these areas
had benefited from a history of relief programmes providing heavily subsi-
dized credit, agricultural inputs and food supplements.
The desire to work with more commercially oriented farmers and to
expand its services to other areas led the project to begin operations in 1992/3
in the Brong-Ahafo Region, where the highly productive 'maize triangle' is
located. The scheme immediately had greater impact there on participating
farmers' incomes and on the number of participating farmers and farmer
groups.3
TechnoServe began operations in the Upper West Region in 1991 in a
World Bank-funded initiative implemented jointly with the Department of
Cooperatives. The aim of this project was to train farmer groups to take over
and manage the assets of the state-owned Farmers' Service Company
(FASCOM). Inventory credit was part of the assistance package and was
used to fund the storage of maize, sorghum, groundnut and rice.4
To diversify its sources of finance for the initiative, the project obtained
funds from the Ghana Ecumenical Church Loan Fund on more favourable
terms than those provided by ADB. Seeing the success of the model, together
with its consistent realization of 100 per cent repayment rates, ADB dropped
its loan guarantee requirement and in 1995 recommenced funding the proj-
ect-supported groups.
A number of factors have combined to stimulate the significant increase in
the volume of stored cereal crops (and the resulting fall in profitability of
inventory credit) from the mid-1990s:
• the introduction by ADB in 1997/8 of an inventory credit scheme for
traders to buy maize stocks in bulk
• the import of maize (a particularly serious problem during the 1998/9 sea-
son), which had a distorting effect on the market
• the generally good harvests of the past two growing seasons5
• the significant growth in the geographical spread of the project and the
number of participating farmers and farmer groups. This was facilitated in
part by the pilot project of a World Bank-funded initiative, the Village
Infrastructure Project (VIP), implemented by a number of support agen-
cies, including TechnoServe. Under this pilot, new financial resources were
mobilized, four rural banks introduced inventory credit into their portfolio,
and the number of participating groups experienced rapid growth
• the launching of another inventory credit programme by the Adventist
Development and Relief Agency in the maize triangle in 1997. This pro-
gramme now covers 75 farmer groups
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• widespread adoption of the crop treatment and storage techniques intro-
duced by the project in collaboration with the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture (MoFA) by non-participating farmers. These farmers use these
techniques without taking inventory credit.
The combination of these factors, together with the bumper harvests in
1997/8 and 1998/9, meant that over those two years inventory credit delivered
meagre returns and ADB was left with large deposits of grain that it could
not sell.
Those years may have marked the beginning of the end of the viability of
inventory - or they may have been just a blip in the long-term trend.
However, the project managers always recognized that the scheme's prof-
itability was of limited duration, and consequently they worked to identify
other potential value-adding activities for their client farmers (see
'Promotion of other value-adding activities for small-scale cereal crop
producers').
Support to farmer groups
Establishing and strengthening farmer groups has been central to
TechnoServe's traditional approach in developing successful rural enterprises
(although a new orientation in global policy will phase out general capacity
building for farmer groups and emphasize support for group and individual
enterprises). The process of mobilizing and strengthening groups varies little
among the various TechnoServe-supported activities.6
Many of the groups working with TechnoServe were in existence before
the project came to Ghana, although they were generally less active. To qual-
ify for TechnoServe support, a group must
• have a formal constitution and democratically elected leaders and hold
regular meetings
• be recognized by financial institutions and have operated a bank account
for at least six months
• be willing to invest equity capital in group enterprises
• be willing to sign a formal management assistance agreement with
TechnoServe and pay a fee for TechnoServe services
• have a savings scheme for its members to ensure they continue to store
their crops without the need for credit when profit margins from inventory
credit fall.
TechnoServe's business advisers (BAs) - mostly university-level extension
staff - are responsible for supporting the groups. A team of BAs based at each
TechnoServe zonal office has a range of skills including community
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animation, sociology, agronomy, engineering and accounting. On average,
each BA supports ten groups.
Experience has demonstrated that internal group cohesion, transparency
and trust among members are central to the success of group economic activ-
ities. Over the past decade, TechnoServe has devoted progressively greater
efforts to engendering these attributes among its client groups. Its support has
shifted from being purely technical to a more balanced approach, reflecting
the importance of effective community mobilization and organization. It has
also placed greater emphasis on training women, who typically have less
access to formal training than their male counterparts. Each group maintains
its books and accounts using a system developed by TechnoServe. The BAs
train and supervise the farmers in all aspects of accounting and record keep-
ing. The accounting system has been simplified over time, both to increase the
ability of group members to maintain and use their records to inform busi-
ness decisions and to reduce the time the BAs spend on training and technical
assistance.
The project also provides several project-specific services.
• It supplies critical market information on prices, including information on
import shipments or other potentially market-distorting events. This helps
the groups decide when to sell their stored grain.
• It trains the groups in tracking local market trends themselves.
• It works with the groups to establish and strengthen umbrella organiza-
tions that will be able to take over the functions currently performed by the
project. One such body, FASCU, has been established in the Brong-Ahafo
Region. Opportunities are being explored in the north for forming a com-
pany - with farmers and TechnoServe sharing the equity investment - to
take over crop marketing.
TechnoServe's support of FASCU has been through advising it on develop-
ing a constitution and working methods and by funding a visit of two
members of the FASCU executive to a similar but more established organi-
zation in Nigeria. The project is conscious of the need to allow FASCU to
develop in an organic manner and at a pace that is comfortable for its mem-
bers. Consequently, TechnoServe has not developed a blueprint for it.
Farmer groups pay fees for TechnoServe's assistance. This is to recover
costs for TechnoServe and to imbed a commercial attitude among the farm-
ers. In 1998/9 this fee was GHC 250 (US$0.08) per bag stored.
Improved treatment and storage
Smallholders were largely unfamiliar with effective storage techniques for
cereal crops before the project started. Typically, part of the crop was stored
100
Box 5.1 FASCU
FASCU is an umbrella organization representing all the groups in the maize tri-
angle that are supported by the project. It operates on two tiers: each group has
three representatives on a zonal executive committee. Each zonal committee
represents about eight groups. These committees meet monthly; each zonal
executive, in turn, sends three representatives to sit on the national executive
committee, which covers the entire maize triangle.
FASCU is proving to be an important channel for communication between the
project and farmer groups. Business advisers are now able to communicate
with and receive information from participant farmers without having to travel to
each group.
FASCU is funded exclusively by fees from group members. Registration with
FASCU currently costs a group 6HC100000 (US$32). Monthly dues of
QHC1000 (US$0.32) per member are allocated 30 per cent to the group, 40
per cent to the zonal committee, 30 per cent to the national committee.
TechnoServe hopes to be able to withdraw from significant involvement in the
project by the end of 2001 and foresees FASCU playing a growing role in
delivering the services that TechnoServe currently provides.
at home after harvest for consumption, but it could not be held long without
suffering from post-harvest losses, which were generally high, reaching 30 per
cent in some cases.
The project worked with experts from the Post-Harvest Management
Division of MoFA to develop improved treatment and storage techniques for
the groups. The techniques developed involved drying the crops either on
patios (concrete strips constructed for the purpose) or in cribs resting on pal-
lets to allow ventilation. The patios were new to Ghana, but the cribs had
been used previously. The project has significantly increased crib use and also
promoted an improved, rodent-free model.
Drying time depends on the crop: rice and groundnut take about three
weeks, and maize up to two months. The crops are then shelled or husked,
cleaned of all foreign matter and taken to the group warehouse where they
are checked for moisture content, insect infestation, mould and broken ker-
nels. This is done by a group member trained by the project in quality control.
A MoFA-trained group member then sprays with insecticide the grain that
meets quality standards. Farmers are now largely able to obtain chemicals
and spray their crops without any help from the project.
In most cases, group members provide storage facilities - either rooms in
their houses or other buildings. Occasionally premises are hired for this.
Building materials for 40 storage warehouses were provided as a grant
under the VIP pilot phase, and participating communities built these
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voluntarily. In the 1998/9 season, 33 more warehouses were built using funds
from TechnoServe's Development Assistance Project and materials and
labour from participating communities.
Three hermetically sealed grain-storage cocoons from the USA were intro-
duced under the VIP pilot phase. These structures control insects by
preventing outside entrance of oxygen. Studies are under way to determine
their economic feasibility for crop storage.
Intermediation between groups and financial institutions
The project acts as an intermediary between client groups and financial
institutions, without which the inventory credit scheme would not be
possible.
• First, before the harvest, the BAs find out how much grain the groups
intend to store and how much credit they will need. The project uses these
projections to negotiate commercial facilities with the lenders.
• Second, the BAs inspect the crops as they are deposited at the storage facil-
ities to verify that both quantity and quality agree with the inventory
declaration.
• Third, the project monitors group records and activities to ensure that loan
repayments are made to the bank before the group members are paid for
their crops, thereby ensuring that the loans are repaid on schedule.
Several participating financial institutions, particularly rural banks and the
NGO Sinapi Aba Trust, which has been lending to groups in the north since
1997/8, have extension staff who participate in the monitoring activities. In
fact the project has trained staff of a number of financial institutions in these
skills. However, these extension staff are too few and do not have the neces-
sary logistical support to cater for the entire project coverage. Without the
intermediation role of the project there is no doubt that the participating
financial institutions would suspend inventory credit for smallholders.
The project provides these services without charge. An attempt to charge
the institutions a fee was dropped when ADB indicated that it would increase
the interest charged to producer groups by 2 per cent to cover this. The
project considers that the interest rate charged to farmers is already high, and
increasing it would not be justifiable.
Marketing support
The project links its client groups with large-scale grain buyers to develop
reliable markets, reduce transport and other transaction costs, and obtain
higher prices. Deals have been successfully brokered by the project with two
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such buyers. In 1998/9, a single buyer bought all the maize in the maize
triangle sold by the groups. Other marketing avenues are being explored.
Members of the FASCU executive also are increasingly participating in
meetings between the project and potential clients.
Promotion of other value-adding activities for small-scale cereal crop
producers
It has always been clear that the profitability of the inventory scheme
would decline over time as the volume of grain stored at harvest time
grew. Consequently, an important element of the project's long-term strategy
has been to identify and develop other value-adding activities in the subsector.
TechnoServe is currently exploring several such activities. The economic via-
bility of mechanical maize drying is being studied. Newly harvested maize
takes around two months to dry with sun drying, and a certain level of
spoilage and breaking of kernels is inevitable. Maize dried with mechanical
dryers is of higher quality and reaches the market at a time of relative scarcity
- and thus earns a high premium. If mechanical maize drying is deemed
viable, individual farmers will be invited to develop business plans, and the
project will help them to get credit and identify suitable technology.
The project is also helping cereal farmers to exploit high-value niches for
food and drink products. A multinational corporation with a production plant
in Ghana is working with farmers to identify the potential of specific varieties
of maize for commercial beer brewing, poultry feed and children's food. The
project is also investigating the possibility of the farmer groups themselves
grading their grain. This would give them access to higher-value markets for
top-quality crops.
Project management
At the apex of TechnoServe's structure is the head office in the United States,
which comprises regional offices for Africa and Latin America; the market-
ing, finance, human resources and administration departments; and the office
of the president. TechnoServe maintains an extensive field presence for proj-
ect implementation through ten country offices or affiliates in Africa, Asia,
Latin America and Poland. TechnoServe-Ghana has a head office in Accra;
zonal offices in Kumasi, Techiman and Tamale; and subzonal offices in Wa
and Bolgatanga (reporting to the Tamale zonal office) and Cape Coast
(reporting to the Kumasi zonal office). The head office comprises the finance,
research and development, and Microenterprise Development Assistance
Service (MIDAS) departments.
TechnoServe plays a leading role in identifying and developing potentially
profitable economic activities. Since poor farmers themselves do not
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generally have access to the information or resources necessary to identify
and test market opportunities, TechnoServe sets itself the task of doing this
for them. Although client farmers and the BAs inevitably feed into this
process, it is the research and development and the MIDAS departments
that lead it. This appears inevitable in view of the role that TechnoServe
seeks to perform: professional researchers have much better access than
farmers or project field staff to information on macroeconomic trends,
potential market niches and appropriate technology. They are also better
placed for the financial analysis required to gauge the profitability of
potential activities.7
Both the research and development and the MIDAS departments are well
equipped for the role of identifying and developing new business ideas. Their
staff includes economists, agriculturists, technologists and a healthy mix of
those with private sector and NGO experience. They also have funds to hire
specialist consultancy advice where necessary.
Once new business concepts have been introduced there is a notable level
of participation in their implementation and development by both client
farmers and TechnoServe staff at zonal and subzonal levels. The BAs and the
farmer groups, for example, played an important role in developing FASCU.
Village-level meetings recognized the need for the umbrella organization to
increase the number of groups the project reaches. Responsibility for all
operational matters (holding elections, arranging meetings, developing agen-
das, establishing fees, deciding on policy, and so on) was left entirely to the
client groups.
At zonal and subzonal levels, monthly strategy meetings are held involving
all TechnoServe staff where ideas for new activities or for innovations in
existing ones are discussed. Those agreed upon are included as proposals in
the monthly reports made to head office. These reports also include impact-
monitoring data on a wide range of performance indicators collected by the
BAs. TechnoServe-Ghana issues progress reports on all its activities every six
months.
Periodic cost-effectiveness analysis may be carried out at key moments in
the life of a project to appraise project strategy and achievements. This oper-
ation employs a standard methodology worldwide for evaluating all
TechnoServe activities.
Project performance
For the most part, the data used here are derived from project records of
actual costs and benefits. Reference is also made to a cost-effectiveness analy-
sis of the inventory credit programme that TechnoServe recently completed.




In describing the project's impact, data will be disaggregated between two
distinct zones: the north and the south. Disaggregated data are available since
1992/3 for the south but only for 1997/8 and 1998/9 for the north.
In the north there is only one growing season, production levels of crops
stored (maize, cowpea, rice, groundnut, millet and sorghum) are relatively
low, and project impact is primarily in terms of improved food security; up to
60 per cent of cereal stored under the project is redeemed. Any stored crops
that are sold are managed individually, as most farmers redeem some of their
crop to sell in local markets to handle their periodic needs for cash.
There are two growing seasons in the south (major and minor), maize is the
only grain stored, yields are relatively high, and the larger portion of stored
produce is sold. Generally the groups handle the selling, and where possible
they sell in bulk.
Participating groups and farmers
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the growth in participation since the project was
launched in the maize triangle in 1992/3. Participation fell after 1993/4, after
more than doubling in the south between 1992/3 and 1993/4. The fall in par-
ticipation was caused by bad weather in several years in the mid-1990s that
produced low yields and consequently higher harvest-time prices: farmers
had little surplus crop to sell and little incentive to hold it in view of the rel-
atively high price offered at harvest time.
Favourable weather and large harvests contributed to the sharp increase in
project coverage from 1997/8. However, the primary factor was the large
increase in the size of TechnoServe's programme: staff numbers grew from 43
Figure 5.1 Growth in the number of participating groups
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Figure 5.2 Growth in the number of participating farmers
in 1996 to 71 in 1997,85 in 1998 and 97 in 1999, and the project spread to areas
serviced by its newly opened offices in Bolgatanga, Cape Coast and Kumasi.
The fall in participation in the south in 1998/9 was due to several factors
that led to a flooding of the market and reduction in profit margins from
inventory credit: the expanded availability of inventory credit to traders from
banks; maize imports; good harvests; extension of the project's reach; and
adoption of project techniques by non-participating farmers. The effect of
these factors was stronger in the south, where the commercial grain market is
more developed. The extremely high interest rates - currently running at 43
per cent relative to an inflation rate of 18 per cent - also discourage partici-
pation in the inventory credit scheme.8
The number of women participants has grown with the project, reaching 50
per cent in 1997/8 (57 per cent from the north, 44 per cent from the south)
before dropping to 41 per cent in 1998/9 (43 per cent north, 35 per cent
south). The main reason that women were not recorded as participants in the
early years of the project is that men controlled household resources and
therefore grain stored was registered under their names. Women have
become more active in the groups and correspondingly more likely to store
crops under their own name as the project has gone on.
Credit mobilized
Trends in the volume of credit to farmers mirror the patterns of growth of the
project (Table 5.2). Following strong growth in credit volumes between 1992
and 1994, poor harvests in two of the succeeding three years substantially
reduced credit demand. This changed from 1997/8 with the increase in size
and geographical coverage of the project. The relative rise in the amount of
credit taken in 1995/6 and 1996/7 compared with 1994/5 can be explained by
the groups' participation in VIP.
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However, the average amount of credit that farmers take is falling (Table
5.3). This is due to the increased size of the project in the north, where farm-
ers typically use less than half the amount of credit, compared with those in
the south, and to a reduction in the use of credit in the south because of the
falling profit margins.




























Loan repayment rates on inventory credit have generally been steady at
100 per cent. The only exception are several groups in the Techiman area that
have outstanding interest payments from the 1997/8 season. This has only
recently come to light and is being dealt with.
Crops stored
Production levels in the north are relatively low (Table 5.4). Despite the fact
that the north had more than twice as many participating farmers in 1998/9,
northern farmers stored only 60 per cent more crop than their southern
counterparts.
Farmers in the north, unlike those in the south, store a number of crops
other than maize (Table 5.5).
All the crops stored in the north are produced by participating farmers, all
of whom take inventory credit. In the south, however, stored grain falls under
three categories:
• maize produced and stored by participating farmers for which inventory
credit is taken
• maize produced and stored by participating farmers but for which no credit
is taken. This is called 'simple storage', and a fee is charged only for treat-
ment and storage
• maize purchased by groups from non-participating farmers to meet the
credit allocated by the financial institution. This is called 'buy-sell'. In some
cases, groups deliberately overestimate their storage needs to generate
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Table 5.4 Total volume of crops stored (tonnes)













































extra income from the buy-sell operations or to compensate for unexpect-
edly low demand for storage by members.
Between 1992 and 1994, all farmers in the south took inventory credit for all
their stored produce. Simple storage was introduced in 1994/5 but has never
accounted for more than 6 per cent of the total maize stored.
Buy-sell operations accounted for 11 per cent of the total maize stored in
1992/3,10 per cent in 1993/4 and 19 per cent in 1994/5. However, it dropped
sharply after that, reaching zero in 1998/9. This is probably because of the
falling profits from inventory credit.
Sharp differences exist between the north and the south in how farmers
use stored grain (Tables 5.6, 5.7). A significant proportion of maize in the
north is redeemed mainly for household consumption, although some is sold
to meet cash requirements. In the south all stored maize is sold cooperatively,
except in exceptional circumstances.
The majority of farmers in the north redeem some of their grain (65 per
cent in 1997/8 and 78 per cent in 1998/9), but relatively few farmers in the
south do so. A small but growing proportion of farmers in the south store
their grain in the group warehouse and benefit from cooperative marketing
without taking inventory credit. With credit being so expensive, this is a more
profitable course for those who can afford to store without taking loans.
If, as appears likely, the margins from inventory credit continue to fall, the
number of farmers involved in simple storage in the south is certain to grow.
The project has reduced the loan available to farmers from 75 per cent of the
total value of stored grain to 60 per cent, to be lowered further afterwards.
Client farmers in the south appear to be in broad agreement with the
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Table 5.6 Crops sold or redeemed (percentage)
Area 1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9
North





Table 5.7 Farmers redeeming or simply storing inventoried crops














































*ICP - Inventory Credit Programme
proposal and are keen to reduce their dependence on credit. Their group sav-
ings schemes will help to reduce their dependence on the banks. Cuts in credit
levels will be considerably more difficult to achieve in the north.
Benefits
Calculating the benefits of the project is a highly complex process involving
many variables, such as various prices for different crops; differential benefits
of selling and redemption, buy-sell and simple storage; income to groups and
individual farmers; timing of selling; and prevailing market prices. A summary
of the total project benefits is presented here rather than a step-by-step
account of how the benefits have been calculated (Table 5.8, Figure 5.3.)9
Table 5.8 Financial benefits per 135-kg bag of maize from inventory credit sales,
redemption and simple storage (US$)



















































The 'maxi bag' traditionally used in Ghana weighs 135 kg.
*IC = inventory credit
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Simple storage is the most profitable option, yielding in most cases more
than double the returns of inventory credit. Similarly, holding produce to sell
when prices peak can bring significantly higher returns than the savings gen-
erated by redemption.
The year-on-year percentage differential between harvest and selling













Trends in prices and benefits are subject to a number of variables, the most
important of which are the size of the harvest, the scale of inventory credit
allocations nationwide, and market-distorting maize imports. The relative
effect of these factors on prices and benefits, however, has not been deter-
mined and no simple, linear pattern is evident in the data available (Table 5.7,
Figure 5.3). Recently, though, the trend in harvest and selling prices and incre-
mental benefits from inventory credit has been downward. But the times
might have been exceptional and prices might rise again.
Figure 5.3 Trends in financial benefits per 135-kg bag of maize accruing from
inventory credit sales (US$). These data refer to the sales of maize
stored under inventory credit in Techiman District
It seems more likely that the key variable in the fall in prices and benefits
is the widespread adoption of inventory credit by larger economic entities.
The introduction of ADB's scheme for traders in the 1997/8 growing season
coincided with the beginning of the fall in returns. And it is likely that traders
will continue to buy large volumes of grain using inventory credit.
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There is no discernible narrowing of the differential between harvest and
selling prices. The more significant trend appears to be a progressive erosion
of both. It may be that the market for grains is now saturated and that prices
will not generally rise again except in years of poor weather when harvests
are relatively low. It should be noted in this context that the recovery in prof-
itability during 1998/9 was due to a sharp fall in storage cost, not to an
increase in the differential between harvest and sale prices. This followed the
building of 33 warehouses during the 1998/9 season. With these warehouses,
storage costs will remain low, increasing the margins for farmers.
The project had an important impact on the incomes (or, in the case of
households redeeming crops, reduced outgoings) of participating farmers
(Table 5.9). Between 1992/3 and 1996/7, average household incomes for farm-
ers in the south rose by 10 to 29 per cent from inventory credit selling and 12.5
to 27 per cent for simple storage. The margins were higher for simple storage,
but the volumes were lower. The benefits from redemption were modest.
Table 5.9 Average annual financial benefit per participating farmer from inventory
credit sales, redemption and simple storage (US$)
1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9
North
1C* sales
Increment as % of
family income
Redemption
Increment as % of
family income
Simple storage




Increment as % of
family income
Redemption
Increment as % of
family income
Simple storage






















































*IC - inventory credit
It is too early to draw conclusions for the north that can be generalized
since data are available for only the last two growing seasons. Nonetheless,
the 10.5 per cent increase in the average household income of participants in
1997/8 must be counted as a remarkable achievement.
Four additional benefits from the project, but for which data are not avail-
able, are worthy of mention. First, the inventory credit model introduced by
the project has been adopted on a much larger scale and extended to other
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food and cash crops. While it is true that this may have contributed to under-
mining the benefits accruing to the participants in the TechnoServe project, its
long-term impact on the wider Ghanaian economy is likely to be favourable.
Second, a higher proportion of the food grains produced in the north now
remains in the region after harvest. Traditionally, traders bought most of the
grain harvested in the north, transported it south for storage, and later sold it
in the north during the lean season. Poor households, as a consequence, had
to pay an extra premium to cover transport costs. By improving the capacity
of farmers to store their grains, the project has helped to enhance food secu-
rity in the region.
Third, as a result of the treatment and storage techniques introduced by the
project, post-harvest losses have fallen sharply to no more than 3 per cent of
the crop.
Fourth, there is no doubt that participating farmers have become more
businesslike in their farming activities as a result of the training the BAs
provided. There is evidence that awareness about trends in the costs of inputs
and market prices has increased and that this knowledge is being used in
choosing what crops to grow.
Cost effectiveness
As indicated above, TechnoServe estimates the net benefits accruing to par-
ticipating farmers, year by year, as well as annual estimates of project costs.
Figure 5.4 Project costs and benefits
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According to their calculations, the total project costs between 1992 and 1999
(US$1754708) exceeded benefits (US$1238445) by a factor of 1.41:1.
Moreover, the margin between the two has grown over time (Figure 5.4). This
is because the profitability of inventory credit is declining, and most of the
recent growth in the project has been in the north, where the surpluses have
been relatively small.
A recent analysis by TechnoServe expected the project to prove cost effec-
tive. Projecting project costs and benefits until the year 2011, it arrived at a
cumulative ratio of quantifiable benefits to costs of l.Olil.10
However, this finding is based on several assumptions. First, the benefits are
projected to remain strong until the year 2011, the final year of their period of
analysis. Although some reduction in benefits is built into the projection, this
appears to significantly understate the likely decline, especially given the
sharp drop in profitability of inventory credit over the past two years.
Second, the analysis assumes that no new expenses will be incurred by the
project after 2001, as project functions are expected by then to have been
transferred to umbrella organizations such as FASCU. Although Techno-
Serve recognizes that this is not attainable within the time frame envisaged,
it has not included any costs for continuing activities in the calculations.
Finally, the analysis does not include data for 1989-92, when the model was
being tried out, when the project's impact was considered to be low and con-
sequently when costs would have exceeded benefits. This was considered a
pilot phase or an action-research period and is thus not included in the final
calculation.
Despite these limitations, the quantifiable financial returns of inventory
credit to direct project participants are not expected to match project costs
until about 2010. A case may be made that the gap between costs and bene-
fits is covered by other benefits that the project has not been able to track -
such as widespread adoption of improved treatment and storage by small-
holders not directly working with the project and replication of the inventory
credit model. The limited resources available for assessing impact, together
with problems of attribution, make it impossible to verify this hypothesis.
Sustainability
Any discussion of sustainability must begin with the question, sustainability
of what? Support to cereal crop producers has taken several forms.
Constraints in grain marketing led the project to move from promoting
increased production to facilitating inventory credit for storage and market-
ing. Now, as the returns from inventory credit begin to fall, the project is
exploring opportunities for value-adding processing and marketing activities.
However, it is likely to be difficult to deliver sustainable benefits along these
lines to smallholder maize farmers, because maize processing and marketing
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are highly commercialized, with many large processors and traders against
whom smallholders will have to compete.
The barriers to entry into inventory credit are not high enough to restrain
competition. Traders benefit from inventory credit from banks, and in the
maize triangle farmers with no direct contact with the project have adopted
the new treatment and storage techniques without taking credit. Widespread
imitation of any innovation that the project introduces in the maize subsec-
tor is inevitable. The weak market position of smallholders relative to
large-scale farmers, processors and traders means that it will be difficult for
the project to identify activities for its clients whose benefits will not be
usurped by other, more powerful market players.
So, while the project may take credit for introducing inventory credit as an
important financial product in Ghana, it appears likely that in the maize sec-
tor the principal recipients of such credit are likely to be large-scale
operators. Nonetheless, even under such a scenario, smallholders may benefit
in the longer term from reduced differentials between harvest and lean-sea-
son prices - a core aim of the project.
Benefits may well continue to accrue sustainably to small farmers in two
important areas. First, farmers in the north growing crops other than maize
are unlikely to face high levels of competition from large operators. Here,
smallholders may continue to capture the principal benefits. Second, many
farmer groups have adopted the facilities and techniques for simple storage
of crops. This is likely to continue to be a widespread, long-term, sustainable
feature of smallholder activity - at least in the south of the country.
Another question relating to sustainability concerns the future role of
FASCU and similar organizations that might take over the responsibilities of
the project. At present it is unlikely that FASCU or any other body will be
able to assume any significant role in the near future. In the first place,
FASCU is the only umbrella organization that has yet been established, and
discussions on establishing others are still at an early stage. Second, FASCU
itself has no secretariat, premises, vehicles, equipment, salaried staff or large
flow of income. The capacity-building requirements for this organization to
take over the functions of a well-funded international NGO are enormous
and long term in nature.
TechnoServe's effort to transfer its group capacity-building activities to
indigenous agencies has not succeeded. Attempts to encourage other agen-
cies to play a more active role have been unsuccessful because these activities
are difficult and expensive to conduct and few organizations in the country
have the resources to undertake them.
In view of the uncertain future of inventory credit, the role of these organ-
izations is not clear. Financial intermediation, which is essential for inventory
credit, is beyond their capacity, as they would not have the expertise, logisti-
cal support or staff numbers this task requires. However, it is possible to
114
envisage a scenario in which the role of financial intermediation would
diminish in significance. The project is currently exploring new economic
activities for its clients and, in line with TechnoServe's new global policy, will
increasingly seek to promote individually owned enterprises.
If farmers move rapidly to simple storage, with project interventions
increasingly directed towards the support of individually owned enterprises,
the range of services to be transferred to other actors will be greatly reduced.
FASCU and other organizations could then limit their role to storing and
marketing crops. These activities appear more amenable to management by
farmers' organizations: they can be centrally planned without huge expense;
they do not require resource-intensive outreach work with groups; and they
have the potential to be commercially viable, covering all administrative costs
and generating a profit. This appears feasible in the south. However, in the
north, where dependence on inventory credit and logistical problems
associated with crop marketing (smaller and more dispersed stored crops)
are greater, returns are lower and the institutional framework is generally
weaker. In short, if inventory credit remains popular in the north, a realistic
strategy for its long-term sustainability when the project closes will need to
be developed.
Lessons learned
Inventory credit is a potentially important tool for supporting smallholders...
Inventory credit has proved of great value to participating farmers, whose
annual household incomes increased by as much as 29 per cent in the south
and 10.5 per cent in the north. Food security has also improved significantly
in the north. Moreover, the benefits have spread beyond the direct partici-
pants, since many farmers without formal contact with the project have
adopted the new treatment and storage techniques.
. . . but its direct benefits may be short term in nature. With the replication of
the inventory credit model by other agencies, price differentials have come
down and the direct benefits to project participants appear to have been rel-
atively short term. Do the last two years represent a blip or are returns from
inventory credit, in fact, already fading? The bigger lesson is that where the
model is adopted by financial institutions lending to large-scale operators, the
volume of grain stored will increase sharply and the differential between har-
vest and lean-season prices will drop.
Effective democratic structures in the village are valuable in empowering rural
producers socially and economically ... The project has had a marked
impact on the capacity of its client groups. Groups with accountable leader-
ship and transparency of operations developed autonomous, self-help
activities such as group farms and buying of expensive equipment like corn
115
mills and power tillers. Farmers, both as groups and in the context of FASCU,
are exploring the potential for cooperatively purchasing inputs and crop mar-
keting in bulk.
Farmers are apparently using the skills in record-keeping and analysis of
costs that they acquired from the project in deciding how to allocate their
resources. Signs are appearing of a growing understanding of trends in the
relative profitability of various crops, and agricultural activities are changing
accordingly.
. . . but the venture can be long term and expensive. Developing such village
structures takes time and resources. Groups working for less than seven years
with TechnoServe did not feel confident enough to operate independently.
This was not primarily because they feared that group dynamics would disin-
tegrate without the supervision of an external referee (although, in some
cases this might be the case), but rather that without TechnoServe support
they would not be able to identify new economic activities and evaluate their
likely profitability.
The extension services that the BAs provide to strengthen the capacity of
the client groups have used up most of the project's funds. TechnoServe is
increasingly aware that the high cost of these services makes cost effective-
ness difficult to achieve. This realization has been an important consideration
in the organization's decision to phase out general group-strengthening activ-
ities and to focus more on providing support to group and individually owned
enterprises.
The operation of an inventory credit scheme for smallholders using commer-
cial banks appears to be dependent on the ongoing presence of an intermediary
support agency... There is no doubt that without the services that the proj-
ect and financial institutions currently provide, the inventory credit scheme
would collapse. The organizational and support needs of smallholders are
considerable, and even the most efficient and committed of lenders have nei-
ther the resources nor the logistical support to provide the services that the
project currently supplies.
. . . but responsibility for some of the elements of the support programme may
be transferable to local organizations. Early efforts by the project to trans-
fer service provision to local NGOs were unsuccessful, as these institutions
had neither the commitment nor the resources required to take over the
responsibilities. A new exit strategy has been developed, based on building
the capacity of FASCU and perhaps farmers' marketing companies for serv-
ice delivery. It seems unlikely that such organizations could ever be expected
to take over the role of financial intermediation. This requires technical skills
and logistical facilities that only international NGOs have. However, with
appropriate support, farmers' umbrella organizations could take over such
functions as crop storage and marketing operations.
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TechnoServe's long-term strategy of identifying agencies to which it could
transfer its group mobilization and strengthening services appears extremely
ambitious. This is difficult and expensive work and, as the project is already
established, finding local organizations willing and able to take over these
roles without international funding will not be easy.
Intermediary organizations have a key role in identifying viable economic
opportunities for smallholders... One of the defining features of poverty in
the developing world is isolation from profitable economic opportunities and
from information about such opportunities. The twin processes of economic
liberalization and globalization are opening up many opportunities (as well
as problems) for small producers. A wide range of domestic and international
market niches has been created that, with appropriate assistance, small pro-
ducers have proved able to occupy. In such circumstances, intermediary
organizations can play a vital role in linking their clients with new markets
and building their capacity to compete successfully in them.
.. . but they must do so in a businesslike manner. A huge responsibility rests
on the intermediary organizations in encouraging their clients to move into
new market opportunities. If they miscalculate the prospective benefits of
activities they promote, or overlook some threat to their profitability, the
losses their clients sustain can be substantial. This is particularly true with
organizations like TechnoServe that require clients to make a significant
investment in the enterprises they support. The strong private sector back-
ground of TechnoServe staff is an advantage in this respect.
Intermediaries need to be able to recognize the limits of their market pro-
motion role. That is, their forte lies in identifying and exploring the
profitability of market opportunities, building the capacity of their clients to
exploit the opportunities, and linking them with private sector partners (input
providers, marketing companies and so on). It does not extend to playing an
active market role. Indeed, evidence from the project shows that even
capacity building for small producers is often provided by the larger compa-
nies that they supply - known as 'buyer-mentoring'. This is an idea that the
project will be exploring along with new, high-value market niches for its
cereal crop producers.
The small-producer support agency must continually innovate. Small-pro-
ducer markets are rarely static. An innovation - a new technology, a new
product, or a new model of assistance - is introduced into the market and
soon after, where the barriers to entry are low, imitation and market satura-
tion follow. In such circumstances the role of the support agency is to watch
the horizon continually, identifying innovations that clients can adopt and
that have the potential to promote their competitive advantage.
A commercial orientation on the part of the service provider can be of great
value to its client producers. An important factor in the success of
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TechnoServe support to rural enterprises is its commercial approach.
Enterprises - individuals or groups - are required to have a bank account,
sign a management agreement with TechnoServe, pay fees for services, and
invest equity capital in the enterprise. This created problems in the organiza-
tion's early years in Ghana, where the predominant development ethic was
one of subsidy and grant. However, the tide has turned TechnoServe's way,
and its businesslike approach has contributed to the high level of ownership
among its clients of their group activities.
Support for privately owned enterprises is a legitimate way of addressing rural
poverty . . . In a recent shift in its global policy, TechnoServe now supports
individually owned as well as group enterprises and is set to phase out gen-
eral capacity building for its client groups. Two factors inspired this change.
First, it is often considerably cheaper and simpler - or more cost effective -
to launch and support a private enterprise than a group one. Second, for cer-
tain types of activity, it may well be more efficient. For maize-drying
businesses, which the project is considering to establish, for example, there
are grounds to believe that individual entrepreneurs provide higher-quality
services than group-managed enterprises.
. . . but it can entail a trade-off in focusing on poverty and empowering com-
munities. TechnoServe's current strategy to achieve greater cost
effectiveness entails trade-offs at two levels. First, the move away from gen-
eral group mobilization and strengthening will mean that the impact of its
interventions in community empowerment will inevitably decline. The activi-
ties that the BAs undertake to teach the groups to organize themselves, keep
records, and analyse their costs and income, may have been expensive and not
cost effective. But they helped to build a foundation for solid community
empowerment. Although continuing support to group enterprises will pro-
vide an ongoing vehicle for skills transfer, the empowerment dividend
associated with general capacity building of groups is bound to be affected.
Second, it is likely that in some parts of the country no economic opportu-
nities will be identified that will merit TechnoServe intervention on the
grounds of cost effectiveness alone. These will generally be the poorest and
most isolated areas that already lack development services of all kinds. The
point here is not to question the reasoning behind TechnoServe's pursuit of
greater cost effectiveness; it is rather to recognize that such a shift does
involve trade-offs. There are certain deprived areas where the market is most
unlikely to be an effective mechanism for delivering services to the poor.
Flexible funding allows projects to explore different strategies and approaches.
A lesson from the project concerns the value of flexible funding. TechoServe-
Ghana has two main sources of funding: the Title II programme provides 70
per cent, under which TechnoServe imports wheat and uses the proceeds
from its sale to fund development activities, and 25 per cent comes from the
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USAID office in Ghana under the Trade Investment Reform Programme.
TechnoServe enjoys a high degree of flexibility in allocating these funds. This
flexibility has permitted it to explore various models of enterprise support
and to investigate the profitability of a range of potential economic activities.
Challenges for the future
The project faces three important challenges as it seeks to build on its success:
Identifying new, value-adding activities for farmer groups. The first chal-
lenge is to find new value-adding activities for cereal crop farmers as the
profitability of inventory credit declines. This is likely to be particularly diffi-
cult for maize (the most important crop among participating farmers), as this
is a crop in which many large-scale operators are already engaged. Finding
niches in which innovations introduced for the benefit of small producers will
not be replicated and ultimately usurped by these large operators will not
be easy.
Transferring project responsibilities to local organizations. Transferring
project functions and capacities to local, private organizations is a laudable
goal - particularly when the organizations are representative bodies created
by the project's client groups. However, this will not be achieved easily,
quickly or cheaply. As noted above, the gap between the current form of
FASCU and its envisioned role is vast. Other regions of the country do not
have such an organization. With appropriate support, these organizations
could gradually increase their capacity to manage the storage and marketing
operations. However, this needs to go slowly, at a pace that is comfortable for
the new bodies - and certainly with a longer timeframe than provided for in
the cost-effectiveness analysis.
Transferring the financial intermediation role to local organizations will be
difficult. Previous attempts at this have failed because of a lack of commitment
and resources. Perhaps a significant fall in inventory credit demand will
remove this problem. However, if inventory credit is to remain an important
part of the project, careful thought needs to be given to cost-effective
approaches to financial intermediation. Finding solutions will not be easy.
Retaining the poverty focus. The challenge facing the project (and indeed
TechnoServe as a whole) as it moves away from its traditional focus on group
enterprises is to retain its strong focus on alleviating poverty. It is undeniable
that in some circumstances the market can deliver services to the poor.
However, in others it cannot. In particular, in some geographical areas cost-
effective promotion of new economic activities will probably not be possible.
The challenge for the project in choosing economic activities to promote
and individual entrepreneurs to support is to minimize the trade-offs
necessary to empower communities, and focus on alleviating poverty.
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Notes
1 Ghana Poverty: Past, Present and Future, World Bank, Washington, June 1995.
2 An in-depth analysis of the scheme can be found in 'Financing rural growth: rural
inventory credit in Ghana', TechnoServe Findings Paper, Norwalk, 1999.
3 Although one of the districts of what is known as the maize triangle falls outside
of Brong-Ahafo, in Ashanti Region, all project activities in the maize triangle are
undertaken by the Techiman zonal office, located in Brong-Ahafo.
4 Sorghum was dropped from this scheme after it was realized that its price differ-
ential between the harvest and the lean seasons was not sufficient to make
inventory credit a profitable activity.
5 The ADB scheme is being used for the storage and marketing of maize, fish and
coffee and is soon to be extended for use with cocoa. The government of Ghana
allocated GHC 40 billion (US$12.8 million) for inventory credit schemes in its
1999 budget. Although this funding has not yet materialized, there is little doubt
that inventory credit allocations in the country are set to grow further.
6 In most cases, groups become involved in only one of the activities that
TechnoServe promotes - non-traditional export crop development, cereal crop
storage and marketing, or palm oil production and marketing - although a small
number are engaged in more than one.
7 Both the research and development department and the MIDAS department
investigate new, potentially viable rural economic activities. Until recently,
MIDAS was concerned only with activities in the field of non-traditional crop
exports, but it has now broadened its brief.
8 The falling benefits from inventory credit are illustrated in Figure 5.3.
9 Details of these calculations are available from TechnoServe.
10 In the method TechnoServe uses to calculate cost effectiveness, benefits from the
project (actual measured benefits) are subtracted from benefits that would have
accrued without the project (based on a calculation of the levels of output,
income, employment and so on that would have been likely had there been no
project) to arrive at the net benefit that is used in calculating the cost-effective-
ness ratio. This ratio is naturally much less favourable than would be achieved by
simply subtracting total costs from total benefits.
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6 Linking small ornamental fish producers in
Sri Lanka to the global market
SANDRA O. YU
Sarvodaya Shramadana Sanamaya
AN ORNAMENTAL FISH FARMING project is being promoted through the eco-
nomic arm of the Lanka Jathika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sanamaya (LJSSS)
as one among several ways of improving the economic lot of the rural poor
in Sri Lanka. LJSSS started as the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, a peo-
ple's movement, in 1958, and by an Act of Parliament was incorporated as
LJSSS in 1972. LJSSS aspires to strengthen people in spiritual, moral, cul-
tural, political, social, economic and technological spheres through an
organization that encompasses people and communities, from the village to
national levels. Its basic grassroots unit is the Sarvodaya Shramadana Society.
The economic programmes of LJSSS are handled by the Sarvodaya
Economic Enterprise Development Services (SEEDS). SEEDS began its
operation as a separate division of LJSSS in 1986 and it now reaches 18 of
Sri Lanka's 25 districts, or approximately 300 000 people. LJSSS itself covers
all of the 25 districts, or around 500 000 people. It is the hope of SEEDS that
the Sarvodaya Shramadana Societies will become self-governing villages,
capable of serving their community's economic and social needs. Through
these organized societies, a social infrastructure was laid through which
SEEDS provides business development services (BDS) to a large popula-
tion at low cost. It is hoped that the united societies will constitute an
economic and political force that can influence sectoral and national eco-
nomic policies.
This case study of the SEEDS ornamental fish-growing project examines
the impact, outreach, cost effectiveness, overall effectiveness and sustainabil-
ity of the project. It pinpoints lessons and makes observations that can add to
current thinking about business development services in general.
Enterprise promotion
SEEDS started its work by offering only microfinance (savings and credit)
and training in entrepreneurship. Seeing the need for advisory services to
help borrowers, it expanded its services in 1990 to include business develop-
ment, business information and extension services. Accordingly, SEEDS
established three main divisions, each of which handles specific but comple-
mentary services. Village banking services are handled by the Rural
Enterprises Programme (REP), while training in entrepreneurship and
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management is carried out by the Management Training Institute (MTI).
Extension and business services are under the Rural Enterprise
Development Services (REDS).
Realizing that the main rural livelihood of its members - rice production -
does not produce an adequate income for rural households, REDS seeks out
new and non-traditional business opportunities for rural communities. As
part of its business support service, REDS provides business opportunity
identification, marketing support, feasibility studies, business plan prepara-
tion, and training in technical skills.
In line with this, REDS promotes a number of economic activities, one of
which is ornamental fish farming. It has also actively promoted garment,
dairy, cashew, betel, tea cultivation and pineapple-growing businesses, sup-
porting them through a full range of assistance. REDS calls these 'major
sectors'. They were selected for their market potential, availability of raw
materials and land, and potential outreach. For the major sectors, SEEDS
aimed at establishing at least 250 new enterprises each year. 'Minor sectors'
were also promoted, although on a lesser scale. Ornamental fish farming
belonged to this latter category. Others were ornamental plants, cut flowers
and retail shops. Priority sectors vary year by year, depending on market con-
ditions, perceived potential and entry of new sectors.
Ornamental fish growing: the development phase
The ornamental fish farming project was conceived in 1995 after REDS staff
members attended a conference where this idea was presented as a promis-
ing business opportunity. REDS examined its potential and took the
following steps during the development stage of the project.
Market assessment
The marketing aspect of the project was handled by the agricultural coordi-
nator, with the assistance of the extension officer of Colombo District. Both
spent two weeks collecting technical and market information on ornamental
fish farming, including export and local markets, prices, breeds, technology,
feeds and disease management. The findings of the study were favourable
(see Box 6.1), and they were presented in a report drafted with the assistance
of a college student (REDS 1995).
Community needs assessment
To assess community capability, extension and field officers consulted com-
munities informally about their interest in farming ornamental fish as a
backyard industry. The findings were favourable.
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Box 6.1 The ornamental fish industry In Sri Lanka
the past ten years. The value of




have acquired access to new markets. According to the 1999 FAO News
Highlights, the export value of ornamental fish and vertebrates worldwide was
over US$200 million in 1996. The same report indicated that international trade
of aquatic organisms for ornamental purposes increases at an annual rate of
14 per cent Sri Lanka's share in the world trade, at over 1 percent, Is projected
to increase to 10 per cent in the medium term. The largest supplier of fresh-
water ornamental fish Is Singapore, which accounted for 33 per cent of global
imports in 1986. Singapore has 130 exporters of ornamental fish compared
with Sri Lanka's 14, of which only around five or six export in any significant
quantities. The major buyers of ornamented fish am France, Germany, Japan,
the Netherlands and the USA.
Thus far, local Sri Lankan production has not been able to fill the volume
requirements of export markets. Among tie biggest fish export companies are
Lumbini Aquarium, O.C. Tropical Fish Aquarium and Lanka Aquarium. Recently
a large fish export company, Joan Kees, set up shop in Sri Lanka, and this has
given worldwide prominence to the local industry.
Around 75 per cent of ornamental fish exported from Sri Lanka are marine
varieties. In recent years, however, Western countries have been putting
restrictions on the importation of fish caught from the ocean. This has led tie
Sri Lankan government to promote freshwater ornamental fish production in
the country. Sri Lanka is endowed with favourable climatic conditions that make
it suitable for rearing and breeding freshwater fish.
Among the problems of the local industry are inadequate stocks of freshwater
aquarium fish, tack of communication between small-scale breeders and
established exporters, lack of research and development in freshwater aquar-
ium fish breeding, lack of government support to the industry, and lack of
Sources: REDS 1995, Weerakoon 19%
Development of organizational capability
Given the positive results of the study, REDS officials and staff set about
organizing the project and recruiting participants.
Orientation of REDS
REDS sought the assistance of a specialist from the Dehiwala Zoo to train its
staff and potential project participants in raising ornamental fish. A two-day
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Exports of aquarium fish by Sri Lanka have been increasing substantiallly over
 l  f ornamental fish exports increased fr  LKR
because existing importing markets have expanded and Sri Lanken exporters
adequate faciities for packaging and air transport.
training session was held in Godigamuwa, Maharagama, with 12 participants
from REDS and Sarvodaya. The participants were taught about fish varieties,
constructing cement tanks, feeding systems, breeding systems, pest and
disease management, and marketing.
Intensive training for REDS officials
REDS officials sought more thorough and intensive training in ornamental
fish growing. They contacted the National Aquarium Research Agency
(NARA), which offered longer training programmes on ornamental fish
farming. The agricultural coordinator, the district extension officer and
another REDS official attended this programme, which was held over six
days on three consecutive weekends.
Having acquired solid technical knowledge about ornamental fish farming
and an initial network of technical agencies, exporters and academic institu-
tions, REDS proceeded to develop a programme for ornamental fish farming.
The following steps were taken.
• It prepared a plan for supporting project participants, consisting of finance,
training (both technical and management), and extension services using
the resource complement within SEEDS.
• It began contacting prospective buyers and exporters who could work with
Sarvodaya members through purchase agreements or outgrowing
(described below under 'Market identification').
• It set about publicizing and promoting the project among Sarvodaya
members.
Recruitment and training of project participants
Information was spread throughout Sarvodaya's existing organization, which
encompassed some 10000 village societies, 25 district offices and several
national offices and networks. While REDS also produced flyers to aid the
dissemination of information, the main channel for communication was the
constant interaction between the national and district offices, the Sarvodaya
societies and the members.
Through these channels, REDS announced that it would hold a one-day
training programme on ornamental fish farming in the district offices.
Hundreds of Sarvodaya members responded and, as a result, REDS con-
ducted one-day training programmes for 345 people, in batches, in nine
districts. Although it was hoped that the project would mainly benefit women
and youth, the training was open to all interested members. (It was noted that
non-traditional products using new technology, such as ornamental fish farm-
ing, had greater appeal and success among younger people.) People from
NARA, the Fisheries Ministry, AgEnt (a USAID-funded agency) and uni-
versities, as well as commercial buyers and exporters taught participants
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about fish varieties, constructing ponds and tanks, feeding systems, disease
management and marketing.
Although 345 people participated in the training sessions, only 115
embarked on the project. Both Sarvodaya members and REDS officers gave
several possible reasons for the low turnout of project participants. Some
members thought that those located far from the district offices and major
markets realized it would be difficult to transport fingerlings and grown fish
to and from their homes. Others were discouraged by the difficulty of finding
markets. There were also those who found it difficult to handle the technical
details. Some understandably found one day of training not enough to pro-
vide them with the knowledge and confidence they needed to begin the
project. A few seemed to be interested only in putting up an aquarium in their
homes.
Project feasibility for individual participants
When 115 participants stated their interest in starting an ornamental fish
business, the district extension officers helped each one to assess the feasibil-
ity of implementing the project at the participant's location. The extension
officers looked at the skills of the participants, their previous business expe-
rience, the land on which ponds would be constructed, water quality, available
transport and infrastructure facilities. The district extension officers prepared
feasibility reports for each of the participants. The participants prepared proj-
ect proposals, usually to apply for a loan.
Production process and support
Support was given in market identification, financing, technical and manage-
ment training, and advisory services.
Market identification
Project participants generally had two types of buyers: exporters and local
dealers. For exporters, project participants operated through an outgrowing
arrangement. Outgrowing is a common arrangement in the ornamental fish
industry. As exporters expand their volume, they need larger tracts of land
to hold more ponds. With land prices rising in Colombo and nearby areas,
the best method for expansion is to contract out the job of growing and
breeding fish. Exporters provided participants with the fingerlings to be
grown over 45 to 60 days. After the fish were grown, they were sold back to
the exporters.









Siamese fighter (Betta splendens)
Swordtail (Xiphophorus helleri)
Mainly for the domestic market
(60-day growing period)
Angel (Holocantus and Pomocantus)
Carp (Cyprinus carpio)
Goldfish (Carrassius auratus)
Exporters supplied fingerlings under varied terms. Some required that the
project participant or outgrower purchase the fingerlings outright. In this
case, when the fish were harvested the project participants were free to sell
them to whomever they wished. Other exporters, such as Lanka Agua, did not
require outright purchase but rather asked for a bond in the form of a bank
cheque equivalent to the cost of the fingerlings. Lanka Agua then held this
cheque until the fish were harvested and sold back to it. Another, Shoal
Aquarium, did not require either outright payment or bond but simply
deducted the cost of the fingerlings from its payment to the outgrower upon
harvest. The owner of Shoal Aquarium relied entirely on the pressure and
influence of Sarvodaya on the project participants to return the grown fish to
him and not to sell them to other buyers. Normally the survival rate of fish
was 70 to 90 per cent. Figure 6.1 illustrates the outgrowing relationship
between outgrower and exporter.
Local dealers paid outgrowers one-and-a-half to two times more than did
exporters. However, outgrowers still preferred selling to exporters since they
Figure 6.1 Basic outgrowing arrangement between Sarvodaya project
participant-outgrower and exporters
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would buy larger quantities of fish. Some outgrowers sold to both local deal-
ers and exporters to maintain their sales volume. They sold a bigger portion
of their fish to exporters during the peak export season (early September to
mid-April), and to local dealers during the lean export season (mid-April to
August). Those who did not have links to local dealers simply experienced a
drop in income during the lean season.
REDS played an important role in identifying exporters and local buyers.
If problems arose, the REDS district extension officers also provided liaison
and arbitrated between parties when necessary. One exporter agreed that his
company's relationship with SEEDS could become a commercial one, since
SEEDS ensured the reliability of the outgrowers and, through the extension
officers, maintained communication between the exporter and the outgrow-
ers. He found it more efficient to deal with extension officers, who made
enquiries on behalf of the outgrowers, rather than having to deal separately
with each outgrower.
Financing
To start fish farming, a person had to construct fish ponds. Two types of ponds
were built: mud ponds and cement tanks. Fish varieties such as angelfish, carp
and goldfish were raised in mud ponds. Fish raised in cement tanks were
found to acclimatize to aquariums more easily, especially when sent to the
importing countries. Therefore, those for export - guppies, swordtails, mollies
and platys - were raised in cement tanks.
Mud ponds were usually 1000 square feet and could contain as many as
1500 to 2000 fish. The cost of constructing a mud pond 1000 square feet in size
would range from LKR 10 000 to LKR 15 OOO,1 depending on the materials
used for netting. Cement ponds, on the other hand, usually were 100 square
feet and could hold around 1000 fish. The cost of constructing a 100-square-
foot cement pond ranged from LKR 10 000 to LKR 18 000 depending on
whether the walls were made of cement layers with soil filling, which were
cheaper, or were entirely of concrete. Cost could be halved if the participants
used their own labour in constructing the ponds. An all-concrete pond could
last ten years, while one made of cement slabs with soil filling would last five
or six years.
Apart from the investment in the ponds, other expenses involved in grow-
ing ornamental fish, with sample costs for one cycle, are detailed in Table 6.1.
At the start of the project, the outgrower needed to lay out capital to cover
the construction of ponds or tanks and, if payment was immediately required
by the supplier, to buy fingerlings. Subsequently, the operation could be
financed out of earnings. Further financial needs arose out of the desire for
expansion - to construct more ponds or to buy other equipment such as water
pumps or oxygen tanks.
127
Table 6.1 Typical expenses incurred in growing ornamental fish
Cement tank fish per 1000 fingerlings Mud pond fish per 2000 fingerlings
Fingerlings: LKR 2500
Fish food: LKR 350-500
(fish food is often prepared at home upon
the instruction of the exporter, NARA or
REDS)
Medicine: LKR 100
(necessary only on rare occasions when
fish contract some disease)
Transportation: LKR 500-600
(purchase of fingerlings, showing fish
samples for harvesting, and delivery of
grown fish)
Fingerlings: LKR 4000
Fish food: LKR 400-800
(feeds are cheaper in mud ponds as organic
foods are bred in such ponds or are found
in surroundings)
Medicine: LKR 100
(necessary only on rare occasions when
fish contract some disease)
Transportation: LKR 500-600
(purchase of fingerlings, showing fish
samples for harvesting, and delivery of
grown fish)
To support the costs of starting the project, SEEDS provided loans to proj-
ect participants ranging from LKR 7500 to LKR 25 000. Loans were often used
to finance pond construction and purchase fingerlings. These loans matured in
two years and carried an interest rate of 24 per cent per annum. The maturity
period was appropriate for the project since the greater part of the expendi-
ture consisted of capital investments whose payback period was not
immediate. A borrower who established a good record and wanted to expand
could take out bigger loans. One participant recently borrowed LKR 50 000.
Technical inputs
Follow-up technical training was found to be important for the businesses,
especially since trainees had only the initial one day of training. It was found,
for instance, that after the initial training, some participants still did not know
how to construct ponds properly or feed the fish adequately. Others sought
advice on more specialized topics, such as breeding. These follow-up training
sessions lasted one or two days. They were usually held two or three times a
year per district. Examples of topics covered were breeding, fish identifica-
tion, sexing (determining whether a fish was male or female), how to deal
with diseases, feeding, marketing and selling.
'Fish clinics' were to form part of the technical support provided to out-
growers. The clinic was set up as a one-day consultation between experts and
producers. Experts were invited to a place where they could talk individually
with outgrowers with queries. Each expert occupied a booth and the produc-
ers consulted the expert who could best help them. So far, the only fish clinic
held was in February 1998. Ten experts came from the University of
Peradeniya, NARA, AgEnt, the Ministry of Fisheries and export companies.
The main areas covered were fish breeding and embryology, ecosystems and
environmental conditions, water quality and water management, nutrition
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and feeding, diseases and prevention, and marketing trends. The turnout
exceeded REDS expectations as 133 people registered, over double the 60
that were expected.
REDS further provided information on ornamental fish technology
through a SEEDS magazine and through various handouts distributed during
training seminars. Participants noted that the only resource materials in the
local language on ornamental fish farming that they could use for reference
were those that REDS provided. For their regular operation, project partici-
pants relied mainly on exporters for technical help.
Extension services
Extension services were provided by the district extension officers, who vis-
ited project participants regularly and attended to problems as they emerged.
The extension officers were instrumental in maintaining good relations
between producers and buyers and in inspiring feelings of confidence among
participants.
Sarvodaya members found that having intermediaries such as REDS was
important in organizing participants for joint tasks and for consulting
exporters. Many Sarvodaya project participants lived far from each other.
Therefore, exporters were not willing to collect fish from them, since each
might have produced only a small quantity. In contrast, some non-Sarvodaya
outgrowers, for instance those by the Mahaweli River System, lived close to
one another and, because of their large collective volume, exporters easily
organized transport of fingerlings and collection of grown fish. For instance,
it took only two days for Lanka Agua to collect grown fish from 57 outgrow-
ers in Mahaweli River System B or from 52 outgrowers in Kothmale.
Furthermore, other outgrowers had telephones and could consult the
exporters by phone. Sarvodaya members did not have such advantages and
therefore frequently needed the help of the extension officers to organize
joint transport or to communicate with the exporters.
District extension officers visited project participants once a month, or
more frequently during start-up and when problems arose. They checked on
the development of projects. They were sometimes overwhelmed by the scope
of their work, which included as many as 4000 Sarvodaya members in each dis-
trict undertaking different REDS-promoted projects. These officers expressed
their need for greater technical and managerial skills and knowledge.
Management
Managerial and entrepreneurial training was provided in a more limited
manner. Management training was provided utilizing the GTZ-developed
training programme Competency-based Economies through Formation of
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Entrepreneurs (CEFE) and was implemented by the Management Training
Institute. The course was held over a period of 14 days with a one-week break
during which participants began to apply their learning back home and gath-
ered information for drawing up their business plans.
Assessment of the project
This project is assessed on its
impact on the project participants
outreach
cost effectiveness
client perception of the effectiveness of the services received
potential for sustainability.
SEEDS for the most part has not kept data on the above. Except for findings
such as new enterprises created, cost effectiveness per beneficiary or enter-
prise reached and sample profitability achieved, the accomplishment reports
of SEEDS summarized inputs provided rather than output realized. One of
the problems cited was the difficulty in reaching its members. Also, SEEDS
hesitated to use its limited financial resources for external assessment stud-
ies. Recently REDS devised a self-administered survey tool to keep track of
people's economic activities, but as it contains only the respondent's name,
address and enterprise type, it thus serves as no more than a registry.
Because of this inadequacy of data, a survey was conducted among 30 proj-
ect participants to find out how they had fared on the above five criteria. The
reported findings are deemed indicative only, inasmuch as the sample size is
small (26) relative to the population (115). Moreover, the survey was carried
out in only four of the eight districts and hence does not represent a balanced
picture of conditions in all districts. However, 90 per cent of all project par-
ticipants are located in these four districts.
Project participants were almost evenly split between men (54 per cent)
and women (46 per cent). The highest formal education of any participant
was secondary school, and 40 per cent had attended only primary school.
Before participants joined the ornamental fish project, their main source of
income had been wage employment, which provided an average income of
LKR 5598. A few of the respondents had joined at the project's inception in
1994, but most (65 per cent) had been with the project for only two years.
Impact
SEEDS considered ornamental fish farming as one of the more successful
enterprises of those they were promoting. In their quarterly reports, SEEDS
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Table 6.2 Average profitability of various SEEDS-sponsored activities, 1998





















Source: SEEDS quarterly reports
made sample comparisons of average profitability realized by participants in
the various districts; Table 6.2 is an example.
In assessing impact, the task of estimating returns to the participants is
complicated by the wide variation in the participants' cost and input patterns
and by their use of different marketing and pricing strategies. The data used
here were derived from the survey and sample computations made by the
beneficiaries and the exporters.
On income
Ornamental fish farming has a seasonal market, characterized by approxi-
mately seven months of peak and five months of lean export sales. Sales
dropped 60 to 70 per cent during the lean season. Thus annual instead of
monthly data are used to assess income improvement.
The annualized profit calculation below presents two sample projects. The
first had two 100-square-foot cement tanks of guppies, a common start-up
scale farmed by outgrowers. The second, operated by one of the interviewed
participants, had a 1500-square-foot mud pond containing 5000 platys.
In the first example, the farmer realized from a small scale of two cement
tanks a net monthly income of LKR 3950, or LKR 3025 after the cost of cap-
ital was deducted. Except for a few fish farmers who had a good mix of local
and export buyers and thus could still enjoy good sales during lean export
periods, most experienced a 60 to 70 per cent drop in sales during slow
months. Assuming a 60 per cent drop in sales, net monthly income during the
lean season in Example 6.1 would drop to LKR 2370 or LKR 1445 net of cap-
ital cost. Assuming seven months of peak sales and five months of low sales,
annual net earnings amounted to LKR 11 415. In Example 6.2, the annual net
earnings amounted to LKR 23 670.
Based on the survey, the 20 (of 26) respondents who reported their
incomes revealed an average annual income of LKR 27 509 from ornamen-
tal fish farming. Two respondents performed exceptionally well - more than
LKR 100 000. The rest earned LKR 30 000 or less. The average annual
income, excluding the two exceptional performers, was LKR 17 427. Project
participants reported that their incomes increased after they joined the
ornamental fish project. The pre-project average monthly income was LKR
5598. Average monthly income after joining the project rose to LKR 8300, a
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Example 6.1 Two 100-square-foot cement tanks (2000
fingerling guppies)
Sales per cyde (2000 x 80 per cent yield) x LKR 6.50 LKR 10400
Operating costs
Rngerlings LKR 5000
Rsh food (average of LKR 0.350
and LKR 0.500 for two tanks) 850
Medicine (average of LKR 0.0
and LKR 0.100 for two tanks) 100
Transportation*
Total operating costs LKR 6450
Contribution margin per cycle LKR 3950
Number of cycles per annum
Peak export months (7 months/45 days) = 4.7
Lean export months
(5 months/45 day x 30%)«1.0
Total cycles per year = 5.7
Total contribution margin (5.7 x LKR 3950) LKR 22 515
Financing
(Capital cost for two 100-square-foot
cement tanks, LKR 15000)
Principal payments per year
(2-year financing) LKR 7500
Interest at 24 per cent per year LKR 3600
Annual capital costs LKR 11..100
Cashflow surplus LKR 11415
transportation costs are estimated at LKR 500, but for those with a large har-
vested crop of, say, at least 4000 fish, the exporters are willing to collect the
fish. Some growers alternatively try to reduce this cost by sharing transport
costs with otiier growers.
50 per cent increase (or 13 per cent real increase after netting out inflation
rate).2
A summary of the averaged income data is as follows:
Monthly income before ornamental fish farming (OF) project LKR 5598
Monthly income during OF project, including other income 8300
Annual income from OF project 27 509
Annual income from OF, without two exceptional performers 17 427
Total value of business investments in OF project 33 130
Total value of new household investments as a result of OF project 19 807
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500
Example 6.2 One 1500-square-foot mud pond (5000 fingerling
platys)







Contribution margin per cycle
Number of cycles per annum
Peak export months (7 months/45 days) = 4.7
Lean export months
(5 months/45 day x 30 per cent) = 1.0
Total cycles per year = 5.7
Total contribution margin (5.7 x LKR 6100)
Financing
(Capital cost for 1500-square-foot mud pond, LKR 15000)
Principal payments per year
(2-year financing) LKR 7500







LKR 23 670Cashflow surplus
*ln general, the survival rate of fish in mud ponds is lower because conditions
are less controlled.
tSome of the operating costs are lower on a per unit basis than in the first case.
Fish food is cheaper in mud ponds than in cement tanks because the natural
environment provides a variety of organic feeds. Transportation cost is also
lower because the exporter, given the large volume, collects the harvested
fish. Transportation costs here involved collecting fingerlings and sending fish
samples to the exporter to verify if they can be harvested.
On productive investments
Those interviewed invested from LKR 10 000 to LKR 500000 in their orna-
mental fish operations. Most had at least two or three ponds or tanks. The more
successful ones had as many as 15 tanks plus a few smaller ones for breeding.
All started out with one or two ponds and gradually increased the number. The
average investment made in the ornamental fish project was LKR 33130.
On household investments
A primary aim of such a project was to improve the living conditions of the
participating household. An indication of improvement would be the
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amount of household investments made out of the project's earnings. Based
on the survey, half of the respondents reported an increase in household
investments as a result of income earned from the ornamental fish project.
The average household investments made by those who reported them was
LKR 19 807. It was not clear whether those who did not respond did not
make such investments or found the question difficult to answer. Reported
incomes and investments were rough approximations since the participants
simply made mental notes of their expenses and earnings and rarely kept
written records.
On jobs created
Ornamental fish farming is not a labour-intensive activity, since only
about three to four hours a day are needed to tend the ponds. One
project participant who had 12 ponds hired only one worker throughout a
year. Another, with 15 growing tanks and 12 breeding tanks, hired only one
or two workers and only during peak season. The survey corroborated this
finding, as 80 per cent did not hire full-time workers. If they hired at all, they
would do so only during peak season or part-time (56 per cent of
respondents).
Outreach
Notwithstanding the favourable increase in participant income, the reach of
the project was limited. Since the start of the project in 1995, there has not
been a substantial increase in the number of project participants. Only 40 par-
ticipants have joined the programme, with most of them coming from
Colombo District.
Because the ornamental fish project serves mainly the export market, the
distance to exporters, who are mostly located in urban centres, is an impor-
tant consideration. The project could be useful mainly to people who were
not too far from the urban centres, particularly those in urban and semi-urban
areas. It was not surprising that the new additions to the project came almost
entirely from Colombo District.
Though the land requirements of the project would have been ideal for
Sarvodaya's rural target groups, this also meant that project participants lived
relatively far from one another. The distance between participants in some
districts averaged five to seven kilometres, and this prevented participants
from cooperating to reduce their costs and increase their profit. As a result,
those who were successful were the ones who had the drive to expand their
operation and thus achieve economies of scale on their own. Those who
wished to pursue ornamental fish farming as subsistence farmers, with three
tanks producing fewer than 4000 fish, had to shoulder transportation costs on
their own, which could be quite substantial per batch of fish.
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Cosf effectiveness
The cost of implementing the project is summarized in Table 6.3. The costs are
categorized as follows:
• Development costs associated with preparing the project. These included
market assessment, network organization and development.
• Maintenance costs incurred in running the programme. These included the
salaries of those directly involved and a share of the organization over-
head.
• Other direct expenses incurred in activities such as training and clinics on
raising fish.
Table 6.3 Summary of project costs and cost assessments







Developmental cost 20 625 115




Training, 12 participants 13980 12
Training, 345 participants 139775 345
reached3
Users of the training - 115
Fish clinic, 133 participants 21272 133




























Source of raw data: SEEDS quarterly report and interview with Mr V.N. Jayasinghe, Senior Development Manager.
a345 participated in the training, 115 actually used the training to start a business.
bl_KR 405 for each of the 345 training participants, LKR 1215 if the training cost is calculated per person for
only those who started businesses.
Some of the data, such as development costs, and the cost of training that
took place in 1995, were mere approximations. The absence of such data
(some of which were located in the district offices where the training activi-
ties took place) made the task of making accurate calculations quite
daunting.
The costs of implementing the project were low. Development costs were
estimated at LKR 198 per participant, preparing individual feasibility studies
for each participant cost LKR 117, and monthly maintenance added up to
only LKR 253 per person. A fish clinic cost only about LKR 160 per
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participant. Training costs were a bit higher, computed at LKR405 per
trainee, but because turnout for the training course was low, the actual cost
per user was even higher - LKR 1215 (see Table 6.3).
Costs for this project were low because it mainly linked project partici-
pants to the market and to the technology (the exporters). REDS was a third
party that provided supplementary support and troubleshooting to ensure
the proper functioning of these links.
The cost of implementing the project, compared with the effect on the par-
ticipants, was generally positive. The cost of developing the programme,
including the initial training cost of LKR 1837 per participant, averaged over
one year (which is a shorter time than the actual usability of the learned
material), was LKR 153 per participant per month. The monthly maintenance
cost of SEEDS per project participant was LKR 253. Added together, the
monthly per participant implementation cost was LKR 406. Annually, this
amounted to LKR 4872. Comparing this with the annual income of
LKR 27509 averaged from 26 respondents, the benefit/cost ratio was 5.6:1
(LKR 27509/LKR 4872).
Despite the improved participant income from the project and the rela-
tively low cost of the project per participant, SEEDS did not try to recover
costs through fees. It had achieved a recovery rate of only 11 per cent for the
development expenses, including training, and zero per cent for the monthly
overhead. Some of the REDS costs could have been recovered from
exporters as service fees, if its services had been valued. One of the inter-
viewed exporters was willing to treat its relationship with REDS as a
commercial one and pay for the services received through the extension offi-
cers. Other exporters were not so willing.
Effectiveness of services
Information on the effectiveness of the services that SEEDS provided was
gleaned mainly through participants' satisfaction. As stressed, SEEDS pro-
vided integrated support services, including marketing assistance, technical
training, financial support, advisory services and management training. Most
participants received all these services except management training, which
only a few undertook.
The respondents were asked to rank the services they received from
SEEDS according to importance on a scale of one to five - five being the
most appreciated. It was found that the most important service was financial
support (3.76), followed by technical training (3.38), marketing (3.0), and
advisory services (2.4).This reflected the critical role of financial help in start-
ing the participants off in the ornamental fish project. Financial support was
highly valued as it enabled participants to construct tanks they would not
have been able to afford on their own. Other outgrowers had to approach
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banks to take out a loan, sometimes with the help of the exporter, who had to
vouch for the expected revenues from the project.
Technical training was particularly valued. The technical training pro-
gramme conducted by REDS motivated trainees to set up an ornamental fish
farming project or to venture into related activities such as breeding. Still,
buyers and exporters provided much of the day-to-day technical input. Some
of those interviewed also commented that SEEDS should provide more tech-
nical help than the initial one-day training. They recommended a three- or
four-day training programme or the one-day programme with regular follow-
up sessions in quick succession.
Although REDS had linked most of the project participants to their buy-
ers, participants still gave a low rating to marketing help, and 39 per cent said
they had marketing problems.
In terms of satisfaction with specific assistance received, training ranked
the highest (3.27) on a scale of one to four, with four being the highest, fol-
lowed by advisory services (2.95), marketing (2.50), and finance (2.38).
Overall satisfaction on the project was high (3.0) with 42 per cent saying they
were 'very satisfied' and 38 per cent 'satisfied'.
Interestingly, respondents cited SEEDS as the main source of future
financing, the private sector as the main source of markets, and government
as the main source of technical training only. The two high performers cited
the private sector as their only source for future assistance. This could mean
that the assistance SEEDS provided was less adequate for the more complex
needs of growing businesses.
Sustainability
The project achieved some measure of sustainability in that it linked project
participants with the exporters or buyers who provided technology and a reg-
ular market. This was apparent in the low cost of the project to REDS, as it
played mainly a third-party role, helping to maintain good relationships and
providing supplementary training and technical information.
The sustainability of running the project would be ensured if costs
could be recovered. Given the relatively low cost of the project and the
high benefit to the participants, this objective seems to be feasible. Since REDS
extension services helped exporters to deal effectively and efficiently with
outgrowers, it could well be paid by these suppliers for its services. As earlier
pointed out, one exporter was willing to pay for such intermediation services.
REDS, however, may need to improve its services to both outgrowers
and suppliers. It is aware that it needs to scale up its competency now that
many of the microenterprises it has helped are growing into larger concerns
and are facing more complex issues than REDS can presently handle. REDS
will need to increase its competency if it wishes to be effective with both new
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clients and those expanding their businesses. This realization has been echoed
by some of the district extension officers, who cited the need for greater knowl-
edge about practical management and further technology training.3
The sustainability of the industry is another matter, however. The govern-
ment has given minimal support to this industry; research and development
have not been given serious attention. There is, for instance, inadequate
research in developing new and better genetic pools of ornamental fish. As a
result, it is feared that too much inbreeding has been taking place among
freshwater fish in Sri Lanka, especially among guppies, which constitute 60
per cent of Sri Lanka's freshwater ornamental fish exports. Still, because the
business has been profitable, people have continued with unguided breeding
and growing of fish. Fear has also been expressed that water quality is dete-
riorating in Sri Lanka because of agrochemical pollutants. This may have
caused the recent outbreak of guppy disease.
Prospects for the growth of the industry have been further hampered by
the lack of information on market preferences abroad. Exporters have
usually been caught unaware of the changes in the demand for specific vari-
eties, and were often informed by their buyers only when the demand was
already there. Unable to anticipate demand, they are limited by what they
have produced and thus have missed business opportunities.
Expansion of the industry has also been hampered by other problems such
as the low level of technology in packing, with fewer fish being packed in
boxes compared with what is being done in Singapore. Inadequate airfreight
facilities also constrain the industry. Direct flights out of Sri Lanka have been
less frequent than those from Singapore and other major exporters of orna-
mental fish. In view of these drawbacks, promoters of the industry cited the
need for greater collaboration between the private sector and government as
well as stronger government support for the industry.
Because of these inadequacies, REDS was considering playing a stronger
role in market research and product development and even in exporting
ornamental fish. Whether REDS should carry out these activities themselves
or by getting stronger public and private sector support should be discussed.
Government agencies such as NARA are already in charge of research and
development on the country's aquatic resources. Furthermore, the private
sector has been active in the industry and has made its voice heard in policy
and programme issues. The presence of both private and public institutions,
which already enjoy a good relationship with REDS, may warrant a more
facilitative role for REDS rather than a direct role in developing the industry.
Key issues in providing business development services
Market orientation
The importance of access to markets was obvious in this case study, where
maximum use was made of training and financial and technical assistance
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because a market existed for the product - ornamental fish. The project
sought to help people become effective suppliers to that market. As part of
its market-oriented approach, REDS established market links and secured
commitments from buyers before the project was launched. Once the market
was assured, the project produced noticeable benefits.
Such market orientation is in contrast to production-oriented approaches
in which beneficiaries are given credit and training but are left, with limited
information, to look for markets on their own - when in some cases there
might have been little potential market to begin with. Any increase in pro-
duction will reach a bottleneck in the absence of strong buyers and dynamic
markets that can absorb the additional production. Such a situation results in
minimal improvement in incomes, low-quality produce and squandered
resources.
Working within an established network
A factor that contributed to the favourable benefit/cost ratio was the nomi-
nal cost of services that the project incurred per beneficiary. Because SEEDS
worked within an established network, the Sarvodaya Shramadana Society, it
easily reached a large number of people. The presence of Sarvodaya and
SEEDS in all districts throughout Sri Lanka allowed them to implement each
new project at a nominal cost.
Because of the institutional reputation and networks of LJSSS, the central
organization, SEEDS could tap into external expertise to the advantage of its
members and at minimal cost to itself. In the case of the ornamental fish proj-
ect, SEEDS was the catalyst that helped members to enter an industry, and it
linked them with existing markets, resources and experts. Because of its min-
imal intervention, SEEDS could carry out this project at low cost.
Specialization versus diversification
The reasons why SEEDS preferred a diversified approach in this project are
several. SEEDS promotes a whole range of products and services to society
members, choosing different economic options for different target groups.
Furthermore, since alleviating poverty is the priority of its economic empow-
erment programme, SEEDS attempts to reach large numbers of people
through different economic opportunities. Either promoting single indus-
tries or graduating growth-oriented businesses would probably result in
lower outreach. This diversified approach of SEEDS could also be the result
of its own internal capability, insufficient workforce, and a broad socio-eco-
nomic mandate, which prevents it from aggressively promoting a single
industry, given the responsibilities and competencies needed for such an
approach.
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Increasingly, REDS finds that this general approach is less effective among
growing enterprises, which have more complex needs. This is corroborated by
the survey results, in which the two outstanding performers cited only the
private sector as their future source of business help. It is further supported
by extension officers, who felt inadequate in advising entrepreneurs and cited
their need for further technical and business training. Thus, REDS hopes to
develop its competency further. At this juncture, it can be debated whether
more complex and specialized requirements of growing companies would be
better addressed by developing the internal capability of a non-governmental
organization, such as REDS, or by establishing stronger links with experts
and the private sector, which might be in a better position to address the
concerns of more mature businesses.
Role of an intermediary
The intermediary role is critical where markets do not work well. This
occurred in the ornamental fish project. First, SEEDS was instrumental in
linking Sarvodaya members with the ornamental fish business. Given the lim-
ited information available to the people the project was designed to help, and
their general unwillingness to take economic risks, the role of SEEDS was
obvious in identifying this business opportunity. It encouraged and motivated
people to invest in the project. It also developed ways of helping that encour-
aged Sarvodaya members into the new business.
Likewise, SEEDS enlisted support from exporters, NARA, non-
governmental organizations and academia, all of which were brought within
the reach of project participants. The reverse is also true. The semi-rural com-
munities of Sarvodaya were brought within the purview of exporters and
other dealers, who were introduced to these rural households through
SEEDS. Previously, they had dealt with, and had preferred to deal with,
denser communities where they could operate more efficiently.
As most of the technical assistance was provided by exporters and
local dealers, REDS felt it should work outside this framework, especially
where needs were not met within these arrangements. For instance, some
outgrowers wanted training in areas that exporters considered to be
unnecessary, such as breeding varieties not assigned to them but
for which local demand was good, such as discus. Given the limited resources
and market information of low-income households, REDS constantly helped
to find local buyers, which was especially beneficial during lean export
seasons.
REDS considered taking a more active role in breeding and in market
research and exporting, given the inadequacies in export market research and
product development. To the extent that the role of the intermediary
produced immediate payoffs in terms of greater efficiency, profitability and
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viability for its clients (both outgrowers and buyers), the intermediary might
provide its services commercially.
Institutional capability building
REDS continuously develops its competence in supporting products and sub-
sectors. It develops this competence by linking with existing institutions and
by committing its own personnel in identifying and assessing the projects.
For instance, REDS personnel prepared feasibility and market studies
themselves rather than hiring external consultants to collect and analyse
information. REDS personnel found this beneficial in maintaining a close
link between study findings and field realities. Through this process, several
staff members within REDS became in-house experts in farming ornamental
fish. The experts were the senior enterprise development manager and the
district extension officer of Colombo.4 They maintain links with their techni-
cal mentors, whom they regularly consult on ornamental fish farming, and
their familiarity with the main institutions and resources within the industry
is extensive.
This process, if continued and carried out consistently, can produce experts
within the pool of extension officers within REDS. Extension officers would
have technical expertise and at the same time would be generalists. REDS
and its officers do not aspire to become specialists but prefer to remain gen-
eralists, tapping outside resources for technical needs, but at the same time
developing relative expertise within the institution with respect to the enter-
prises being promoted.
Group approach
A group approach is helpful if microentrepreneurs hope to get into main-
stream markets such as export markets. The export orientation of the
ornamental fish farming project provided a relatively profitable opportunity
for Sarvodaya's members. While this project has allowed project participants
to earn a sizeable income, its export orientation limited its outreach to fewer
people than in other sectors that cater for the domestic market, such as gar-
ment and dairy products. This project tended to reach those located near the
urban centres, since participants needed to be near exporters.
To tap distant markets, one has to reduce costs. Those who have the moti-
vation and capability to run larger operations can, by themselves, achieve scale
economies and thus internalize the costs. The majority, however, who do not
have the interest or skill to develop a large operation may form clusters in
their neighbourhood. Through clusters they can organize transportation in
getting fingerlings and in delivering grown fish. Additionally, they may organ-
ize breeding activities in their neighbourhood to cut transportation, and
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possibly fingerling costs. Such a cluster was organized experimentally by an
exporter, Aqua Ceylan, which helped one group of 23 outgrowers, located
some 48 km from its premises. The exporter trained three people in the clus-
ter to breed fingerlings so that these three could supply the rest of the
outgrowers. The cluster began in July 1998 and has so far worked well. The out-
growers have been able to save on transportation costs for fingerlings, since
fingerlings were available from nearby breeders. With the large, combined vol-
ume of grown fish, outgrowers could share the cost of transport or pass it on
to Aqua Ceylan, which would collect the fish as long as the harvest was large.
Clustering had not been a REDS strategy in promoting the ornamental
fish project. But it took place spontaneously in the Kegalle District, where a
number of producers operated as a cluster to share transportation costs and
to help each other when additional hands were needed during the harvest
period. Some REDS officers said they needed to consciously develop clusters
of outgrowers among future participants.
Summary and conclusions
The ornamental fish project that REDS implemented was reasonably suc-
cessful. REDS took a market-oriented approach, linking project participants
with markets and helping participants to supply these markets effectively.
With their markets assured, growers could make maximum use of the assis-
tance that SEEDS provided. The fish were readily bought, and participants
thus earned better incomes.
All this was done at minimal cost. REDS tapped into an institutional net-
work within Sarvodaya, which allowed REDS to reach more people at the
same time and thus reduce the cost per beneficiary. Furthermore, in this
project, REDS played essentially a linking role in which it introduced project
participants to the economic activity and to buyers, who subsequently sup-
plied the market, technology and inputs. The main role REDS played was to
act as a conduit of information and technical assistance as well as to mend
relationships when problems cropped up. It continued to provide support
through diverse business development services, including technical training,
financial assistance and further market identification.
REDS played an important role in identifying this particular project, iden-
tifying markets and putting the support system in place. Once these systems
were set up, REDS receded into a more catalytic and supportive role in help-
ing people get started. Because its involvement was catalytic, it also
implemented this project at a relatively low cost, yet reached many people at
once. Cost per beneficiary and benefit/cost analyses made in this study
showed favourable results.
Nonetheless, it was found that for this particular project the outreach was
limited. Because of the export orientation of the project, participants were
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limited to the urban and semi-urban areas of Sri Lanka. The difficulty of
transporting goods to exporters and to mostly urban buyers was a problem
for many rural people. Because of this difficulty, REDS officials are now con-
sidering promoting the cluster system more strongly.
Because of the links and relationships forged, the sustainability of the proj-
ect seemed to be quite favourable, as REDS could take a back seat after
linking the two parties. However, REDS still played an active role in supplying
inputs and in supplying information about additional markets when the infor-
mation available to farmers was inadequate or was withheld by exporters. The
need for greater inputs could be gleaned from the satisfaction of the project
participants. While their satisfaction with the ornamental fish project was high
overall, they expressed some dissatisfaction about specific inputs.
The financial sustainability of the project may gradually be strengthened
by charging client fees for the services provided. Based on cost calculations,
these amounts did not seem to be substantial; however, the crux is the degree
to which the services were valued by those who can and have been asked to
pay - the project participants and the exporters who received a valuable serv-
ice from REDS through its coordinating role. REDS sought to strengthen its
competency in providing such services to project participants, since the
assisted enterprises were growing and were meeting more complex issues.
This need was corroborated by extension officers, who also articulated their
need for greater technical and management skills.
If REDS contributed to the profitability and viability of the exporters and
dealers, then REDS could ask to be paid for its services. Exporters had mixed
reactions to this.
The sustainability of the industry appears less positive as a number of
problems confront the ornamental fish industry in Sri Lanka. Lack of a strong
research and development programme on fish varieties, deteriorating water
quality, lack of information on overseas demand, and inadequate transport
and packaging facilities all hamper the growth of a promising industry and
have caused opportunities to be lost. These losses have prompted REDS to
consider a stronger role for itself in research and product development as
well as in exporting direct. However, this role may be superfluous given the
presence of public agencies and active private businesses that could be
assisted instead to link up with small outgrowers and breeders.
A number of useful insights may be derived from this case study. First,
since a market already existed for ornamental fish, REDS focused on linking
clients with strong buyers at the outset of the project.
Second, SEEDS provided a whole range of support to project participants
at a relatively minimal cost by tapping into the established network of
Sarvodaya and using existing administrative structures. It assumed the role of
a catalyst, then it took a back seat once it had helped participants enter the
industry and linked them with existing markets, resources and experts.
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Third, REDS saw itself as a generalist rather than a specialist, and this
enabled REDS to respond to the needs of a wide range of clientele. REDS
promoted many subsectors as well as providing a broad mix of inputs in help-
ing its clients to operate effectively. While its diversified approach allowed
REDS to reach more people, it was unable to serve the more specific and
complex needs of a few growing businesses. Whether it should develop its
competency in more specialized areas or simply link growing businesses with
the private sector and other institutions is a matter for consideration.
Fourth, the role of an intermediary is crucial where markets are not cur-
rently working well. In this case, REDS, as an intermediary, introduced
opportunities to poor rural households who had little access to market infor-
mation. It also provided assistance, including credit and training, where these
were unavailable to its clients, even within outgrowing arrangements. It
would be useful to determine the extent to which REDS could charge fees to
its clients, both project participants and exporters, if its services contributed
to the profitability and viability of the businesses. It would be appropriate for
REDS to take an active role in the absence of other such providers. However,
it is debatable whether REDS should actively undertake market research and
product development where others in the market are already doing this but
only need greater support.
Finally, a group approach was appropriate for small producers who wished
to tap mainstream and distant markets. In this case, those who were able to
supply export markets efficiently were those whose operations had grown
enough to cover such costs as transport and delivery expenses. Those who are
content to remain micro in scale but nevertheless wish to tap distant markets
or meet volume requirements need to combine their individual enterprises.
Notes
1 LKR - Sri Lanka rupee; conversion rate per US dollar: 83.50 (Jan 2001), 77.01
(2000), 70.64 (1999), 64.45 (1998), 58.99 (1997), 55.27 (1996), 20.0 (1981).
2 Computed by using the following assumptions:
o average length of participation in project (among survey respondents) - 2.42
years
o inflation rate for 1997,9.6 per cent; 1998,9.4 per cent; 1999,9.0 per cent (source:
Asian Development Outlook Update 2000).
3 Information from Anura Atapattu, deputy director of SEEDS.
4 The experts were V.N. Jayasinghe, senior enterprise development manager, and
Vipule Dasanayake, former district extension officer of Colombo, now of Kalutara.
Further reading
[REDS] Sarvodaya Rural Enterprise Development Services (1995) 'Training report
about the ornamental fish project', unpublished.
Weerakoon, D.E.M. (1998) 'The ornamental fish industry of Sri Lanka', Aquaculture
Asia January-March, Bangkok.
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ZIMBABWE FACES A huge and growing unemployment problem. Official esti-
mates, from government budget speeches in 1995 and 1996 and from the 1997
Zimbabwe Reserve Bank Annual Report, of the proportion of the working
population without employment rose from 22 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent
in 1996 and to between 50 and 55 per cent in 1997. In addition, 300 000 sec-
ondary school leavers enter the job market every year in pursuit of the 10 000
to 16 000 formal sector jobs available. While these figures almost certainly do
not fully reflect the absorption of 'unemployed' workers into the informal
sector, they do give some indication of the growing unemployment problem
facing the country.
An important source of new employment should undoubtedly be in small
business. Indeed, diversification and growth in the informal sector are already
evident throughout the country. However, a shortage of equipment that small
enterprises require hampers their employment-generating capacity. Making
more and better-quality equipment available to small entrepreneurs has been
the aim of this project.
The project seeks to promote small-scale light engineering. It is a sector
that can manufacture production equipment for small enterprises in
Zimbabwe to use. It can help to generate employment; strengthen indigenous
small manufacturers; decentralize manufacturing, maintenance and repair
capabilities; and slow the rural-to-urban drift so evident in the country. The
manufacturers are small-scale engineering businesses or capital goods pro-
ducers. The equipment is used in small enterprises.
Throughout this case study, a distinction is made between manufacturers of
production equipment and users of that equipment. The manufacturers are
referred to as small-scale engineering enterprises or capital goods producers;
the users are called end-users or simply small-scale enterprises.
The small-scale light-engineering sector has grown strongly in recent years.
Contraction in formal manufacturing has led to an in-flow of skilled labour.
However, several important constraints have inhibited this sector from play-
ing a role in the national economy that is significant. Prominent among these
has been poor access to modern machine tools. Sharp devaluations of the
Zimbabwe dollar in recent years have pushed the price of imported equip-
ment well beyond the means of all but a few small entrepreneurs.
Commercial machine shops do take on jobs for businesses without machine
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tools. However, such shops are mainly geared towards large clients and they
cannot offer affordable service suited to the flexible and smaller workloads
of small clients. Where the small firms are able to use commercial machine
shops, they usually find themselves at the end of the queue and consequently
they suffer delays in delivery.
Additionally, large retail outlets dominate in distributing production
equipment for small-scale enterprises. Consequently, small engineering firms
seeking to manufacture production equipment have to use underdeveloped
and less formal channels. The large retail outlets are poorly equipped to deal
with much of the technology that the small entrepreneurs need. Previous
attempts by ITDG-Zimbabwe projects to use large retail outlets to distrib-
ute light machinery have yielded little fruit. Turnover and margins are
generally too low to encourage large retailers to undertake the necessary
promotional work, compared with most of the equipment that these outlets
stock.
There is, moreover, widespread suspicion in the country concerning the
quality and reliability of goods produced by the small engineering enter-
prises. Investment in improving product design, quality control and
promotion is required to address this problem. Finally, as a result of the rela-
tive dominance of the formal manufacturing and retail sector, there is little
awareness among potential clients of what machinery small-scale engineering
enterprises could produce.
Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG)
Founded in 1966, ITDG is an international NGO that works with people in
poverty to promote the policies and practices that ensure the appropriate
development and use of technology in developing countries to reduce
poverty while safeguarding the environment. ITDG concentrates its efforts
on technical change and small-scale production because it recognizes the
importance of technology to poverty reduction and sustainable development.
ITDG's head office is in the United Kingdom, and it has regional and coun-
try offices in Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan and
Zimbabwe. It also has two business subsidiaries: IT Consultants spreads the
group's influence and mission by selling expertise to other development
organizations, and ITDG Publishing is the world's largest publisher and sup-
plier of books and journals about appropriate technology.






• building materials and shelter
• disaster prevention and mitigation
• transport
• mining.
ITDG-Southern Africa has all these programmes, except transport and disas-
ter prevention and mitigation. The light-engineering project fell under the
manufacturing programme.
Project business development services
The light-engineering project delivers services to both small engineering
enterprises and the customers of the capital goods they produce to address
the various constraints. These are summarized in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Business development services provided by the project
Business development services Activities
Tool and equipment hire • fixed equipment for hire-service centres
• portable equipment rented out
Product development • new or adapted technology
Training • informal training provided to the producers
of capital goods
• business management training (initial
phase only)
Hiring out workshop space • workshop space at commercial rates to
Harare service centre clients
Marketing: initial stage • promotions to raise the project profile and
link client engineers and larger businesses
Marketing: second stage • business shops as retail outlets for
production equipment
Information • information on other service providers
The Department for International Development (DFID) and Comic
Relief, both of the United Kingdom (UK), funded the project.
Methodology
The case study was prepared from project records and interviews with ITDG
staff in the UK and in Zimbabwe by e-mail and telephone. The project
manager was consulted during a visit he made to the UK.
Exchange rates
Precipitous devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar in recent years (losing 80 per
cent of its value between 1997 and 2000) and consequent high price inflation
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(40 to 50 per cent per annum) make comparisons over time using this cur-
rency difficult and misleading. Consequently, financial and economic data are
provided in US dollars. Project funding that was provided in pounds sterling
has also been converted to US dollars at the prevailing rates.
The light-engineering project
Project strategy
The project emerged out of activities that ITDG-Southern Africa had already
undertaken over several years with blacksmiths and carpenters. It became
clear that availability of high-quality hand tools was a problem for these arti-
sans and that local small-scale manufacturers had the potential to increase
their production of tools for them and many other small entrepreneurs.
The light-engineering project's first year (1995/6) comprised field research
into how the project could build on previous experience to develop a support
programme for small manufacturers. This included working with artisans in
their workshops, linking up with small producer associations and providing
business training. In addition, Dr John Powell, the head of the Technology
Consultancy Centre (TCC) in Kumasi, Ghana, was hired to carry out a study
about support for small light-engineering enterprises in Zimbabwe. TCC
developed the model of the intermediate technology transfer unit, a machine
shop located at the heart of informal industrial areas, and undertook technol-
ogy research, development and transfer activities with its small engineering
clients.
Out of these steps emerged the concept of tool hire. Both the nature of the
services to be provided and the scale of operation were significantly more
modest than those in the Ghanaian model. It was believed that this modest
approach was more appropriate to Zimbabwe and would help small engi-
neering enterprises to expand, break into new markets and generate
additional employment.
Two service centres providing a tool hire service were opened in Harare
and Gweru in 1996. From this point, project staff devoted much energy to
creating awareness among potential clients of the facilities available at the
service centres and promoting subcontracting between client small-scale
engineers and larger enterprises.
It soon became clear that the project's initial focus on relatively unsophis-
ticated, small enterprises was not working. These workshops did not have the
basic skills and training required to make the best use of the hire equipment
at the service centres. Consequently, the project rapidly turned its attention
to more highly skilled entrepreneurs, many of whom had been trained and
employed in formal sector enterprises. This shift in focus was justified
because relatively sophisticated engineering enterprises were better able to
manufacture small-scale production equipment.
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It also became clear that attempts to broker subcontracting were bearing
little fruit. A number of the more highly trained entrepreneurs had already
succeeded in winning subcontracts without any assistance from the project.
With such links developing without project assistance, and having failed to
define for itself an effective role, the project team devoted progressively
fewer resources to this activity.
By the end of 1998, the service centres were both operating at a profit.
However, project impact was disappointingly low. Few jobs had been created
among those enterprises using the service centres. Moreover, while there
were encouraging indications of enhanced productive capacity and links
within the small-scale engineering sector and between small and large enter-
prises, developing and disseminating production equipment for other small
enterprises had not been as successful as had been hoped.
Two insights gained during the initial years of the project provoked a rad-
ical shift in strategy. First, the benefits of the project would be felt not
primarily among the manufacturers of production equipment (where project
efforts had been concentrated) but rather among the users of that equipment.
That is, while only a relatively small number of entrepreneurs could make use
of the machines at the service centres, the potential for increasing income and
generating employment was among those purchasing new and improved cap-
ital goods for small-scale economic activities.
Second, selling production equipment to small-scale enterprises was more
difficult than had been foreseen. This was for three reasons: the domination
by large retail outlets in distributing production equipment; widespread sus-
picion about the quality and reliability of the products made by the
small-scale sector; and lack of exposure among potential customers to the
capital goods that small manufacturers could produce.
A project review at the end of 1998 resulted in focusing project activities
away from the manufacturers towards the users of production equipment. A
new logframe was designed for the project's second phase (June 1999 to June
2004) with the revised purpose: 'to create sustainable mechanisms for the
delivery of an improved quality and quantity of capital goods to end-users
and to promote the model internationally'.
This new strategy involved important innovations. To address the market-
ing constraint, four 'business shops' were to be opened in various parts of the
country to show and sell small-scale production equipment. Since the empha-
sis of the project was now shifted to providing production equipment to
end-users, the business shops could purchase machinery from sources other
than client small-scale engineering enterprises using the service centres. To
increase the coverage and impact of the project, two service centres were to
be opened in Mutare and Bulawayo. The service centres would increase the
variety of production equipment for hire, reducing the risks for those seeking
to test the profitability of new economic activities. And efforts to introduce
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new technologies for small enterprises that had begun towards the end of the
initial phase would be continued and expanded.
Tool and equipment hire
Tools and equipment were available for hire at the service centres, which
opened in Gweru and Harare in 1996. A third service centre opened in
Mutare in August 1999, and there were plans for a fourth in Bulawayo. Two
categories of equipment were available for hire: fixed machine tools used by
small engineering enterprises in manufacturing and maintenance, and
portable equipment used in small enterprises.
All the equipment was made in Zimbabwe, although the Harare service
centre manager was investigating buying industrial sewing machines from
South Africa. Around 60 per cent of the equipment was second-hand and,
with the phasing out of donor funding for the Harare and Gweru service cen-
tres, this percentage was growing. Table 7.2 provides details of the fixed
machine tools at the Harare and Gweru service centres.
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Welding machines - 3
Capacity use for the fixed equipment at the Harare service centre is given
in Table 7.3. One hundred per cent use was based on continual use from 9 in
the morning to 5 in the afternoon, Monday to Friday, plus five hours on
Saturday morning. Some items were used more than this, accounting for some
figures in excess of 100 per cent. Other fixed equipment at the service centre
not listed in this table was charged per job performed. No data on capacity
use were recorded.
All the machine tools, especially the lathes, were in high demand. The prin-
cipal reason for lower use rates on some machinery was stoppages for
maintenance and repair work. Several pieces, including the 1.5 kW lathe and
the surface grinder, suffered significant problems with reliability and break-
downs. Where equipment was not in regular use, it was sold off. About 100
small engineering enterprises regularly used the fixed equipment at the two
service centres. Of these, 42 (36 in Harare and six in Gweru) were 'core
clients', using the service centre at least once a week.
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Table 7.3 Capacity use of equipment at the Harare service centre (percentages)
Harare
2.0 kW lathe
1 .5 kW lathe
1 .2 kW lathe
1.1 kW lathe


































Capacity use is figured on 45 hours per week - an amount exceeded at times, hence figures over 100 per cent.
NA - not applicable, as the equipment was not yet purchased.
Following is the list of portable equipment provided for hire at the Harare
service centre. This service was discontinued in Gweru because of lack of
demand. It was not clear whether sufficient demand existed in Mutare to jus-
tify the service. Brick moulders were in high demand, but many small
businesses did not have the money to purchase the cement and pay the
labour to operate them. The project is working on a new, smaller model that
would be introduced over the next 12 months. It is expected to prove very
popular. The freezit is an 'ice-pop', flavoured iced water in a sealed plastic
tube.
Industrial sewing machines - 18
Brick moulders - 5
Welding machines - 3
Overlockers - 2
Freezit machines - 2








Decisions on purchasing portable equipment for hire were made from
feedback received from service centre clients. The rate of use had been high
for portable equipment, with industrial sewing machines, in particular, in
almost continual use. Use of portable equipment was carefully monitored and
where it remained low over a long time equipment was sold off. Equipment
sold by the Harare service centre, for example, included woodworking tools,
for which there was limited demand, and hand grinders and drills, as a result
of breakdowns and theft.
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In an important sense, the tool hire business was independent of the busi-
ness shops. That is, equipment was hired out to anyone prepared to pay for
the service and not just to those supplying goods to the business shops. This
permitted relatively high use of most equipment and allowed the service cen-
tre to keep hire prices relatively low. The hiring out of portable equipment at
reasonable prices was a particularly important service in that it permitted
those wishing to explore the profitability of a new small business to minimize
both cost and risk. Core service centre staff included a manager, a mainte-
nance technician and an office supervisor. Auxiliary staff were a driver, a
cleaner and a watchman.
Product development
To date, nine products have been introduced by the project:









In some cases, these represented machinery entirely new to small enterprises
in Zimbabwe. In others, design modifications rendered existing technology
more appropriate to small enterprises and the needs and purses of their
clients. In some cases - the brick and tile machines and the oil expelling and
peanut butter making machines, for example - the designs arose out of work
undertaken by other programmes within ITDG-Southern Africa. These pro-
grammes had struggled to find private sector partners in technology
development and dissemination. Large companies had generally not been
attracted by the prospect of manufacturing small-scale technologies, while
smaller enterprises tended to experience problems with quality control. As a
result of the light-engineering project, small engineering enterprises increased
their capacity to achieve the quality required for commercial production.
In other cases, ideas for the technologies developed by the project arose
out of collaboration and feedback between project staff and client engineer-
ing enterprises. Work at each stage in developing new technologies involved
significant collaboration between project staff and client workshops. For
example, clients, including women, often developed and tested prototypes.
Only women were involved in the development of the peanut butter
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machines, for instance. Women provided much feedback on modifications for
machines they had purchased.
Since the business shop opened in Harare, users and potential users of pro-
duction equipment were given a voice in influencing the technology
development work undertaken by the project. The business shop provided
them with a channel through which they could contribute ideas for new (or
adaptations of existing) technology. Customers provided feedback on the
performance of equipment already purchased. These proved to be important
feedback loops.
As a general rule, formal market analysis and feasibility studies were not
undertaken before work was begun on developing a new technology. Rather,
requests from prospective clients through the business shops and the willing-
ness of client engineering companies to devote their resources to developing
prototypes were taken as sound indicators of a new product's likely viability.
Among the products in development as a result of suggestions coming
through the service centres and business shops were a bottle sealer, a candle
mould and a small-capacity brick mould.
Training
Most of the training took place informally through the close working rela-
tionship between client engineering workshops and project staff. While
unsustainably expensive in the long run, informal training involving small
groups and one-on-one sessions was essential in developing trust and estab-
lishing a successful working relationship between the project team and its
clients. Project staff also provided training for personnel at two national train-
ing institutes - the Institute of Agricultural Engineering (IAE) and Silveira
House - to manufacture the welding machine introduced by the project. Both
of these agencies added the technology for this machine to their training cur-
ricula for artisans. In its first training course in welding machine manufacture,
IAE trained 39 artisans, 34 from Harare and five from Gweru. All made their
own welding machine during the training course. Since the course, Silveira
House has manufactured over 50 welding machines and sold them through
hardware outlets in Harare.
Initially, the project aimed to provide general technical and business man-
agement training. Several courses were designed and delivered, but demand
and willingness to pay for them proved low and they were quickly dropped.
Marketing
During the project's first phase, marketing efforts were dominated by pro-
motions to increase the profile of the service centres and the products and
services provided by client workshops. These included the following:
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eight short broadcasts on ZBC Radio 2
regular advertisements in the classified section of the national Herald
newspaper
 posters
 personal visits by service centre staff to potential clients, including large
enterprises where there was believed to be potential for subcontracting links.
Despite these efforts, project impact continued to be somewhat limited.
Consequently, following the review in late 1998, it was decided to devote con-
siderably more resources to the marketing constraints facing client
engineering workshops. Central to the new marketing strategy was the deci-
sion, following market surveys by independent consultants, to open four
business shops to promote and disseminate small production equipment. The
first of these opened in Harare in June 1999.
The business shop made production equipment available to the public
through business kits that had several components:
production equipment
 an instruction manual
an ITDG-Southern Africa seal of approval
 a guarantee.
For an increased fee, business kits also included the following:
 spare parts as required
 consumables as required (for example, plastic tubing for the freezit
machine)
 training in the use of the equipment.
The business shop also held spare parts and consumables in stock. Business
kits for sale at the Harare business shop included the following:
maize mills
electric and manual peanut butter machines










Which business kits were stocked at the business shop was determined pri-
marily by requests and feedback from prospective clients. Both to promote
the profitability of the business shop and to stimulate growth as widely as
possible throughout the small enterprise sector, the project team decided not
to hold a tight sectoral focus but to disseminate many different business kits.
The seal of approval and guarantee were considered important innovations
in overcoming the suspicion of clients of small enterprise products. Even
though the guarantees were in the name of the business shop, effectively the
manufacturers - who would have a vested interest in continuing to be com-
missioned by the business shops - were responsible for any repair work
required (although they were likely on occasion to require assistance from
project staff in correcting problems). Agreements to this effect were made
between the project and manufacturers before the latter were commissioned.
So far, two types of machines sold in the business shops - maize mills and
brick presses - have been returned as defective under guarantee. Problems
on both items are being resolved and project staff are confident that they will
soon be back in production.
Eighty per cent of business shop stock was expected to be made by client
small manufacturers during the project's second phase. While the project
emphasized strengthening the local small engineering sector, its core goal was
to generate employment by manufacturing and selling production equip-
ment. To this end, it was expected that the business shops would also purchase
equipment from sources other than its own client engineering enterprises,
where appropriate. To date, such purchases have included manual peanut but-
ter mills supplied by the Zimbabwe oil press project as well as Chinese-made
oil mills and diesel engines. Business shops have also explored stocking solar
panels.
It was hoped that the business shops would develop a reputation among
entrepreneurs and agencies promoting small businesses as prominent suppli-
ers of small-scale production technology in and outside Zimbabwe. In a
number of neighbouring countries, particularly Mozambique, production
equipment was in short supply. As the profile of the business shops grew, an
increasing number of clients - individuals and development agencies - might
place orders for business kits. The expected importance of Mozambique as a
market was one reason for opening a business shop and a service centre in
Mutare.
Hiring out workshop space
Of the 120 regular users of the service centres by late 1998,17 (11 in Harare
and six in Gweru) did not have separate premises but used the service cen-
tres as their base. This served a very useful function in that customers coming
to the service centre for machining work had a ready supply of qualified
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labour to hire. Nonetheless, client enterprises in the Harare service centre
(where congestion was a much greater problem than in Gweru) were served
notice in 1998 that by the beginning of 1999 they would have to open inde-
pendent workshops. It was expected that this would make them less
dependent on the project and encourage them both to expand and to move
from repair and maintenance into manufacturing. For these reasons, the proj-
ect rented workshop space close to the service centre. The space was divided
into seven workshops, which were rented out to client enterprises at com-
mercial rates.
This served several purposes. First, space in the service centre was freed up
to house more items of hire equipment and serve as 'office space' for client
enterprises when they rented desks by the hour for discussions with customers.
Second, it maintained the benefits of 'clustering' evident during the first phase
of the project - mutual learning and specialization among client engineering
enterprises. Third, it made skilled labour available for hire near the equipment
in the service centre. And finally, clients occupying the workshop space served
as a window for the new technologies and techniques that the project intro-
duced. Had its client enterprises been able to hire workshop space near the
Harare service centre, the project would not have taken this step. But suspi-
cion on the part of proprietors towards small enterprises and their preference
to rent space to one large client rather than many small ones made it neces-
sary. The project sought to demonstrate that small engineering enterprises
were viable and trustworthy, which would make it easier for them to find
appropriate workshop space without outside assistance.
Providing information on other service providers
The project set out with the aim of being an information resource to its clients
on the full range of services available in Zimbabwe for small-scale enter-
prises. Towards this aim, it developed a directory of small enterprise support
agencies with the services they offered. This was used to refer clients to rele-
vant agencies about services the project did not provide. The directory was
not published.
Project management
Project employees were a manager, a part-time marketing officer, a techni-
cian and a part-time quality control engineer. The finance and
communications departments of ITDG-Southern Africa also provided serv-
ices and ITDG-Southern Africa's manufacturing sector programme manager
provided overall management supervision. All staff were Zimbabwean
nationals, except the project manager, who was an expatriate. Advice came
from the UK-based ITDG senior specialist in manufacturing and enterprise
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development. All service centre staff were funded direct by income from the
service centres.
The concept of the tool hire centre arose out of the field research done by
project staff and artisans during 1995 and 1996. The project management
team developed the project strategy, although they called on the services of
an expatriate consultant to help with the review in late 1998.
The Zimbabwean managers of the service centres had a high degree of
autonomy. Only two days per month of the project manager's time were allo-
cated to supporting them. The managers of the business shops will have
similar autonomy once these are up and running profitably.
The technology support and development work involved close collabora-
tion. The choice of a new technology (or adapting an existing one) introduced
by the project, for example, arose out of the ideas, expertise and experience
of client engineering enterprises; the activities of other programmes within
ITDG-Southern Africa; information available to the project team on tech-
nologies successfully disseminated elsewhere; and increasingly, feedback
from clients of the business shops. Client engineers were involved in devel-
oping technology from the earliest stages of the process. They played a
leading role in introducing new ideas and, with support from the project
team, they were generally responsible for developing and testing prototypes.
Project performance
Impact
It should be remembered the project is still at an early stage. Little impact
data have been generated. It has been less than a year since the change in
strategy shifted the focus of the project towards the machine users. Although
methodological challenges remain (see 'Challenges' section), this shift,
together with the establishment of the business shops, should provide a sim-
ple and cheap method of measuring project impact. Formulae should be
developed to track the income and employment generated by each item of
equipment the project has promoted. Business shop records should provide
information on equipment sold.
Impact assessment should be undertaken annually by a team of external
consultants. However, during this first year of the new approach, efforts were
concentrated on setting up the new business shop in Harare and establishing
a third service centre in Mutare. The first impact study had not yet been com-
missioned.
During the first three years of the project, when the primary focus was on
client manufacturers, few useful data were generated. This was due in part to
the methodological difficulties inherent in measuring the impact of what the
project was attempting. Four difficulties proved particularly troublesome.
First, keeping track of the number of items of each machine introduced by the
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project and produced by its clients proved difficult. Many client entrepre-
neurs were initially suspicious of the project, fearing it constituted
competition rather than assistance.
Second, among small manufacturers throughout Africa, product innova-
tions spread rapidly through imitation. Manufacturers that had no contact
with the project took up production of several of the pieces of equipment that
the project introduced. Sales of such equipment were difficult to track, or
even to estimate.
Third, a core aim of the project was to increase the productive capacity and
technological self-confidence of small manufacturers. An important measure
of success in this lay in project clients developing and introducing new
machines independent of the project. This, too, was difficult to track.
Finally, the increased capacity among client workshops as a result of the
project was manifested not just in discrete finished products, but also in parts
and components. Many items of working equipment would not have been
made, would not have been repaired, or would have been more expensive to
make or repair without the project. Trying to calculate these benefits was a
methodological minefield.
Failure of the project team to undertake a baseline survey exacerbated
already substantial methodological difficulties in attempting to track project
impact. Moreover, with the project's focus during the initial phase on capital
goods producers, no data were gathered where, it became progressively
clearer, the greatest impact would be felt - on the users of production equip-
ment. As a result of all these factors, the impact of the project on income and
employment has not been quantified.
Some data that were generated during the first phase of the project
described an increase in productive activity that could be attributed to the
project. Engineering enterprises using the service centres provided two types
of goods and services:
• subcontracts for medium and large enterprises and state clients
• equipment and components for intermediary manufacturers who made
production equipment for small enterprises.
Details of the performance of client engineering enterprises during the first
phase are provided in Tables 7.4-7.6. Twenty-two engineering enterprises
provided subcontracting services (Table 7.4). Some subcontracts listed did
not represent new value-added activities. Several of the engineers using the
service centres had used commercial machine shops, and brought their clients
and contracts with them. In addition, some contracts were the result of large
companies subcontracting to former employees.
Nonetheless, significant new subcontracting work was created. As in many
countries, large companies and state bodies in Zimbabwe had narrowed their
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focus to their core business and were subcontracting ancillary services, such
as catering, cleaning and engineering support. This opened up markets for
small enterprises. Trained Zimbabwean engineers, with access to modern
equipment as a result of the project, benefit from these trends.
Table 7.4 Client engineering enterprise subcontracts



























shoe moulds for soles
equipment maintenance; parts manufacture
milk homogenizer




injection moulds for plastic goods; manufacture and
maintenance of various machine parts
wheel studs; couplings and pneumatic fittings; bore-
hole pistons and shafts; diesel engine cylinder sleeves
wheel studs; couplings and pneumatic fittings; bore-
hole pistons and shafts; diesel engine cylinder
sleeves
moulds for plastic bottles
equipment maintenance; manufacture of machine
parts
injection moulds for plastic goods; manufacture and
maintenance of various machine parts
repairs to dough mixer
shafts and repairs to meat cutters
equipment maintenance; manufacture of machine
parts
wheel studs; couplings and pneumatic fittings;
various parts
punch tools for laminations
press tools and shafts
press tools and a wire straightener used for making
mattress springs
gate rollers
parts for crushing equipment
components for electricity meters
repair and maintenance of boreholes; school
furniture; playground equipment
Table 7.5 lists capital goods produced by client engineering enterprises for
intermediary capital goods enterprises during the initial phase. Engineering
enterprises recently moved into producing new capital goods, including
wood-turning lathes, circular saws, metal rollers and metal-spinning moulds.
This machinery could have a significant long-term impact on Zimbabwean
manufacturing.
In addition to the items listed in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, client engineering
enterprises manufactured thousands of smaller items, including nuts and
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Table 7.5 Capital goods and components produced by engineering enterprises for
intermediary capital goods producing enterprises
Item Quantity sold
Axles for trailers and carts 2000*
Hammer mill parts 50
Welding machines 38
Parts for food-packing equipment 30
Punching tools 25
Punch tools for window and door components 16






Punch tools for electric transformers 2
Wood-turning lathes 2
This is such a widespread activity among client small-scale engineering enterprises that it is very difficult to
estimate the total number with any degree of accuracy. This is a conservative estimate.
bolts, window hinges and latches, and all manner of one-off machine parts
during the project's first phase. This enabled manufacturers to increase the
range and quality of the equipment they provided.
As well as subcontracting and providing engineering services to intermedi-
ary manufacturers, many engineering enterprises also manufactured
equipment for end-users (Table 7.6). Technologies introduced by the project
were prominent, although it may not have adequately monitored its manu-
facture of production equipment. Client engineering workshops have been
able to move into producing new products without direct assistance from the
project, except for improved access to equipment. This indicates increased
technological capacity and self-confidence. Estimates of the quantities of
each item produced by engineering workshops cannot be made:
mixers for animal feeders and for chemical and paint companies
replicas of other commercially available oil mills
metal-benders for scotchcarts and window and door frames
tobacco rollers
irrigation pumps




While the distinction between client engineering enterprises and intermedi-
ary manufacturers is useful for conceptual purposes, in practical terms the
line dividing the two is somewhat blurred. Many of the items of equipment
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produced for end-users were manufactured by both engineering workshops
and intermediary manufacturers. Engineering workshops made components,
such as axles, shafts and machine parts. They provided some parts to inter-
mediary producers for manufacturing equipment; some they used themselves
in their own manufacturing. Where both engineers and intermediary produc-
ers made the same types of equipment, they are categorized under which
class of entrepreneur produced most of it: intermediaries, Table 7.5;
engineers, Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Production equipment produced by client engineers for end-users during
project phase
Item Quantity sold
Manual freezit machine 254
Electric maize mill 44
Diesel maize mill 32
De-huller 17
Concrete tile machine 8
Brick moulder 5
Peanut butter machine 4
T-shirt printer 2
Another case study project, the Zimbabwe oil press project (see
Chapter 8), also promotes the manufacture and dissemination of peanut
butter mills.
Business kits sold by the Harare business shop during the second phase are
listed in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7 Business kits sold by the project in 1999
Business kit Quantity sold
Maize mills 64
Brick and block presses 56
Electric peanut butter machines 37
Manual freezit machines 33






Automatic freezit machines 5
Diesel engines 5
De-hullers 4
Several of these machines were used primarily by women, including peanut
butter machines, maize mills, freezit machines and bag sealers. The ability to
hire rather than purchase machines outright was important in giving relatively
poor entrepreneurs - men and women alike - access to improved technology.
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The project sought to benefit the relatively poor by developing manual as well
as powered equipment. Manual machines were often cheaper than powered
ones, required less capital and were more appropriate for a small enterprise.
Cost effectiveness
It was difficult to make a judgement on the cost effectiveness of the project
because of the lack of data and because the project was engaged mostly in
field research. Without doubt, the costs of the project to date have far
exceeded its benefits. Indeed, it was this realization that led to the change in
strategy at the beginning of 1999. No authoritative conclusion can be drawn
until the service centre and business shop models have had several more











Many of the costs involved represent investment in activities that have yet
to bear fruit - the Harare business shop, the Mutare service centre and the
groundwork for opening the remaining business shops and service centres.
The Gweru tool hire centre was a very small operation. Despite various
efforts to stimulate demand for its services, it remained small, with running
costs, income and turnover of around 15 per cent of the Harare service centre.
One unit established by the project performed strongly - the Harare serv-
ice centre. It ran at a profit with minimal help from the project. Figure 7.1
compares the project expenses and income associated with the Harare serv-
ice centre. Table 7.8 provides gross income, running costs and net income of
the centre itself.
Figure 7.1 Expenses and income from the Harare service centre
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Table 7.8 Harare service centre gross income, running costs and net income (US$)
1997/8 1998/9 Total
Service centre income
Service centre running costs










No records were kept of service centre running costs in 1996/7. Income during that year was negligible.
Costs at the Harare service centre were modest for the first year of the proj-
ect, during field research, and then rose sharply in 1996/7 and 1997/8, before
falling in 1998/9. In 1999/2000, project expenses for the service centre dropped
to almost zero, only two days per month of the project manager's time. The two
high-expenditure years resulted from intense contact between project staff and
client enterprises. Project staff experimented in providing business training
and promoting subcontracting links, which have since been abandoned.
With the opening of new service centres in Mutare and Bulawayo and three
new business shops, project costs were expected to rise again, but not as much
as in 1997/8. Around 20 per cent of the expenses associated with the Harare
service centre were spent on capital assets. Most project spending paid ITDG-
Southern Africa staff and overheads (including inputs from UK-based staff)
associated with designing and developing the project and experimenting with
different approaches. Now that the model has been developed, costs associ-
ated with the new service centres and business shops should fall.
Both the Harare and the Gweru service centres have now recorded one year
of profit. Income from equipment hire covered all staff, premises rental and
equipment replacement costs. However, because of the high currency devalu-
ation rates, project management decided to use the equipment replacement
budget (funds raised from service centre business) to purchase new equipment
rather than set money aside to replace worn-out machines. This raises the ques-
tion of how large and expensive machines will be replaced when they come to
the end of their natural lives. The project has not had to face this problem. But
it does place a significant question mark over the claim of financial self-sus-
tainability for the service centres. The only remaining direct subsidy is two days
per month of the project manager's time, which the project pays for. A more
definitive judgement on the cost effectiveness of the project should count the
hidden subsidy represented by the expertise and expense involved in develop-
ing the machinery introduced into the project by ITDG-Southern Africa's
building materials and food processing programmes - the brick and tile
machines and the oil expelling and peanut butter making machines.
Sustainability
Formidable challenges face the project team as it attempts to prove that the
model can be cost effective and sustainable. If they were not profitable, the
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service centres and business shops would simply cease to exist. Working on
the assumption that the service centres and the business shops will be com-
mercially viable, three options present themselves: sell to an entrepreneur,
franchise an entrepreneur, or establish a private company with a high level of
operational autonomy but ultimately answerable to ITDG-Southern Africa
for policy decisions.
The first option has the merit of removing project staff from interfering in
the business (good for efficient business) but has no guarantee that the pur-
chaser will continue to provide a developmentally valuable service. Just
because tool hire and selling production equipment is viable (albeit following
substantial initial investment on the part of the project) does not mean that
they would necessarily be profit-maximizing activities for a private entrepre-
neur. Without some continuing role for ITDG-Southern Africa, there would
be nothing to prevent the new owner from cashing in the assets or switching
to some more lucrative market niche. Both of the other options present inter-
esting approaches to the dilemma of promoting business efficiency while
maintaining a developmental dimension to commercial activities. Both will
be explored as the project develops.
Lessons learned
The project is too young to have generated more than provisional lessons or
conclusions. It has been mostly experimentation, its strategy representing a
radical reorientation. For most of its life, the project has been feeling its way
towards an effective approach. This has been justifiable - indeed, it may even
be considered to some extent inevitable in an initiative pioneering a new
model for supporting small enterprises. However, it is not the stuff that solid,
transferable lessons are made of. The model that the project sought to
demonstrate has not yet proved itself.
Several lessons can nonetheless be drawn. Tool hire can be a valuable serv-
ice to small enterprises. Despite the paucity of data generated, there is little
doubt that the tool hire service that the project provides has been valuable to
its clients. Most of the equipment operated at high capacity, small enterprises
developed subcontracting links with larger clients that otherwise would not
have been possible, and the quality and range of small-scale production has
improved.
Hiring production equipment has allowed would-be entrepreneurs to
explore the viability of new business at low cost and low risk. This has been
especially valuable in a country like Zimbabwe where the formal sector is
strong and small-scale self-employment is a new concept for many.
Project experience has suggested that service centres could be viable busi-
nesses within two years of opening, even if the problem of how to replace
large and expensive machines when they wear out has not yet been resolved.
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However, on their own, without complementary interventions, they cannot be
considered to be a cost-effective use of donor funding. Complementary inter-
ventions, to a significant degree, should be context-specific. In the case of
Zimbabwe, with its history of formal sector dominance in both production
and marketing, the project has developed two complementary services that
hold promise of high impact and cost effectiveness - introducing new tech-
nology, and opening market outlets. In other places, appropriate
complementary interventions are likely to differ.
New approaches require substantial field research before being launched.
Much of the expenditure incurred in the project's early years represented
research and development costs. These included commissioning studies by
consultants, experimenting with different approaches and services, and iden-
tifying the target group. It is legitimate to question whether such costs should,
at least in part, have been financed out of general research and development
funds rather than allocated to a project. Certainly, the expenses incurred dur-
ing the light-engineering project's early years, when it was clearly feeling its
way towards an appropriate approach, made achieving a positive benefit/cost
ratio over the lifetime of the project all but impossible.
One lesson to emerge from the case study is that if donors wish to see new
and innovative approaches to business development, more untied research
and development funding will be required. During this preparatory phase,
capital investment should be limited. It appears probable that the pressure to
demonstrate results and justify project expenses pushed the project team into
a premature and over-ambitious capital investment programme. Had this ini-
tial period been conceived as preparatory field research, the pressure on the
team would have eased and investment would have been more coherent and
gradual.
With innovative projects, there is a need for flexibility in developing proj-
ect strategy. The orientation of the project changed radically over the course
of its short life. Beginning as a technology support project targeted towards
small engineering enterprises, the core thrust of the project today could more
accurately be described as a marketing push aimed at the users of small-scale
equipment. Such a radical restatement of project objectives and strategy is a
tribute to the flexibility of both the project's management and its donor
sponsor.
With innovative approaches, some learning by doing is inevitable. Nor can
it be assumed that this learning will be either smooth or rapid. Patience, flex-
ibility and a willingness to question what the project seeks to achieve, and
how it does so, are necessary.
Poverty can be addressed through assisting relatively sophisticated modern
enterprises. An important change in strategy early in the life of the project
shifted the focus from unsophisticated microenterprises to more modern
small firms. The microenterprises could not use the equipment provided by
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the project to manufacture equipment to an acceptable standard. This step in
the evolution of project strategy reached completion with the launch of the
project's second phase in mid-1999. It shifted the focus from the manufactur-
ers to the users of production machinery. What is clear in retrospect is that the
shift to small enterprises permitted the manufacture of a quality and range of
production equipment that would otherwise not have been possible. This per-
mitted the project to enjoy significantly greater impact than if it had retained
its initial focus. It improved availability of inexpensive, manual production
equipment for relatively poor producers.
Product guarantees may be important in overcoming the widespread sus-
picion about the quality of goods produced by small-scale enterprises. Clients
purchasing goods and services from small enterprises generally have little
recourse to the law with faulty or substandard service. Indeed, this is one of
the attributes of 'informality'. The resulting vulnerability has inhibited the
development of stronger links between large and small businesses, perhaps
especially so in countries with strong formal sectors. Effective guarantee
schemes have proved important elsewhere; they may have the same effect in
Zimbabwe. This feature of project design appears crucial to interesting 'insti-
tutional' clients - aid agencies, local government, large retailers and so on -
in the production equipment sold in the business shops.
Simple, affordable monitoring needs to be built into project design. Impact
monitoring is not just to prove to one's donor that value for money is being
provided; it is also a key management tool. Project staff, convinced of the
legitimacy of the model they are attempting to prove, can be tempted to
plough on even though methodological problems with monitoring have not
been resolved. This is a mistake to be avoided. Without clear systems feeding
information to management on project performance, project staff can
become confused and demoralized and projects can lose their way.
Nonetheless, methodological difficulties exist when measuring the effect
that interventions have on enhancing the technological capacity of small
engineering enterprises. Initiatives that seek to increase the technological
self-confidence and capacity of small engineering enterprises present partic-
ular difficulties. Benefits accrue not just to direct beneficiaries but also to
those supplied with production equipment, those supplied with components
and parts, and those imitating the innovations introduced. Even measuring
project impact on direct beneficiaries is not simple, since the beneficiaries use
their enhanced capacity to introduce new products and techniques independ-
ently. Problems of attribution and data collection abound.
In the face of these difficulties, donors may be tempted to abandon fund-
ing of 'capacity-building' initiatives in favour of those targeted at helping to
introduce specific products, although there would be no possibility of inno-
vation, since the impact is easier to measure. This would be unfortunate, as
enhanced capacity within the small engineering sector in developing coun-
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tries is a prerequisite to sustainable development of indigenous technology.
Rather, greater resources should be devoted to developing an affordable
impact assessment for such initiatives.
No decision was made about the long-term status of the organizations cre-
ated by the project. However, the option of simple transfer to a private
entrepreneur offers no guarantee that the developmental benefits of the proj-
ect will be retained. Two options present themselves as interesting
approaches to reconciling independent business management while retaining
development focus. Franchising or establishing a private company under the
aegis of ITDG-Southern Africa are interesting possibilities that should be
explored as the project develops.
Challenges
Formidable challenges lie ahead for the project team as it seeks to demon-
strate the viability of the service centres and business shops. The project team
must develop cost-effective ways to help small engineering enterprises
achieve the quality standards that the market requires. This will not be easy.
The project has attempted to work with many clients engaged in producing a
wide range of equipment. All experience in this area has taught that success-
fully upgrading small enterprise products to consistent standards is expensive
and time consuming. Already, two of the machines introduced by the project
have had problems and a number have been returned under guarantee as
defective. Such problems appear bound to be repeated as the project pro-
motes new machines entering the market.
To achieve high impact, the project will need to find ways of transferring
products and production methods that will not require extensive follow-up
on the part of its staff. Only thus will they be able to devote time to develop-
ing new production equipment and new client enterprises. The project team
postulated that since many of its clients had trained and worked in the formal
sector and understood well the need for quality control, this should not be a
major problem. Only time will tell whether this optimism has been well
placed.
The ability of project client engineering enterprises to compete success-
fully in manufacturing small-scale production equipment has not been
proved. Competition has come from two sources. First, the formal engineer-
ing sector produces a range of machines used by small producers, including
some agricultural and food processing equipment, block-making machinery,
and so on. Second, already a number of donor-funded initiatives in this field
have sought to improve the efficiency and increase the market share of their
client enterprises. Prominent among these has been the Zimbabwe oil press
project (see Chapter 8 in this volume), which is diversifying away from its
original focus on the oil press. It helped to establish a private company, RAM
167
Ltd, which produces small production equipment in bulk for sale in
Zimbabwe and for wide export in Africa. RAM Ltd already competes with
clients of the light-engineering project. Both produce peanut butter mills that
are similar. As RAM Ltd looks around for other products that it can prof-
itably manufacture, competition appears set to grow.
The core issue here is the scale on which the equipment in question can
most efficiently and profitably be produced. International experience sug-
gests that small enterprises have advantages over larger ones in markets not
suited to production and distribution in bulk, those characterized by rela-
tively low and dispersed demand and high distribution costs. Yet it must be
assumed that low demand will often not be true for those businesses the proj-
ect is interested in. That is, if the business shops are to be profitable, they will
need to achieve a relatively high turnover of goods.
It may not be easy for project client engineering enterprises to compete
successfully. It is, for example, not difficult to imagine that project clients may
open market niches only to have them invaded by larger competitors once
their profitability has been demonstrated. Many client engineering compa-
nies had already found profitable niches as subcontractors of larger
companies. They might abandon subcontracting in favour of manufacturing
small production equipment if they could be sure of increasing their profits.
Helping to bring this about would be a major challenge for the project.
A third challenge has been to demonstrate that there exists a sufficient
unmet demand for small machinery to warrant establishing business shops. A
concerted marketing drive, including attending agricultural shows, trade fairs
and other fora would be required. This represents yet another potentially sig-
nificant drain on staff time and project resources.
To date, the project has collected little baseline and impact data. By switch-
ing the focus to the technology users, tracing impact should be considerably
easier through the simple recording of equipment sales in the business shops.
This, however, will not record the full impact of the project. It is probable that
client engineering workshops will sell through channels other than the busi-
ness shops. But it does represent a simple and affordable way to capture the
bulk that can be attributed to the project, providing clients do, in fact, supply
most of their output to the business shops. While the new monitoring system
focuses heavily on recording the business kits supplied to users, some atten-
tion will be required to measure the impact of project activities that enhance
the technological capacity of client small engineering enterprises.
The challenge lies in the way in which the effectiveness of each of the
business kits is calculated. There are two key issues. The first concerns attri-
bution and displacement. It is not sufficient to calculate the financial and
employment gains that a technology is capable of generating and equate that
with impact. Reasonable assumptions about likely utilization rates must be
made. First, account needs to be taken of the value of activities previously
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undertaken by entrepreneurs and their employees that are displaced by the
new activity. Second, the manner in which the calculations are made will have
to be adjusted, as employment and income for most technologies are likely to
vary according to weather, input supply and other factors.
Should the businesses created by the project prove viable, transferring
them to the private sector lies some distance down the road. That transfer will
be a further challenge for the project staff, and finding the right balance
between business efficiency and continued development will call for sound
judgement.
A final challenge over which the project has little control is how to oper-
ate in spite of political and economic instability. Devaluation, high inflation
and periodic rioting are not conducive to business growth.
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8 Building Zimbabwe's edible oil industry
JONATHAN DAWSON
The problem
INSUFFICIENT CONSUMPTION OF dietary fat, an important source of calories, is
a common health problem in most developing countries (Hyman 1993).
Although the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) recommends an annual per capita intake of 9.6 litres of edible oil (an
important source of dietary fat), studies have shown consumption to be as
low as 5.9 litres per year in Zimbabwe, 2.3 litres in rural Zambia and 1.5 litres
in some rural areas of Kenya. In much of the region, young children subsist
mainly on maize meal porridge with sugar and milk. Adding edible oil would
be nutritionally desirable (Lobulu 1990).
Until the mid-1980s, most edible oil in the region was produced by large-
scale private and state-owned processing plants. Their product was often too
expensive for the poor. Distribution costs further exacerbated problems of
affordability for those in the rural areas, where 70 per cent of the population
lives and where poverty is greatest. Moreover, from the early 1980s onwards
the quantity supplied was less than the quantity demanded, and oil was sim-
ply unavailable in many rural areas.
Yet land suitable for growing oilseeds is relatively plentiful and conditions
for processing them at village level by small-scale producers have long been
favourable, but appropriate processing technologies were not available in
Zimbabwe before this project. With unemployment rising and rural-urban
migration a progressively more serious problem, new higher-value agricul-
tural and processing activities are desperately needed.
Two key elements, however, have been missing: a regular supply of high-
yielding oilseeds and an affordable technology for small-scale manual oilseed
extraction that could be used in villages far from the nearest repair workshop
and electricity supply. Small-scale screw presses have been available in the
region for some time. However, they are relatively expensive, and to press
soft-shelled seeds such as sunflower and sesame, a decorticator is also
required, which is a separate piece of equipment. Consequently, the screw
press has never been widely used in the rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa.
Enterprise Works Worldwide (then known as Appropriate Technology
International, or ATI) commenced project activities to address these prob-
lems in 1984 when it launched an oilseeds project in Tanzania. In 1989, the
Zimbabwe Oil Press Project was launched as a replication and refinement of
the Tanzanian project; and subsequently EnterpriseWorks and the other
NGOs it assisted also launched oil press projects in the Gambia, Kenya, Mali,
Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia.
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In the early years, the World University Service of Canada (WUSC) imple-
mented the Zimbabwe project since Enterprise Works did not have an office
in that country. From the outset, however, Enterprise Works had primary
responsibility for project strategy, funding and all major management deci-
sions. Enterprise Works formally took over the project from WUSC in 1996.
The Zimbabwe Oil Press Project promotes the oil press as a business
opportunity with the potential to create widespread benefits in the commu-
nity, as it
• produces affordable oil
• improves nutritional standards
• by virtue of its low investment cost, creates widely accessible opportunities
for processing to add value to agricultural crops, generating additional
income and employment in rural areas
• produces seedcake - a nutritious animal feed - as a by-product
• stimulates the production of economically high-value crops like sunflower,
groundnut and sesame.
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide is an NGO with a head office in the United
States, which designs and implements business development services for
small-scale producers in developing countries.1 In 1999, it had programmes in
11 countries in Africa, five in Asia and five in Latin America. Between 1993
and 1998, EnterpriseWorks assisted over 38 200 enterprises, benefiting nearly
241 000 people and generating monetary benefits of US$48.95 million. About
47 per cent of the producer participants were women (Hyman, pers. comm.
2001).
Business development services provided by the Zimbabwe Oil Press
Project
In effect, the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project needed to create a new rural indus-
try. To do so, it needed to take a number of steps in the production and
marketing chain, listed in Table 8.1.
When EnterpriseWorks took over the activities of WUSC by implement-
ing the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project through its own new local office, it
continued to train press manufacturers, demonstrate and promote the ram
press and oil filters, promote expanded cultivation of oilseeds, and market
and distribute the press and filters to buyers. It covered some of the costs of
the activities through a price margin on the oilseed processing equipment
sold, and gradually increased the margins to pave the way for commercial-
ization. In 1998, EnterpriseWorks developed a plan to spin off the
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Table 8.1 Business development services provided by the Zimbabwe Oil Press
Project
Business development service Specific activities in Zimbabwe




Planting seed multiplication and distribution
Pressing seed production and distribution
Primary product marketing (oil)
Secondary product marketing (seedcake)
• develop four different sizes of ram press for
different market niches
• train artisans
• develop new press (a fifth size) suitable for
mass production
• identify mass production facility and
establish manufacturing company
• improve access to processing technologies
• identify and multiply improved seed
varieties
• promote multiplication of planting seed
• facilitate market development for planting
seeds in rural areas
• improve farmers' access to inputs
• promote improved farm management
practices
• facilitate small farmer access to better
markets
• disseminate information on edible oil
marketing
• disseminate information to end-users on
seedcake utilization
• promote market for and provide information
on seedcake
Source: Data submitted by EnterpriseWorks-Zimbabwe for EnterpriseWorks WorldWide's annual impact tracking
system
aDevelopment of the various models of ram press occurred through the Zimbabwe project, its predecessor
Tanzania project and EnterpriseWorks' regional programme funding.
commercial press production and marketing activities to two separate private
companies, while retaining the not-for-profit development activities.
Today three key organizations are involved in implementing the
Zimbabwe Oil Press Project:
Appropriate Technology Zimbabwe (ATZ) is a not-for-profit non-govern-
mental organization, established in 1996. It is registered in Zimbabwe as a
trust with its own board but is affiliated with EnterpriseWorks Worldwide. Its
function is to undertake research and development activities for which com-
mercialization cannot be achieved. This NGO was created to undertake
research and development, pilot and promotional activities. It is an outgrowth
of earlier NGO activities of EnterpriseWorks in Zimbabwe.
Rural Associated Manufacturers (RAM) Pvt. Ltd is a for-profit company
established in 1997 that manufactures oil presses and associated accessories.
It is a joint venture between EnterpriseWorks and a private Zimbabwean
entrepreneur.
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ZOPP Pvt. Ltd is a for-profit commercial company that started trading in
1997. It distributes and markets ram presses, peanut mills and planting seed.
ZOPP, as used here, refers exclusively to the private marketing company; the
project is referred to as the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project or simply 'the
project'.
Over the lifetime of the project, the following donor agencies have pro-
vided funding:
• US AID -Africa Bureau and the Microenterprise Innovation Project (MIP
- USAID funded)
Africa Now (UK)
Food Industry Campaign against Hunger (USA)
Canadian International Development Agency
Kellogg Foundation
Japanese Embassy to Zimbabwe.
Exchange rates
Sharp devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar in recent years and associated
price inflation make comparisons over time using this currency difficult and
misleading. Using the US dollar also distorts the picture, since the low-
income sector does not immediately or fully see devalued incomes adjusted
by the new rates, but the scale of distortion is not as great.
End-of-year exchange rates for the Zimbabwe dollar against the US dollar
were as follows:
1993 US$1 = Z$3.89 1997 US$1 = Z$9.29
1994 US$1 = Z$4.97 1998 US$1 = Z$10.82
1995 US$1 = Z$6.20 1999 US$1 = Z$18.51
1996 US$1 = Z$8.36 2000 US$1 = Z$55.20
Technology development
Commercial production of a small-scale manual ram press began in Tanzania
in mid-1986. This was a small, continuous-flow press with automatic loading
and unloading. Invented by Carl Bielenberg, it was considerably more ver-
satile than other available presses, having the capacity to process edible oil
from sesame, shelled groundnut, canola, mustard seed, niger nut, copra, saf-
flower, cucurbit seeds, de-hulled oil palm kernels, avocados and de-hulled
almonds. Importantly, it could process sesame and soft-shelled sunflower
seed without decorticating them before pressing. It could also be used to
produce castor bean oil for industrial use or jatropha seed oil as a diesel fuel
substitute.2
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The press, however, was large and heavy with a piston diameter of 50 mm.
Two women or one man, who attached a large rock to the handle, generally
operated it.
After numerous design modifications, the project developed four more
ram press sizes, each smaller than the original.3 The smaller models are less
costly, and a woman working alone can easily operate one. The oil extraction
rate is similar in all models, and the throughput rates of the smaller models
make them much more appropriate for operation by smaller-scale entrepre-
neurs and farmers.
The Zimbabwe Oil Press Project began in 1989. The initial intention of the
project had been to work with one or two large-scale firms to produce the
ram presses. However, the large firms contacted were either not interested or
quoted very high prices. Consequently, it was decided to work through a num-
ber of small-scale producers, and over time the project trained the 11
producers selected. As orders for presses came to the project, these produc-
ers were invited to submit their tenders for making them, to encourage them
to compete with each other.
However, production at this scale presented a range of problems. Quality
control was often poor and the technical performance of the presses suffered.
Training, supervision and back-up support that the project provided to numer-
ous, disparate small-scale workshops was expensive and time consuming.
Impact and outreach were restricted by the limited production capacity of the
small-scale manufacturers. This was a particular concern in view of the growing
demand for presses, both in Zimbabwe and from other countries in the region.
Enterprise Works concluded that the scale of manufacture had to be
stepped up by mass producing the presses in one factory, which would export
throughout eastern and southern Africa and beyond. In 1997, the United
States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Microenterprise
Innovation Project funded the shift to commercialization with a grant of
US$595000.
EnterpriseWorks opted to enter into a joint venture with Shamen
Engineering - one of the eight small-scale manufacturers it had trained.
Rural Associated Manufacturers (RAM) Ltd was established in April 1997
with 56 per cent shareholding by EnterpriseWorks and 44 per cent by
Shamen Engineering. RAM Ltd has a sales agreement with EnterpriseWorks
projects in Zimbabwe, Uganda and Tanzania. It also supplies presses to
ZOPP Ltd, which distributes them within Zimbabwe and to programmes in
several other African countries.
The model developed for mass production was the RAM-32, which was
superior to previous models in wear, reliability, appearance and ease of serv-
ice. Smaller and lighter than previous models, it was also more appropriate
for export. The project was able to increase its profit margin on the RAM-32
and still retail it for 10 per cent less than any of the other models available.
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It had been expected that when the RAM-32 was introduced, previous
models would fall in popularity. However, sales of two of the earlier models,
BP-30 and BP-40, have remained high, and two-thirds of the ram presses sold
in 1997 were BP-30s.
The BP-30 dominates the market for two reasons: 1) the importance of
familiarity in dictating choice - sales of the RAM-32 did not begin until 1997,
and 2) the second and third batches of RAM-32s to be distributed in the first
year had a technical shortcoming, which adversely affected the model's repu-
tation. This shortcoming stemmed from a design change made to keep the
seedcake from clogging up the press so that it had to be removed manually
rather than automatically. This design change inadvertently reduced the
expected lifetime of the press. Because of the lack of sufficient field testing,
the project recalled 350 of the first 843 presses for retrofitting, at no expense
to the press owners. The RAM-32 presses produced after that did not have
this problem. But it cost the young company three weeks of production time
and substantial financial loss.
The project also developed several models of filters for the edible oil as
well as other technologies for small-scale farmers and microentrepreneurs. In
other countries in the region in which Enterprise Works has oil projects, the
oil is refined by boiling it with water and skimming off the oil. In Zimbabwe,
however, fuelwood is relatively scarce, so clarifying the oil through boiling to
remove the suspended small particles of seedcake and other foreign matter
presents more of a problem. The method introduced to undertake this
process initially consisted of a wooden filter stand with a filter made of brown
wrapping paper. Later, a bucket filter was introduced to save labour in filtra-
tion and to keep the oil more sanitary. The bucket filters are sold together
with the press as an option.
To increase the scope of the project and to promote the commercial via-
bility of RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd, Enterprise Works and RAM Ltd also
developed and introduced a number of other machines that have potential
for mass production and marketing, as listed in Box 8.1.
In mid-1999, production of two new technologies - the motorized peanut
blender and the peanut roaster - began. The peanut sheller should also soon
be in production. Several other technologies will be introduced after RAM
Ltd purchases additional equipment. ATZ decided to promote the treadle
pump designs that Carl Bielenberg had developed for Senegal and that were
being promoted by Enterprise Works Worldwide there and in Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Mali and Niger.
Promotion and sales
In the early stages of the project, project staff undertook all promotion and
sales activities for the ram presses. The price that press purchasers were
175
Box 8.1 Machines produced and developed by ATI and RAM




Oil bucket filter and stand




Manual peanut butter mill
Treadle pump
Peanut shelter
New products to be made or considered when RAM Ltd buys new equipment
Stick planter
Motorized ram press
Small grain storage unit
Cassava grater
Manual maize sheller
charged covered the full costs of manufacturing. However, a wide range of
project services in these early years was subsidized. These services took vari-
ous forms. After producers were trained in press manufacture, supervision
visits were required to ensure quality control and to screen out those not able
to achieve acceptable quality standards. Meanwhile, the project undertook an
active promotional campaign involving field demonstrations, participation at
agricultural fairs, newspaper and radio coverage and advertising. Free train-
ing was given to press purchasers on maintenance and simple repairs, and
ATZ provided more extensive training on repairs to local artisans in the areas
where ram press activities were concentrated. The project produced manuals
to accompany the presses and provided guarantees against technical failure.
It published a newsletter in English and Shona, and it gave a free 5-kg bag of
hybrid sunflower seed to each press purchaser.
During the initial years of the project, it also offered credit to purchasers
of most presses. This was both because early models were relatively expensive
and because the technology was unfamiliar to the potential market. In 1996,
however, the project decided that it could now stop providing this service
direct, and it referred clients to specialist credit agencies.
The multifaceted nature of the project's activities during this period was of
critical importance in inspiring confidence among press manufacturers and
prospective purchasers alike. However, with a limited project budget, the
sheer burden of work falling on project staff imposed strict limitations on the
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potential scale of impact. More widespread dissemination of the press was
also inhibited by the need for the project to increase the price margin to
recoup more of the costs of the services it provided. Consequently, press sales
were heavily concentrated in the two eastern provinces - Manicaland and
Mashonaland East - where the project had begun, and where it appeared that
it would be difficult to achieve wider impact.
This scenario lay at the root of the decision in 1995 to adopt a more com-
mercial approach to press sales. The distribution and marketing company
ZOPP Ltd was established and the project decided to try to
• abolish all subsidies
• significantly increase both production and sale of presses and widen their
geographical spread
• identify other rural technologies that could be sold, thus increasing the
impact of the project and the financial viability of the distribution com-
pany, ZOPP Ltd.
From the beginning of 1995, the gross margin was increased to 35 per cent
above the ex-factory price. By decreasing the production cost of the press,
mass manufacturing, introduced in 1997, permitted a further increase in the
margin received by the private companies spun off by the project and freed
NGO staff time - previously devoted to quality control and supervision of the
trained workshops - to work on other development activities.
In parallel, several innovative market distribution channels were explored.
These included advertising on the radio, direct mail promotion, promotion
through the medium of theatre and retailing through large-scale farm equip-
ment distributors.
In 1996, the presses were sold through just ten shops; by 1998 they were
being retailed by six sales agents and 93 retail stores. In Zimbabwe, and in
neighbouring countries, partner NGOs also act as distributors of the presses
produced by RAM Ltd through their own project initiatives. These include
AFRICARE (in Zambia); and CARE International, Food for the Hungry
and World Vision (in Mozambique).
In addition to ram presses, ZOPP Ltd sells a number of other products and
accessories from sources other than RAM Ltd, mostly manufactured by other
Zimbabwean companies:
sunflower planting and pressing seed
manual maize sheller
electric maize grinder and sheller
foot-powered treadle pump for small-scale irrigation
bucket filters and filter stands
peanut butter mill stands.
177
Despite the increases in turnover of oil presses and other technologies that
have been achieved through this marketing strategy, sales remain below tar-
get and a significant portion of the profit margin is taken by the wholesalers
and retailers. Consequently, the project has recently launched a new market-
ing tactic, which focuses on RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd selling direct rather
than through wholesalers. Several elements are key to the new strategy:
• identifying zones throughout Zimbabwe that have high potential for large
sales volumes
• developing a network of retailers and commissioned agents that sell the
technologies
• placing all ZOPP Ltd staff on commission, reducing basic salaries by 50 per
cent and setting commissions on turnover at such a level that a 10 per cent
increase in sales yields salaries at the same level as at present
• establishing permanent urban-based demonstration units
• finding donor funding to develop stronger sales in neighbouring countries.
Identification, multiplication and dissemination of seeds
The oil content of most sunflower varieties conventionally grown in eastern
and southern Africa is relatively low because the varieties were originally
selected to yield bird seed for export. Consequently, they yield less oil than
do hybrid varieties, and so are less profitable. Also, the hard shell of locally
grown varieties is abrasive and can reduce the life of the ram press if the seed
is not decorticated or heated to soften it before processing. The advantage of
hybrids is higher potential yield - not improved oil content or shell softness.
However, farmers can plant their own seed from their open-pollinated vari-
eties rather than buy the hybrid seed. In Tanzania, where farmer incomes are
lower and the agro-input distribution system is less developed,
EnterpriseWorks has promoted an open-pollinated variety of sunflower that
has a soft shell and high oil content.
Good hybrid varieties of various crops were already available in
Zimbabwe's relatively well-developed system for supplying agricultural
inputs, and farmers had higher average incomes than in most neighbouring
countries and so were more likely already to be planting hybrid maize. Still,
when the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project was launched, it had to buy hybrid sun-
flower planting seed from private producers and distribute it to most of the
areas in which the project was active. However, once the potential market
had been demonstrated, a private company (Pannar Ltd) decided to open 60
rural depots. Another major oilseed company, Cargill, then followed suit.
ATZ continued to help ten village stockists of planting seeds to become
established in parts of the country where Pannar Ltd did not operate. These
fully autonomous private enterprises received training from the project in
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business management and in helping farmers to address technical aspects of
oilseed production. Thus the project was able to limit its sales operation to
those few areas where no other source of hybrid seeds was available. Between
1989 and 1996, the project distributed over 60 tonnes of hybrid sunflower seed.
Nonetheless, lack of an adequate supply of high-quality hybrid seed con-
tinued to hamper small-scale oil processing in Zimbabwe, particularly during
years in which weather conditions were unfavourable. To address this prob-
lem, ATZ produced educational material on sunflower to promote the
production and saving of seed. Although this material was originally available
only in English, it was translated into the Shona language, and similar mate-
rial on groundnut was prepared.
ATZ worked closely with government extension officers of the
Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) to persuade
small-scale farmers to grow hybrid sunflower pressing seed. It commissioned
lead farmers to grow pressing seed, which it collected and distributed. It
tested different varieties of seeds in collaboration with the Department of
Research and Specialist Service's Sunflower Breeding Unit.
ATZ worked with the Development Technology Centre (DTC) of the
University of Zimbabwe, which produces hybrid pressing seeds at its experi-
mental farms throughout the country. ATZ provided seed while DTC
contributed land, inputs and expertise. ATZ and other NGOs working in the
poorer areas of the country purchased and distributed the seed produced on
DTC farms.
The project cooperated with other organizations, including AFRICARE
and DTC, to persuade the state Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to
provide loans for the purchase of pressing seeds. To date, AFC has provided
loans totalling US$13 850 to ten entrepreneurs.
These initiatives have borne fruit, and Zimbabwe is producing much more
hybrid sunflower seed than before. Smallholders grow around 90 per cent of
the seed today. Nonetheless, lack of pressing seed continues to hamper
increased oil production, particularly during years of bad weather. With a sig-
nificant increase in demand for pressing seeds expected, this represents an
important ongoing challenge for the project.
Marketing of oil and seedcake
Because of the relative sophistication of the Zimbabwean economy, the proj-
ect has not needed to devote as much effort to marketing oil and seedcake as
in other countries with oil press projects. Nonetheless, product marketing,
including costing, record-keeping and labelling, was an important element of
the management courses run for oil processing enterprises.
Enterprise Works also supported a study of the nutritional value of sun-
flower seedcake as animal feed in another project (Zimbabwe Livestock
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Project). Once the best feed formulae for particular types of animals have
been determined, ATZ plans to create links between livestock farmers and
oilseed processors and to develop and sell small mixing machines for formu-
lating the feed.
Project management
Responsibility in the project for strategic and management decisions has
been diversified and indigenized. Enterprise Works undertook initial project
design and led the decision to shift to a more commercial approach. Pivotal
to this shift was its regional perspective that mass production of technologies
for export to the various countries in which it had projects (and beyond)
would be more economical and have greater impact than the earlier strategy
of production by multiple small-scale producers.
The shift to a more commercial strategy has given RAM Ltd and ZOPP
Ltd progressively greater levels of autonomy for day-to-day decision-making.
Through mid-2000, responsibility for strategic decisions for all of
Enterprise Works' projects in eastern and southern Africa remained with the
director of EnterpriseWorks' Regional Oilseeds and Staple Foods
Programme. However, EnterpriseWorks helps partner organizations to
develop their own capability and promotes a team approach.
EnterpriseWorks also continues to play an active role in identifying tech-
nologies that can be mass-produced for the eastern and southern Africa
region and beyond. Here, the international relationships that
EnterpriseWorks has with other technology development agencies in the
region is an important source of information and ideas.
Project performance
Impact
The project's impact tracking system measures project performance against
various indicators:4
• sales of presses and other technologies
• number of producer participants:
o press owners and their workers
o press sales outlets
o repair artisans
o filter manufacturers
o peanut butter processors
o press and seed sales agents
o farmers growing oilseeds for sale to processors
• number of economic participants:
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o all the producer participants listed above
o households saving money on edible oil
• monetary benefits:5
o sales value of oil, peanut butter and seedcake produced
o consumer savings from lower-priced oil6.
Sales of presses and other technologies
Data on ram press sales in Zimbabwe are only for presses sold in the
project (Figure 8.1); they totalled at least 1932.
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Figure 8.1 Ram press sales in Zimbabwe, estimated number of ram presses in
operation, and total ram press sales, in Zimbabwe and exported,
1989-2000
Estimates of the number of presses in operation for each year of the
project (Figure 8.1) are based on the number of presses sold less the number
over five years old, which is conservatively estimated as the active life of a
ram press,7 and those temporarily out of operation - that is, those processing
less than 20 litres of oil a year.
Press sales increased steadily for the first five years of the project but then
fell back between 1995 and 1997 before recovering in 1998. The number of
presses in operation increased in every year of the project before 1998.
A sharp increase in ram press sales might have been expected as a result of
the shift to mass production in 1997. However, two key reasons prevented
this. First, the most important variable determining the level of press sales is
weather conditions; in years of unusual or unsettled weather, the entire
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agricultural economy suffers. The 1990s saw a number of years of low rainfall
in Zimbabwe, with particularly serious droughts in 1992 and 1996, and
adverse El Nino weather conditions in 1998. Such conditions limit the
farmer's willingness and ability to invest in technology whose profitable oper-
ation is dependent on good seed harvests.
Second was the technical problems with some of the RAM-32s produced
in the first year, already mentioned, which both eroded confidence in the new
model and diverted the energies of RAM Ltd from producing new stock to
retrofitting returned pieces.
The number of presses in operation fell in 1998, despite the fact that sig-
nificantly more were sold in that year (447) than were counted as falling out
of operation after their five-year life (the 193 sold in 1993). However, a large
number of presses (493) were classified as temporarily out of operation in
1998 because of the unfavourable El Nino-related weather conditions. Press
sales in Zimbabwe increased by about 10 per cent in 1999.
RAM Ltd has also produced a significant number of presses for export to
other countries in the region (Table 8.2). While these sales have not been
included in a benefit/cost analysis of the Zimbabwe project, they are crucial
for appraising the strategy of centralized mass production.
Table 8.2 Ram presses exported from Zimbabwe to other countries































































In addition to those exported from Zimbabwe, including 95 in 1999 and 2000, a sizeable number have been
manufactured by small enterprises in other African countries under the aegis of EnterpriseWorks' regional oils
programme and projects: Benin 2, the Gambia 40, Kenya 802, Mali 172, Mozambique 360, Senegal 44,
Tanzania 2848, Uganda 702, Zambia 3052.
Adding together sales of ram presses in Zimbabwe and in other countries,
Figure 8.1 shows total project sales of presses manufactured in Zimbabwe
(excluding those sold independently of the project after 1994).
If sales to other countries are added in, the rate of sales growth increases
sharply. So, while project oil press sales in Zimbabwe were only 23 per cent
higher in 1998 than in 1994, total sales of presses manufactured in Zimbabwe
during the same period rose by over 250 per cent. Moreover, the period
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1995-98 included two years of unfavourable weather conditions throughout
the eastern and southern Africa regions, where most exported presses are
sold. But sales held up in Zimbabwe and increased sharply elsewhere during
this period, suggesting that, given favourable weather conditions, press sales
are likely to grow strongly for some time to come.
The Zimbabwe project discovered that a small manual mill designed for
grinding paprika and other spices had been imported from the Czech
Republic into Zimbabwe as a peanut butter grinder. ZOPP promoted the use
of the device and sales increased rapidly, as it proved to be hugely popular for
household and microenterprise use. ZOPP Ltd sold 2185 mills in 1997,1890
in 1998, 442 in 1999, and 1355 in 2000, totalling 5872 peanut butter mills. In
addition, 20 motorized peanut mills and 29 peanut shellers were sold in 2000.
If the figures for presses and mills are added (482 in 1999 and 519 in 2000) the
project sold 8854 equipment items in Zimbabwe - 7905 to processing enter-
prises. Assuming 1.12 items of equipment per enterprise, the project
contributed to establishing 8854 processing enterprises in Zimbabwe.8'9
Producer and economic participants
The number of producer participants and economic participants benefiting
from the project is shown in Figure 8.2. Only producers earning at least
US$20 per annum because of the project are included.
Although the number of oil presses in operation almost doubled between
1995 and 1997, the number of estimated producer and economic participants
per operable press dropped sharply during the same period. Three key rea-
sons for this are 1) the poor weather in 1996 and 1998 caused operating mills
to work at low capacity and many people who were previously counted as
participants were omitted since they earned less than US$20 per annum
through the project; 2) most of the presses now in operation are smaller and
process fewer seeds than in the project's early years; and 3) the number of
consumer households benefiting also fell when oilseed availability problems
Fig u re 8.2 Number of producer and economic participants
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limited oil production. The breakdown of producer participants for 1998 is
shown in Figure 8.3. With 1182 presses and 4153 oilseed processors active in
1998, each ram press generated employment for an average of 3.5 people.
Figure 8.3 Producer participants by gender and employment category.
A number of assumptions are used from the impact surveys:
• All of the numbers refer to individual economic actors (manufacturers,
processors, retailers and farmers).
• Each branch of a chain store is counted as one enterprise.
• One man and one woman from each household growing sunflower and
sesame are cultivating these crops.
• All eight of the independent workshops trained by the project that are still
producing ram presses are included as producer participants, even though
it has not proved possible to keep track of the number of presses they are
producing.
• The categories male and female group owners do not refer to the number
of single-gender groups; rather, the number of male and female partici-
pants within mixed or single-gender groups is extrapolated from the
impact survey data.
More women than men own ram presses and peanut butter mills, and more
work in peanut butter-making enterprises. Men constitute a majority of the
workers who operate the ram presses, whether they are owned by men or by
women. Women usually operate the peanut mill. A few women are employed
as workers in press manufacturing firms. Women make up:
• 52 per cent of all individual enterprise owners
• 45 per cent of all group owners
• 56 per cent of all workers
• 51 per cent of all producer participants.
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Some 14866 households were estimated to have benefited from cheaper oil
in Zimbabwe in 1998.10 Counting one beneficiary per consumer household
saving money - the person who provides the primary financial support for the
household - and adding this figure to the number of producer participants
(owners, workers and raw material suppliers) gives a total of 33287 economic
participants for 1998.
Monetary benefits
The economic impact of the project is calculated by adding the increased
income deriving from greater production of oil and seedcake with the savings
accruing from cheaper oil (see Table 8.3 for impact in 1998).11 In the same
year, the 14 866 consumer households saved US$135 582 through price reduc-
tions. Monetary benefits accruing to project participants in Zimbabwe alone
totalled US$639 927 in 1998 and US$2 063 813 in 1999.
Figure 8.4 provides year-by-year estimates of the total monetary benefits
that the project generated in Zimbabwe; Figure 8.5 describes the cumulative
benefits.


























Prevailing prices in Zimbabwe in 1998 are used as the basis for the estimates. The estimated increase in
income from seedcake includes a valuation of that retained by households for their own livestock.
Year-on-year benefits have increased only slightly since 1995, despite the
greater number of presses in operation. In addition to the two causative fac-
tors already discussed - poor weather and the smaller size of the presses now
in operation - this can be explained by the fact that monetary benefits are
converted into US dollars and the Zimbabwe dollar was greatly devalued
during this period.
Cost effectiveness
Three measures are used to consider the cost effectiveness of the project:
• its benefit/cost ratio
• whether the strategy chosen represented the least expensive way in which
the project's objectives could have been achieved
• the profitability of oil-pressing enterprises using the technologies sold by
the project.
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Figure 8.4 Annual monetary benefits generated by the project
Figure 8.5 Cumulative monetary benefits generated by the project
Benefit/cost ratio of the project
By the end of 1998, cumulative project expenditures stood at US$1 573 145.
Total monetary benefits in Zimbabwe as a result of the project by the end of
1998 totalled US$3227149.This represents a benefit/cost ratio of 2.05:1. Even
if no further sales were to take place, benefits would continue to flow for the
operating life of ram presses in the field.
Capacity now exists for considerably greater project impact than has been
experienced to date in Zimbabwe. The current output capacity of RAM Ltd
is around 2000 presses per year - over double the highest amount of annual
sales recorded to date: 934 in 1998 - and the new equipment that it is sched-
uled to add will expand its capacity further. Given favourable weather
conditions, strong growth in ram press sales can be expected.12
Analysis of the project strategy
Project strategy evolved in two distinct but overlapping phases. The first, until
around 1997, was the foundation-building phase. Establishing this new rural
industry involved heavy project investment in building capacity and estab-
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lishing operating structures and mechanisms. Interventions were made on
many fronts, incurring heavy expenditures in the early years of the project. To
ensure that quality standards were maintained, project efforts were focused
on a relatively small part of the country. Consequently, impact in both num-
ber of presses in operation and total monetary benefits were somewhat
restricted.
The decision in 1995 to adopt a more commercial strategy, thus opening the
way for significantly increased project impact, could not have been taken with-
out the earlier capacity-building efforts. By 1995, the project had demonstrated
a technology that had proved both popular and dependable, an effective train-
ing package for press operators, a network for the distribution of high-yielding
seeds, and distribution channels for oil and seedcake. Only on the basis of these
achievements was the move to more widespread sales possible.
Further capacity-building investments were necessary to move towards
commercialization:
• development of a new press model suitable for mass production
• investment in equipment and establishment of a mass production plant
• development of a nationwide network of retail outlets for the sale of ram
presses and other technologies
• implementation of strategies to improve the supply of oilseeds to
processors.
The trends in year-on-year project expenditures and monetary benefits
(Figure 8.6) vindicate the strategy adopted and demonstrate the importance of
both the early foundation-building activities of the project and the later capac-
ity building undertaken in preparation for the shift to commercialization.
Figure 8.6 Total project expenditures and monetary benefits. Expenditure data
include all costs incurred in Zimbabwe and the costs of Washington-
based staff. For the years 1996-98, timesheets of Washington staff
were coded by project and this figure is accurate. Calculations for the
years before 1996 are made on the basis of an indirect cost rate of
23.5 per cent for Washington staff
187
The manufacturing and marketing channels that the project has
established appear to be able to support production and sales of other
machines. The commercialization strategy now being followed means that
project-related expenditure will continue to fall over the next few years.
RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd are already financially viable companies. ATZ will
continue to develop technologies and promote the supply of oilseeds through
mid-2001.
Weather and the political climate permitting, project impact in
Zimbabwe and beyond looks set to grow, and costs should fall to relatively
low levels.
Analysis of the profitability of oil processing enterprises
A 1997 study on performance and profitability of the ram presses indicated
that the two key variables in determining press profitability were throughput
rate and extent of service pressing. The study concluded, unsurprisingly, that
the greater the throughput, the greater the profitability.
Service pressing is the system in which farmers pay the press owner to have
their seeds processed, either for cash or for a share of the oil and seedcake
produced, and the farmers retain the products. It was found both to increase
throughput, since generally processing entrepreneurs were themselves
unable to purchase enough seeds to keep the press at full capacity, and to
broaden the benefits, since farmers who do not own a press can make sub-
stantially more money this way than by selling unprocessed seed. A 1994
Enterprise Works survey found that only around 30 per cent of press owners
offered service pressing, the lowest in any of the countries in Africa where
Enterprise Works has projects. Reasons for the lower rate of service pressing
in Zimbabwe were that 1) entrepreneurs knew they could earn more if they
purchased the seed outright instead of service pressing it, and 2) they did not
want to risk the increased wear on the press that would result if customers
brought in abrasive, hard-shelled sunflower seed. The benefits to owners,
workers, service pressers and customers as identified by the study are
included in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4 Present value of net benefits of oilseed pressing per press (in 1996 US































This analysis preceded the large drop in the value of the Zimbabwe dollar in 1997 and 1998.
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Sustainability of institutions, structures and services
Project institutions
Three entities evolved out of the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project of
EnterpriseWorks Worldwide: the NGO ATZ, the manufacturing company
RAM Ltd, and the distribution company ZOPP Ltd.
The long-term sustainability of ATZ is dependent on its ability to attract
continued donor funding. It is currently seeking additional funding from a
variety of US, European and multinational donors; its resources at the end of
1998 were a balance of US$145000, from the USAID/MIP funding and a
grant of US$312 000 from the Kellogg Foundation.
When the donor funding for ATZ ran out in 2000, EnterpriseWorks con-
tinued supporting it for another year. However, in mid-2001 this support
ended and ATZ suspended operations. The two private companies, RAM and
ZOPP, continued operating. This shows the critical importance of for-profit
spin-offs in ensuring sustainability because NGOs eventually exit from project
activities. It is becoming progressively more difficult to persuade donor agen-
cies to fund activities where no exit strategy is evident, and securing
long-term funding for ATZ will be a challenge for its staff. The survival of
RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd lies in their realizing financial viability, which seems
possible, at least in the short to medium term.
Both companies recorded healthy operating profits in 1998. On a turnover
of Z$92 066 ZOPP Ltd made a profit on trading of Z$22226. However, when
the costs of ATZ promotional activities on behalf of ZOPP Ltd. are taken
into account, ZOPP Ltd's income for 1998 represented only 65.7 per cent
total cost recovery (just above its target of 64 per cent).The cost-recovery tar-
get of 96 per cent for 1999 was exceeded during the first six months of the
year when ZOPP achieved a cost-recovery rate of 109 per cent. Effectively,
then, from the year 2000 (when indirect subsidies from the project ended),
ZOPP Ltd would be a fully profitable, stand-alone company.
RAM Ltd exceeded its revenue targets in both 1997 and 1998. Despite
losses totalling US$24975 because of the early technical problems with the
RAM-32, RAM Ltd recorded operating profits of US$634 in 1997 and
US$89 025 in 1998.
Now that the technical problems with the RAM-32 have been resolved,
and if the weather is more favourable than in recent years, conditions are
conducive for a growth in sales. Moreover, future trends in Zimbabwe are
expected to increase demand further. Land reform and redistribution, which
are bound to continue for some years to come, may promote the trend
towards greater small-scale mechanization in agriculture. But there are fac-
tors that threaten the long-term sustainability of RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd.
Perhaps the most serious is the need for continual product innovation. The
market for oil presses in Zimbabwe does not yet appear to be nearing
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saturation, and saturation is probably even more distant in many of
the other countries to which presses are currently exported. Nonetheless, a
ceiling necessarily exists on the number of presses that the market will
support.
The peanut butter mill offers substantial promise as the next high-volume
product on which the continued financial success of the two companies can
be based. The continued, long-term viability of these companies is dependent
on their being able to identify, in collaboration with ATZ, a stream of new
technologies that can be produced and distributed on a large scale.
While competition is limited at present, there are signs that it may increase.
The light-engineering project of ITDG-Southern Africa, for example, is set-
ting up two 'business shops', which will wholesale and retail a wide range of
technologies manufactured by small-scale enterprises, including a model of
the peanut butter mill. Moreover, while the presses that RAM Ltd currently
produces are much less expensive than those made in Kenya and
Mozambique, this may change.
This points to a more general issue and potential threat: those demonstrat-
ing the profitability of a new product line are vulnerable to competition from
new market entrants. It may be that RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd have already
achieved sufficient market supremacy to be able to withstand such competi-
tion, and the sales agreements that ZOPP Ltd has already negotiated in other
African countries will stand it in particularly good stead in this respect.
However, this cannot be taken for granted and, despite the lack of serious
competition at present, they need to maintain rigorous commercial standards
to ensure that they continue to dominate the market.
The political and economic instability that has afflicted Zimbabwe in
recent years also threatens company sustainability. Put simply, Zimbabwe is
an increasingly difficult place in which to do business; devaluation has driven
the cost of imported inputs sharply upwards; and high rates of inflation (32
per cent in 1998,58 per cent in 1999, and 56 per cent in 2000, according to IMF
statistics) erode the value of cash holdings.
Newly introduced legislation has exacerbated the situation. Since
November 1997, companies are no longer allowed to run foreign exchange
accounts and all incoming funds must be converted into local currency. Thus,
they are no longer protected against currency devaluation.
A further related problem is that, despite the attractive discounts that
ZOPP Ltd offers to distributors to purchase stock, they generally wait to buy
until they receive orders. This strains working capital resources.
A final, critical challenge to their sustainability lies in the transition from
aid-supported to fully independent for-profit companies. Both firms have
enjoyed special privileges by virtue of their relationship with the Zimbabwe
Oil Press Project. ZOPP Ltd is largely staffed by former ATZ employees.
ATZ has provided, free of charge, substantial promotional and market devel-
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opment activities. And two Enterprise Works staff members based in
Zimbabwe provide advice and assistance to the project.
Meanwhile, RAM Ltd has benefited from generous equity participation
from EnterpriseWorks: the stake of US dollars that EnterpriseWorks injected
gave it the capital it required to move into mass production.
In short, while RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd have performed strongly in the
commercial world, both have continued to enjoy benefits from their relation-
ship with the project. And indeed, it appears likely that they will continue to
enjoy some level of ongoing, long-term project support in terms of 'develop-
ment activities', such as identifying technological possibilities and developing
and promoting cultivation of pressing seeds.
Project services
The project has from its outset built alliances with partner organizations, and
this should be an important factor in sustaining the services it provides (see
Table 8.5).
Table 8.5 The project's key partner organizations
Category of partner Organization Nature of collaboration
Government AGRITEX, Department of Research
and Specialist Services
NGOs CARE, Zimbabwe Institute of




Citizens' Network for Foreign Affairs
Donor agencies WK Kellogg Foundation, USAID/MIP
Private sector ZOPP, RAM, Pannar Ltd, distributors,
Seed Cooperative
Information Development Technology Centre of
disseminators the University of Zimbabwe






Sharing of experience in
technologies, training,
joint ventures in programme
implementation
Funding, assistance to
private sector in technology
dissemination
Manufacture and distribution
of technologies and seed





The capacity building that has taken place, often informally, as project
organizations and their partners collaborate, should ensure that non-project
agencies will continue to deliver at least some services. Pannar, for example,
will continue distributing high-yielding seeds. DTC will continue its field tests
in identifying appropriate seed varieties. Partner NGOs such as AFRICARE
will continue to promote the presses and other technologies. And AGRITEX
extension staff will promote good seed-farming practices.
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Lessons learned
NGOs are vitally important in helping to develop and promote new income-
generating activities in the rural community. Perhaps this is the single most
important lesson that the project has demonstrated. This is not to downplay
in any way the role of the private sector. Indeed, the project has sought to
involve private sector operators at every stage of the project and, where pos-
sible, to transfer project functions to them after their potential viability has
been demonstrated.
Without the intervention of the NGO Enterprise Works, the private sector
would probably not have achieved the kind of progress its oil press projects
have achieved over the past decade in Africa. There are three reasons for this.
First, the domestic private sector in sub-Saharan Africa does not usually have
access to critical information on, for example, successful project interventions
elsewhere or the availability of potentially appropriate technologies. Second,
private companies are generally unwilling to invest in the overhead and
development costs of small-scale technologies since they find it difficult to
protect their products from imitation by others. And third, few private oper-
ators have either the expertise or the capital to undertake parallel
interventions in various different fields, as is often required when promoting
new rural activities. It is in conditions such as these that NGOs can play a
decisive catalytic role.
EnterpriseWorks and ATZ continued to provide support through mid-
2001. However, it was never intended that they would continue this role for
the long term, since NGOs are supposed to exit after they have played their
market-facilitating role. The problems associated with an adequate supply of
pressing seed can be successfully addressed in the medium term, and long-
term support in this field will not be necessary. However, as already noted, the
continued competitiveness and profitability of RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd does
appear to be dependent on their continuing to identify and develop new -
technologies.
This raises the question as to whether complete transfer of the initiative to
the private sector is possible - or indeed desirable. The prospect of
EnterpriseWorks generating sufficient revenue from its shareholding in
RAM Ltd to cover the full costs of technology development activities
appears unrealistic.
Moreover, even if RAM Ltd is able to generate sufficient revenue to fund
its own technology development work, can it do so effectively? One of the
strengths of NGOs relative to private companies is their connection to inter-
national networks, which provide them with a wealth of information on new
small-scale technologies and how to sell them successfully.
EnterpriseWorks has become an international centre of excellence, an
important resource for partner organizations with ongoing activities in the
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oilseeds sector in many other African countries. It will naturally continue to
be an important source of information for RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd.
Although the companies would probably not fold in the foreseeable future
without such support, their performance would not be as good without it.
It is also worthwhile to explore the future involvement of Enterprise Works
in the oilseed subsector in Zimbabwe from a developmental perspective.
Serving the needs of small-scale and predominantly rural markets is rarely, if
ever, the most profitable strategy open to a manufacturing company. In the
face of falling sales or loss of the vision that inspired the founders of the com-
pany, there is little reason why an entrepreneur would not choose to abandon
the current focus in favour of a more profitable (but less developmentally ori-
ented) one.
In short, to demonstrate that the production and dissemination of small-
scale technologies may be profitable is not to guarantee that this is the most
profitable strategy for a manufacturing enterprise. Long-term equity partici-
pation by EnterpriseWorks may be the only way to guarantee that RAM Ltd
maintains its current focus.
The long view in promoting new economic activities
The commercial, mass-production strategy that the project adopted has
proved to be essential for sustaining the manufacturing and distribution com-
panies. However, it could not have occurred without the seven-year
foundation-building phase from 1989 to 1996. This early phase permitted
experimentation and learning, and it established trust on which later success
was built.
All this has required an important investment by EnterpriseWorks and its
donors. The willingness of EnterpriseWorks to invest equity capital in an
unproven venture that would be unlikely to generate significant returns for a
private manufacturer in the country in the short term has been particularly
important. A manufacturer would not be concerned with the broader eco-
nomic and social benefits that oilseed processing has had for rural
microentrepreneurs, farmers and rural consumers.
Separation of for-profit and not-for-profit project activities for commercial
sustainability
Creating an institutional distinction between project activities that can be
commercialized and those that cannot appears to be at the core of the pro-
ject's success. NGOs have a poor record of economic proficiency in the
marketplace. By creating for-profit companies, the project has created the con-
ditions in which its manufacturing and distribution elements can adopt fully
commercial working methods, thus promoting their long-term sustainability.
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Although no attempt has been made to measure the level of subsidy the
project afforded to either the two private companies it established or the pur-
chasers of ram presses and other technologies, it is clear that the level has
fallen steadily. With commercialization, the project took a greater margin on
each press and recovered more for its services.
Enterprise Works invested in RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd on conditions that
would have attracted few private entrepreneurs. Substantial donor funding
has been required to create the infrastructure on which their success depends.
While all of the costs of production and marketing the press are currently
being covered and the manufacturing and distribution companies have earned
profits, the costs that Enterprise Works and ATZ have incurred in developing
the technology and marketing the machines have not been recovered - nor
should their recovery be expected, as these are 'public good' functions.
Such subsidy, however, is inherent in all development projects. If no exter-
nal support had been necessary, the private sector would have already filled
the market niche. But as the level of subsidy decreases, the prospect for the
long-term viability of these two companies looks bright. The decision to sep-
arate for-profit and not-for-profit elements of the project have contributed to
this in no small measure.
Enterprise promotion and cost recovery through innovative NCO funding
arrangements
Investment by EnterpriseWorks of equity capital in RAM Ltd represented a
most unusual and innovative step for an NGO. Two obvious advantages are
inherent. First, it allowed the newly established company to operate in the
private sector from the outset, thus obviating the generally difficult transition
from NGO to private company status. Second, it gives EnterpriseWorks the
option of long-term holding in a profitable business, thus giving it a potential
source of income for ongoing development activities. With donor funding
falling, this may prove of great value and may be a model of interest to other
NGOs.
Appropriateness of scaling up to mass production
With certain agricultural technologies, scaling up may require a mass produc-
tion strategy. With the ram press, both the quality control inputs required
from project staff and the productive capacity of trained small-scale manu-
facturers imposed a low ceiling on the amount of impact that could be
achieved in the early years.
The project team's decision to change production strategy away from the
use of multiple small-scale manufacturers to mass production by a single
larger-scale company reflects the fact that the core focus of the project is on
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end-users - oil processors - rather than press producers. It may at times be
appropriate that the natural inclination of many support agencies to work
with small-scale producers be sacrificed to the greater good of mass dissemi-
nation of the technology in question.
This does not, however, mean that mass production by a relatively sophis-
ticated manufacturer is always - or even generally - the most appropriate
means for delivering capital equipment to end-users. Two observations are in
order.
First, the larger the market, the more standard the product and the easier
the transport, the more will mass production be favoured. In product markets
not sharing these characteristics, mass production may not be practicable.
Second, while the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project has recorded considerable
success in marketing new processing technologies, it has had less effect on
enhancing the productive capacity of the local manufacturing sector. Since
the shift to mass production, the project has encouraged one manufacturer to
produce the technologies, many of which were designed by outside, expatri-
ate engineers. However, the mass manufacturing company is headed by a
Zimbabwean citizen whose demonstrated capacity to adapt other rural tech-
nologies has been improved by the project. For example, he has developed a
whole set of equipment for peanut processing.
This is not to criticize the project. There are, however, cases where helping
the local, small-scale sector to respond in a creative and innovative way to the
various and changing market demands may be the most appropriate way to
deliver production technologies to end-users. Then encouraging small-scale
producers would be appropriate.
The value of product guarantees
Introducing a new technology is seldom easy. Risk-averse as the poor are,
they are particularly resistant to purchasing new equipment before its relia-
bility is thoroughly proven. Centrally important to the ram press's rapid sales
was the guaranteed replacement of equipment that was operational but that
did not meet the project's quality standards.
The importance of continued technology development work
The importance of continuing to develop technology after the first approved
prototype is delivered is demonstrated by the five sizes of ram press that the
project introduced, each of which filled a different niche. Three of the models
remain popular in Zimbabwe. ATZ has worked on developing a motorized
oil press together with a number of other technologies to serve other identi-
fied niches.
The importance of adequate field testing of new technologies
The RAM-32 was introduced too fast. The field-testing protocol was not
adhered to and little testing was done outside the workshop in Zimbabwe
and Tanzania (and none at all in Uganda). This led to around 350 of the
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second and third batches (which totalled 843) being recalled and retrofitted,
at an expense of US$24 975 and a damaged reputation for a young company.
The value of untied and regional funding
Important in the success of Enterprise Works' oilseeds projects in Africa has
been the generous funding it has received from donors for activities not
restricted to use within a single country. This regional type of funding is rela-
tively difficult to obtain since many donors programme their budgets by
country. The regional funding that Enterprise Works received has permitted it
to host conferences, prepare newsletters and manuals, develop and test new
models of the ram press, conduct market and feasibility studies, evaluate, and
provide backup and assistance in developing and implementing new strategies.
The fact that this funding was not country specific has helped in developing an
Africa-wide strategy, with mass production in Zimbabwe at its core.
The importance of developing strategic alliances
Finally, the project has demonstrated that it is important to build alliances
with other organizations to localize and sustain project activities. The project
has effectively built capacity and transferred expertise to a range of other
agencies in Zimbabwe. Developing the capability of small-scale workshops in
manufacturing and quality control in the early phase of the project and of the
larger-scale mass manufacturer in the current phase contributes to their abil-
ity to produce these and other products in the future.
Challenges for the future
The need for continued technical and product innovation
While the market for ram presses and peanut butter processing equipment
appears buoyant in Zimbabwe and beyond, at some point a ceiling exists on
the number that can be sold before the market is saturated. Also limited is the
number of rural technologies that can be produced on a large scale and for
which there exists extensive demand. However, the market saturation point
for the ram press, peanut mills and other rural technologies is still far from
being reached.
Other appropriate technology agencies active in the region are also seek-
ing to help their client producers gain an increased share of the market for
rural technologies. The task facing ATZ and the two commercial companies
is to develop a stream of products that will justify the long-term existence of
a mass producer and distributor of rural technologies.
Establishing RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd on a firmer commercial footing
The greatest short-term challenge facing the project is for the two for-profit
companies to become truly autonomous, commercial operations. While both
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have achieved operating profits, they have continued to receive various forms
of project support and subsidy. With reduced support from Enterprise Works
and ATZ, the next two years will be critical in their transition to genuine
autonomy. The way in which the transition is managed will have a strong
bearing on the ability of these new companies to survive in the open market.
A longer-term issue for Enterprise Works in this context is what to do with
its equity shareholding. EnterpriseWorks currently holds 54 per cent of RAM
Ltd. It could be argued that for the model that the project developed to prove
entirely sustainable, it needs to be completely localized. Large devaluations of
the country's currency over the past few years makes this extremely difficult.
Imaginative approaches to transfer shares to company employees may need
to be considered. Alternatively, should employees prove unable to absorb the
remaining shares, it may be appropriate to offer them for sale to the public. A
further interesting approach in this era of donor funding cutbacks would be for
EnterpriseWorks to retain ownership of the shares and use the profits to con-
tinue other not-for-profit NGO activities in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. NGOs
like EnterpriseWorks have to seek new funding arrangements like the private
sector to survive and thrive while traditional donors (especially government
agencies) continue to cut their development assistance budgets.
Effective implementation of the new marketing strategy
The new marketing strategy that the project recently launched marks a bold
departure from its previous approach. If RAM Ltd and ZOPP Ltd succeed in
increasing sales while cutting out the large distributors they have been using,
the rewards will be great indeed. Linking income to sales should guarantee
staff commitment to the new direction. However, identifying and servicing
new networks of commissioned agents and retailers is no small task. The pre-
vious experience of other NGOs with technology promotion mandates, such
as International Development Enterprises and ApproTEC, in developing
such networks for distributing small-scale technologies will be of great value.
It is, nonetheless, a significant challenge.
Addressing the shortage of seed for pressing in years of poor weather
A recurring problem is the shortage of seed for pressing when the weather is
poor. The number of working presses in the field can press many more seeds
than have been available in recent years. The demand for new presses may well
grow; given favourable weather, demand for oilseeds is likely to rise sharply.
The project has already invested much effort in improving the distribution
of seed to small-scale processing enterprises. A top priority of the project
over the coming years is to ensure that these efforts are translated into solid
achievements.
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New developments and ongoing problems
Two new developments should be mentioned. In mid-2000, the funding for the
two Enterprise Works regional representatives stationed in Zimbabwe ended,
but ATZ continued its activities. ATZ was suspending activities in mid-2001
because it lacked new donor funding. Such funding has been greatly reduced
as a result of the political problems in the country. The two businesses, RAM
Ltd and ZOPP Ltd, will continue their activities, although they too have been
hurt by the high inflation rates and continued loss of value of the domestic
currency. The final challenge for the project, over which it has no control, is the
present political and economic instability in Zimbabwe. Devaluation, high
inflation and periodic rioting are not conducive to business growth.
Notes
1 Henceforth the organization is referred to as EnterpriseWorks, even when
describing its activities before it changed its name.
2 Oil processing enterprises in Zimbabwe have used the presses sold by the project
primarily for processing sunflower and sesame seeds, since these are the most
profitable in the country. In other countries, however, presses have been used for
processing the crops listed in the text.
3 The smallest of these, with a 20-mm piston diameter, was produced commercially
only in Tanzania. The smaller presses in common use in Zimbabwe have piston
diameters of 30-40 mm.
4 The assumptions on which estimates of project impact provided in this section are
based are derived from project records, secondary data and periodic surveys. In all
cases, these assumptions constitute a conservative estimate of impact. It has not
been possible to conduct impact surveys every year, but four surveys have been
undertaken in Zimbabwe since 1993. These have permitted the project to adjust
coefficients according to key variables regularly during the project rather than
assume constant relationships of impact.
5 For a discussion of the methodological issues involved in estimating the monetary
benefits deriving from the project, see note 11.
6 Estimated consumer savings indicate the total monetary benefit resulting from
the project. This, however, introduces two methodological difficulties when
attempting to equate project benefits with impact on gross national product
(GNP). First, the inclusion of consumer savings does not take into account the
displacement effect on the producers of (previously consumed) higher-value
products. However, as EnterpriseWorks' mandate is to assist small-scale
producers, it is not concerned about effects on large-scale oil manufacturers or
producers in major edible-oil-producing countries. Second, among households
consuming edible oil (and assumed for the calculation of benefits to be enjoying
the benefits of a cheaper product) are a number that did not consume at the
higher previous price. They are not saving money as compared with before, but
they are now able to afford the oil and are receiving nutritional benefits from it.
7 Given the capacity of Zimbabwean artisans for improvisation, some oil presses
undoubtedly remain in operation for more than five years. However, impact survey
findings suggest that this is a fair, if conservative, estimate of average press life.
8 The impact survey undertaken in Zimbabwe in 1997 found that 12 per cent of
purchasers were repeat buyers; thus the average number of presses per
enterprise was 1.12. A similar pattern is assumed for peanut butter processing
enterprises.
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9 A little under half of peanut butter mills (48 per cent according to a 1998 survey)
are used in processing businesses. The remainder are domestic appliances.
10 This was calculated by dividing the estimated ram press oil production resulting
from the project of 423 693 litres by the average annual consumption per rural
household of 28.5 litres per year (derived from the Nutrition Department of the
Zimbabwean Ministry of Health). It is assumed that one person per household
(the principal bill payer) benefits from access to cheaper oil.
11 Monetary benefits in this project include the gross value of producer income gains
from the sale of final goods and services (oil and seedcake: in this context, ram
presses and other technologies are considered intermediate goods) and consumer
savings. The gross sales value of the oil and seedcake captures the profit to the
oilseed producers, the income their hired workers receive, and the profit of the
press manufacturers, their hired workers and input suppliers.
Since part of the steel used in producing ram presses and other technologies is
imported, this represents a third methodological problem (in addition to those
referred to in note 6) in relating the project's monetary benefits to its contribution
to the gross domestic product. However, the value of oil and seedcake is a useful
and easily obtained proxy measure using survey data. Furthermore imported steel
is a small part of the cost of the ram press. The retail price and import content value
of the RAM-32 and BP-30 oil presses are given below:
Product Retail price Value accounted for by
(US$) imported materials (US$)
RAM-32 163.80 21
BP-30 187.50 14
12 This press production capacity assumes that the oil press is the only item of equip-
ment manufactured by RAM Ltd. As other products are introduced, so the
capacity to produce presses drops.
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9 Overview and conclusions
SUNITA KAPILA, DONALD MEAD, JONATHAN DAWSON,
ERIC L. HYMAN1
THIS FINAL CHAPTER distils from the comparative study of the documented
projects some good practice principles for the design and delivery of business
development services. It comments on current issues in BDS for the rural and
urban poor, and summarizes concerns around the assessment of BDS per-
formance through an overview of the case study experience.
BDS design and delivery success factors
The comparative analysis of the seven projects suggests that the following
factors are critical to the success of BDS support to small producers:
• the scale of intervention
• diversification in the delivery of services
• the key role of the implementing agencies.
Scale of intervention
The most striking feature of the seven case studies is the sheer scale of their
ambition. These were not short-term, minimalist interventions aimed at
addressing imperfections in generally well-functioning markets. These proj-
ects were all attempting to bring about basic, structural change. To do this,
they introduced new economic activities. They helped poor and generally
rural people, whose activities were previously limited to the production of
primary crops, gain access to commercial activities; they addressed tradition-
ally unequal power relationships between poor producers and other actors
further up the value chain.
This set them somewhat apart from the types of intervention that have fea-
tured so prominently in recent discussions at the various fora hosted by the
Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development. These lat-
ter initiatives have been primarily urban in nature and minimalist in
orientation, providing short-term, highly focused inputs to correct specific mar-
ket malfunctions. The target of these mainstream interventions has tended to
be growth enterprises - that is, those individual businesses that are perceived
as having strong potential for development. The aim has been to improve the
quality of BDS available and to enhance the capacity of such enterprises to
make informed choices about which services will best serve their needs.
Those interventions are quite a different scenario from that of the case
studies described in this book. Here, the focus is systemic in nature. The suc-
cess of the projects lies not in identifying growth enterprises, but rather
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subsectors with growth potential and the bottlenecks that constrain the many
small producers within them.
Given the systemic nature of the problems addressed in each of these proj-
ects, it is not surprising that tightly focused, minimalist interventions were
rejected in favour of more comprehensive approaches. To create a local mar-
ket for edible oils in Zimbabwe, for example, meant attention to a number of
activities and support for them: a supply of oilseed (by encouraging growers),
a seed-pressing technology, a distribution network for presses, and entrepre-
neurs trained in press operation. Failure to address any one of these elements
would have threatened the viability of the whole initiative.
Similarly, the capacity of SEEDS clients to supply ornamental fish to
higher-value markets was dependent on the whole range of services (techni-
cal training, extension, credit and market mediation) that the project
provided. Removing any one of these building blocks would have threatened
the viability of the entire edifice. The same principle holds true, to a greater
or lesser degree, for each of the other case studies.
Diversified delivery of services
It is notable that, as a general rule, the implementers of the case study proj-
ects chose to deliver the range of required services in-house, rather than enter
into relationships with other specialist agencies. There are exceptions: ITDG-
Bangladesh has partnered with other local agencies to deliver important
complementary services and provided them with training; SEEDS drew on
government and private sector specialists for some of its training sessions;
and several of the projects facilitated credit access for their clients, rather
than providing it themselves. Nonetheless, the point is generally valid and
three of the projects (SEEDS, the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project and the El
Salvador coffee initiative) even provided the credit themselves.
This is an important finding, contradicting the widely accepted principle that
implementing agencies are most effective when they focus relatively narrowly
on their core area of specialization. The reality, however, is that collaboration
between different agencies is difficult where various bottlenecks need to be
unblocked in a coordinated manner. The lead agency risks losing control of the
process and becomes dependent on the capacity of project partners to deliver.
This, for example, was the experience of TechnoServe in its efforts to identify
local partners to whom it could transfer its capacity in group mobilization and
organization. None of the several candidates identified proved able to under-
take the activities concerned with the thoroughness or at the speed required
for the other project components to be implemented successfully.
The key role of the implementing agency
A further distinctive feature of all the case study projects is the leading role
that the implementing agency played in most phases of project design and
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execution. In all cases, both identifying the economic opportunity that the
project would exploit and designing the project were almost exclusively the
responsibility of the lead NGO. Similarly, most of the key strategic decisions
made later - for example, the shift from small-scale to large-scale production
of oil presses in Zimbabwe; the fundamental refocusing of marketing activi-
ties in the Zimbabwe light-engineering project; the decision to scale up the El
Salvador coffee marketing project by including other countries in the region
- were strongly driven by the implementing agencies themselves.
This is not to say that other stakeholders played no active role: the small-
scale engineers working with ITDG's project in Zimbabwe, for example,
worked closely with the project team in identifying and developing
capital goods; and farmers' groups were involved both in identifying the need
for an umbrella organization to take over many of the functions that
TechnoServe played in Ghana, and in deciding what form the organization
should take.
Nonetheless, the level of participation of stakeholders (and particularly
project clients) was relatively low in most of these projects. There are good
reasons for this. The initiatives are often complex and multifaceted and are
meant to assist relatively poor people who may have limited education and
who live in areas that are often remote, with generally poor infrastructure.
These types of producers are generally unable either to spot potential eco-
nomic opportunities or to identify or mobilize the various interventions
required to exploit them. The NGOs, with their range of expertise and expe-
rience and their connections to international networks of information, were
able to play these roles.
There is, of course, an attendant danger here that NGOs run the risk of
being sucked into the role of market players - a role they have traditionally
played poorly. However, the case study projects suggest that this lesson has
been learned and that lead NGOs tend to recognize that their forte lies in
identifying and exploring the profitability of market opportunities, building
the capacity of their clients to exploit them, and then linking them up to pri-
vate sector partners (input providers, equipment manufacturers, marketing
companies and so on). The growing number of employees among the case
study NGOs with a private sector background appears to be important here
- both in permitting the NGOs to spot and develop income-generating
opportunities and in restraining their involvement in business activities.
The case studies suggest that there may on occasion be an important on-
going role for the lead agency even after the project (or project phase) has
formally ended. This is generally the case where further external inputs are
required in identifying new economic opportunities. For example,
Enterprise Works has an important long-term role to play in identifying and
developing new technologies for RAM Ltd to manufacture and ZOPP Ltd to
disseminate - the two companies that the oil press project in Zimbabwe
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established. The long-term profitability of both companies is likely to depend
to a significant degree on the success of these ongoing research and develop-
ment efforts.
Similarly, in Ghana, TechnoServe will continue to search out new market
niches on behalf of its smallholder clients and work to develop them. These
efforts will become progressively more important as the profitability of the
inventory credit scheme falls. This ongoing role for support organizations
appears to be a common feature of systems-based projects, where success-
fully removing one bottleneck frequently reveals the existence of others that
need to be addressed. This is a common feature of all of the case studies in
this volume.
Developing commercial BDS
Each of the projects reviewed in this book attempted - some quite success-
fully - to link up with the private sector to help sustain the effectiveness of
the BDS interventions after the NGOs and donor support were gone. Several
challenges qualify the market-based and demand-driven approach to BDS
espoused in the guidelines for donor intervention in BDS for micro- and
small enterprises; two of them are outlined here.
Difficulties in drawing a clear distinction between BDS 'facilitators' and
'providers'
The central role of the lead NGO in these case study projects, and the dif-
ficulties experienced in finding project partners with whom to collaborate,
raise important implications in the distinction that the Donor Committee
guidelines insist be made between BDS 'facilitators' and 'providers'.The for-
mer, it is argued, should create, through donor-funded initiatives, the
conditions under which the latter, private sector concerns, can provide busi-
ness development services for a profit. The case studies suggest that with
these projects of multifaceted initiatives working with poor producers, this
may not be possible.
There are two reasons for this. First is the dearth of service providers in the
form of either for-profit enterprises or not-for-profit organizations. Second,
real problems of cost recovery exist for service providers when working with
poor, rural producers. While there are, in the case studies, incidents of finan-
cially viable companies being established to provide BDS on an ongoing
basis, there are nonetheless many other important project services that it
appears cannot be transferred to the private sector. Here, the economic justi-
fication of the project lies in the fact that benefits can be quantified as
exceeding costs - even where many of the individual services may not recover
their costs.
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Synergies between credit and BDS
The Donor Committee guidelines do not consider the BDS credit comple-
mentarity that entrepreneurs often require. Several of the case studies in this
book show strong synergies between credit and BDS. Several different pat-
terns are evident. In the case of the inventory credit scheme in Ghana,
various BDS were required (building group capacity, introducing improved
storage and treatment facilities, and so on) for it to be possible to deliver
credit against stored grains. In Bangladesh, the food processing activities that
poor people adopted as a result of the training provided for them were essen-
tial to enable them to repay loans received (many of which were used for
other productive activities).
In the Sri Lanka ornamental fish project, as in each of the other sectors in
which SEEDS is active, BDS and credit are both seen as necessary elements
of the package of assistance required to permit small producers to move into
new areas of activity. Indeed, a core reason for creating a BDS unit within
SEEDS was as a way to increase the outreach and repayment rates of its
credit programme.
In sum, the projects documented in this book suggest that many new mar-
ket opportunities cannot be exploited without access to the financial resources
required to purchase equipment and raw materials. Credit is made available to
enable client small enterprises to take advantage of these identified market
opportunities. On the other hand, achieving the mass outreach required for
credit-providing organizations to cover their costs when working with poor
producers generally requires some mix of BDS to enhance clients' productive
capacity. If BDS are to be promoted as distinct commercial products, it would
be useful to consider ways of complementing them with access to credit.
Evolution of project services
The evolutionary nature of the business development process
Most of the projects presented in the case studies undertook important
strategic reorientations at some point in the project's life. The Zimbabwe Oil
Press Project, for example, shifted production of presses from small- to large-
scale units as a result of quality-control problems and a need to scale up and
reduce costs. ITDG-Southern Africa introduced a major new marketing com-
ponent into its light-engineering project design as it shifted its focus from
manufacturers to end-users of capital goods. TechnoServe's initial engage-
ment in the maize sector in Ghana was in promoting green revolution
technologies; only after the storage and marketing bottlenecks became obvi-
ous did it develop its inventory credit initiative.
Most of the projects have also expanded their range of activities or the
number of products with which they work. In addition to beans, ASOMEX
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now markets several other crops and has moved into marketing furniture. It
is looking to diversify further. The manufacturing company that the
Zimbabwe Oil Press Project created, RAM Ltd, is now also producing peanut
butter mills and several other items of equipment. Once again, the search for
new products continues.
Each of the projects first started with only one product, enabling the
developers to capture the benefits that come from focused specialization. In
each case, the impetus for diversification came from a desire to increase
turnover, generally with a view to increasing the cost effectiveness and pro-
moting the prospects for financial sustainability of the bodies that the project
created. The commercial viability of ASOMEX, RAM and ZOPP all appear
to various extents to be dependent on this broadening in the scale of their
activities.
As pioneering projects, there is clearly a strong element of action-research
in most of the case study initiatives. Moreover, given the relative complexity
of what it is they are trying to achieve, with interventions on various fronts, it
is perhaps not surprising that projects of this type periodically find a need to
reorient themselves. The obvious question this poses for commercial delivery
of BDS is whether and how such delivery can incorporate action-research
and evolutionary design, which have been so important in the success of the
projects reviewed in this book.
The emergence of innovative forms of development assistance
The case studies illustrate several innovative approaches to small enterprise
support that borrow direct from conventional commercial business activity.
On the one hand, these relate to the way in which the initiatives were set up.
EnterpriseWorks, for example, provided equity investment for establishing
RAM Ltd, the company manufacturing the oil presses and other technologies
that the project disseminated. In the Ghana inventory credit project (as in all
its other projects), TechnoServe based its assistance on a management agree-
ment drawn up between the NGO and its client producers, which required
that client producers invest equity in enterprises that the project established.
Innovative developments oriented to the private sector are also evident in
the routes to sustainability that several of the case study projects pursued.
They involved transfer to the private sector of profitable service-providing
enterprises that the projects created. This is true of the manufacturing and
distribution companies that the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project established, the
ASOMEX marketing company, and the tool hire centres and retail outlets
the light-engineering project created in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Oil Press
Project deliberately created a conceptual and institutional distinction
between the services that could be provided profitably and those that could
not. The former were transferred to private enterprises that the project
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created, and the latter have remained with an indigenous development NGO
dependent on ongoing donor funding.
Harmonizing commercial and development objectives of BDS
Transfer of services to the private sector has, in each of the case studies,
involved a process of transition from subsidy support to fully commercial
operation. In none of the projects has this been achieved without attendant
problems. With ASOMEX, for example, significant confusion exists between
developmental and commercial interests, with the marketing company need-
ing to serve the interests of its parent NGO (ASOPROF) at the same time as
it plays an independent market role. This confusion of roles has been identi-
fied as a key factor in explaining the suboptimal performance of the company
to date. Similar issues arose in the ZOPP project, as functions first performed
by the NGO were shifted to commercial organizations.
Additional problems exist with the bodies created by the two projects in
Zimbabwe. Here, the dilemma resides in finding a way of giving the new
enterprises full commercial autonomy while also ensuring that they continue
to perform the developmental function for which they were created. That is,
while the projects may have demonstrated that equipment hire and the man-
ufacture and dissemination of small-scale equipment may be profitable, this
does not mean that these are necessarily the most profitable activities that
the new enterprises could be undertaking. In short, if full control is handed
over to the private sector, can the new owners be prevented from diversify-
ing into more profitable but less developmentally favourable activities?
EnterpriseWorks is considering holding on to its stake in the press manu-
facturing company for some time as a way of ensuring that it continues to
perform a developmental function. The equipment hire and retail outlets that
the light-engineering project created will become private companies owned
by ITDG-Southern Africa, thus ensuring its continued voice in policy. It is yet
to be seen how successful these arrangements will prove to be in reconciling
commercial and developmental requirements. They should be seen as first
steps in a process of exploration in an area that is likely to grow in importance
as similar initiatives develop.
Assessing successful performance: the case study experience
These considerations raise a number of issues about the assessment of proj-
ects against measurement criteria for impact, cost effectiveness and
sustainability.
It was obvious from the outset of this study that it would be problematic to
apply a common standardized set of indicators to the case studies. The BDS
approaches have been diverse. The NGOs involved used different definitions
206
of the term 'project' and different methods for assessing costs and benefits. In
the comparative analysis of the seven projects, setting numerical standards or
benchmarks for performance was particularly problematic because of the
diverse client groups and participating NGOs. In several cases, the lack of rig-
orous data made even simple benefit/cost calculations impossible.
Nonetheless, the case studies were able to trace some achievements resulting
from project interventions and to note the process that led to these outcomes.
A major concern in attempting to assess performance was how to mark the
start or end of any particular BDS activity.
Impact
Difficulties in defining a project
All of the case study projects have, to some extent, built on previous activi-
ties that the lead development agency had undertaken. ASOMEX was
established to exploit the potential for export marketing of the beans already
promoted by a previous MEDA project. ITDG-Southern Africa's work in the
light-engineering sector in Zimbabwe grew out of previous project activities
with informal sector carpenters and blacksmiths. The oil press project in
Zimbabwe was able to draw on substantial work in technology development
already undertaken by EnterpriseWorks in Tanzania. The foundations of the
inventory credit project in Ghana were built on previous work by
TechnoServe in promoting green revolution technologies in that country.
SEEDS drew on a network of community-based offices throughout the coun-
try. Their linking method, evolved over a number of years, is used to promote
activities in various sectors of the economy. It reduces the marginal cost of
undertaking new activities such as raising ornamental fish, but makes it diffi-
cult to demarcate the boundaries of that activity as a separate project.
In the same vein, systemic interventions will often evolve into new forms.
Having promoted a model for the storage of crops, for example, TechnoServe
is now promoting processing activities, including mechanical grain drying. The
manufacturing and distribution capacities that the Zimbabwe Oil Press
Project created are being used to produce other small-scale technologies.
Moreover, the switch to mass manufacture in one central location permits the
dissemination of these technologies to many countries outside Zimbabwe.
This analysis reveals the unsatisfactory nature of the concept of 'the proj-
ect' as a tool for isolating interventions of a systemic nature and for
measuring their impact, cost effectiveness and sustainability. Where does one
begin to count the costs of interventions that build on previous initiatives, and
where does one finish calculating benefits in situations where other related
interventions emerge? How does one make a judgement on sustainability,
when, as in the case of the TechnoServe initiative in Ghana, inventory credit
and the group strengthening that goes with it can be seen as one element of
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an ongoing process of assistance and development? How to isolate the bene-
fits to be counted when, as in most of the case studies, producers having no
direct contact with the project adopt its innovations through imitation? Or
when client producers use the enhanced capacity they have acquired for pur-
poses other than those directly relating to the project goals? These are all
important methodological questions to which we do not yet have satisfactory
answers. Yet until we develop more appropriate impact assessment tech-
niques, we are likely to continue to miscalculate - generally to underestimate
- the true impact of systemic, capacity-building projects such as those
described in the case studies.
Project achievements
As a result of the El Salvador Small-scale Coffee Producers' Project, 1568
small-scale coffee farm owners and workers each earned at least US$20 in
additional income in the 1998/9 production year. The project's total monetary
benefits (in gross income gains of the cooperatives and producer cost savings
for the cooperatives and farmers) are almost identical with project costs
(from January 1995 to December 1998) at around US$1.7 million. However,
the capacity that the project created among the cooperatives, including a
profitable coffee marketing company, means that benefits will continue to
accrue while costs progressively decline. The project is currently being repli-
cated in a regional initiative covering El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.
The Zimbabwe Oil Press Project is generating employment for 4150 peo-
ple in oil press enterprises and permitting 6000 farmers to increase their
production of sunflowers. In 1998, the project delivered benefits to 18421
producer participants in Zimbabwe (categorized as press owners and their
workers, press sales outlets, repair artisans, filter manufacturers, oilseed and
peanut butter processors, press and seed sales agents and farmers growing
oilseeds for sale to processors). Some 51 per cent of all producer participants
were women. An additional 14 866 households benefited from access to
cheaper oil, giving a total of 33 287 beneficiaries. The project has succeeded in
constructing the infrastructure for a new rural industry in Zimbabwe - small-
scale oil pressing - which is now largely self-sustaining. By the end of 1998,
monetary benefits in Zimbabwe (US$5.3 million) exceeded project costs
(US$1.6 million) by a benefit/cost ratio of 3.36:1. Once again, benefits will
continue to flow while costs, already at a relatively low level, are phased out
over the next few years.
Of the approximately 8700 people trained in food processing by the agro-
processing programme in Bangladesh, which started in 1990, around 1300
have established new enterprises. These are generally very poor, landless peo-
ple. Incomes of beneficiaries starting their own enterprises were found to
have increased by 82 to 140 per cent. Evaluation exercises undertaken in 1996
208
and 1998 calculated benefit/cost ratios to be 12.5:1 and 7:1 respectively.
Sustainability of project achievements is being promoted by transferring
skills to trainers of various other indigenous Bangladeshi organizations and
by establishing an organization, the Forum for Food Processing Enterprise
Development, to take on the roles played by the project to date.
The first three years of the light-engineering project in Zimbabwe, from its
launch in 1995, can be seen as a period of action-research, as it felt its way
towards an appropriate approach to developing and disseminating small-
scale production equipment. Significant progress has been made towards
achieving the project's core aims: the creation of financially self-sustaining
equipment hire service centres and small equipment retail shops. Little in the
way of impact data has yet been gathered.
The crop marketing company established in 1993 by the ASOMEX project
in Bolivia serves the marketing needs of over 2000 small producers per year.
Many of these farmers, having achieved their first exports through
ASOMEX, have almost doubled their previous incomes.
Started in 1995, the ornamental fish project in Sri Lanka generated a 13 per
cent real increase in incomes for participating farmers. Receiving training in
the technologies of this innovative activity were 345 farmers, of whom 115
actually used the training and improved their incomes and range of skills.
Benefit/cost ratio was calculated as 5.6 to 1.
Beneficiaries of the cereal storage, processing and marketing project in
Ghana include 1800 direct participants and a substantial number of other
farmers who have adopted the techniques introduced by the project.
Participating farmers accessed around US$117500 of inventory credit as a
result of the project in 1998/9 and have seen their annual incomes rise by up
to 29 per cent. Total project costs between 1992 and the present
(US$1754708) have exceeded benefits (US$1238445) by a factor of 1:1.42.
In addition to these direct, quantifiable benefits, each of the projects has
generated other significant benefits. Several of the projects, for example, have
been replicated or extended into other areas. The private manufacturing com-
pany established by the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project supplies oil presses to
ten other African countries and is diversifying into the production of several
other small-scale technologies for sale both in Zimbabwe and abroad. Several
banks and other development agencies have adopted the inventory credit
model that TechnoServe introduced in Ghana. The coffee promotion project
has now been extended to two other countries in Central America.
The projects have also created various qualitative and ripple or down-
stream benefits that have not been included in the benefit/cost calculations.
These include improved food security, enhanced capacity among client pro-
ducers that has been used in ways and for purposes other than those directly
relating to the project goals, and enhanced capacity among institutions and
producers not directly connected to the projects but adopting the new
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techniques and technologies they have introduced. Difficulties of factoring
these benefits into impact assessment calculations have dogged all of the case
study projects and constitute a major challenge in gauging the true impact of
projects.
Cost effectiveness
The various definitions of 'project' and what it means affected the scope and
meaning of the cost-effectiveness calculations. Some case studies included
only costs incurred by the NGO itself (ITDG-Bangladesh and TechnoServe),
while Enterprise Works included the costs of all the partner organizations and
clients. Cost-effectiveness calculations for the ITDG food processing project
were affected by the fact that ITDG was a BDS facilitator and not a provider.
It trained fieldworkers of other agencies but did not work directly with end-
users. Cost-effectiveness analysis for indirect service providers would need to
take into account the costs of other field-based agencies providing training or
technical and business management assistance.
Other reasons also made it hard to compare the relationship between costs
and benefits across the case studies. The organizations did not all treat his-
torical costs for direct predecessor projects in the same way. While
Enterprise Works counted historical costs of predecessor projects in the same
country, it did not count those in other countries. TechnoServe did not count
costs incurred by organizations other than itself, on the grounds that it was
concerned with the cost effectiveness of its own resources. The costs per ben-
eficiary could be estimated for many of the case studies, although many of the
differences between projects reflected differing inclusions and treatment of
costs. Furthermore, this is a less useful measure than the relationship between
costs and benefits.
Monetary benefit measures also differed between projects. In many cases,
the value of the benefits was not converted from local currency to US dollars,
although many of the projects spanned a time of major devaluations of the
local currency. Reported income gains were often not adjusted for inflation
or discounted to reflect the time value of money. There can also be non-
monetary benefits, which are difficult to include in such calculations.
Both benefits and costs can be defined at various levels: clients, communi-
ties, a subsector or system, or countries. Some of the case studies used proxy
measures to estimate the impact on the GDP of the country. Because of the
complexity of changing production systems and markets, attribution of bene-
fits (association between the services and the impact) required difficult
judgements.
Cost-effectiveness analysis also illustrated the context specificity of inter-
preting some performance indicators. The ASOMEX case study commented
as follows on the challenge of estimating the level of cost effectiveness: 'a
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major factor in making the financial records of limited value in providing
cost-effectiveness indicators is Bolivia's tax incentive and export bonus struc-
ture, which seem to promote some rather non-conventional accounting
practices. The quantity of export bonus received is determined by the amount
of expenses incurred in the export. This is an incentive to overstate costs of
export, and weakens the incentive to minimise costs.' The ASOMEX exam-
ple also underlines the finding that where multiple services are offered by the
same provider, separate records of costs and revenues are not usually kept
for each of the services offered.
The relationship between cost recovery and the role of the NGO is a ques-
tion that runs across all the projects. Where an NGO has primarily played the
role of facilitator rather than provider of BDS, the project beneficiaries are
not direct clients of the NGO. In the case study of the food processors in
Bangladesh, for example, ITDG-Bangladesh trained local agencies, which in
turn gave the training to the entrepreneurs. In such cases, it is difficult to
expect client enterprises to pay fees that would help the BDS facililitator
recover its costs.
Sustainability
The case studies differed in how sustainability was defined and measured.
Some projects emphasized the sustainability of the enterprises being sup-
ported, either the client MSEs or those providing the BDS; others focused on
the sustainability of impact. In our study, these issues were handled mainly
through an explanation of the projects' strategies for achieving sustainability
as they defined them.
To promote sustainability of services introduced during the project period,
some NGOs turned the services over to private providers after the demand
for them and successful approaches to supply had been demonstrated. Most
of the projects succeeded in establishing market linkages so that the various
players might be expected to continue to interact in profitable ways after the
project support ended. For example, in the case of ASOMEX, the develop-
ment of the marketing service stimulated other commercial service providers
to deliver the same service. In the Zimbabwe Oil Press Project, the replica-
tion of the ram press by private sector manufacturers strengthened the
demand for the capital goods and raw materials that were the principal focus
of the project. While BDS delivery through NGOs was often subsidized, the
example was then set for commercial providers to adopt. One of the projects
transferred service delivery from the NGO to a government agency that will
continue to subsidize it; the NGO considered this a sustainable pattern.
All of the projects involved subsidization of the BDS, although in many
cases the degree of subsidy was deliberately reduced over time. Since not all
subsidies were quantified, it was not possible to make numerical comparisons
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of this measure of sustainability across the projects. In some of the cases, cer-
tain services were cross-subsidized by other activities that generated a profit,
sometimes involving commercial transactions downstream in marketing a
final product. Sunk costs for technology R&D and the start-up of other types
of BDS were not generally recovered. In several cases, the full costs of pur-
chased inputs were charged to the client enterprises, but the full distribution
costs were not charged during an initial period and promotional and demon-
stration activity costs were not recovered. In all of the cases where private
businesses had been established by the NGOs, the companies continued to
operate despite several years of initial losses that were absorbed by the
NGOs, or paper losses for their staff members who had taken an equity share.
To put this in perspective, private businesses in industrialized countries
also absorb losses for extended launch periods. Transnational corporations
that have contract farming arrangements with suppliers often cross-subsi-
dize the costs of input supply or extension services with profits from
processing the commodities. Subsidies are a practical business tool during a
start-up/launch phase and can play a role in a profitable, ongoing business
strategy.
All of the projects paid considerable attention to the development of
indigenous human resources and institutional capacity to sustain the impact
of their interventions. Some invested considerable effort in building the
capacity of groups such as cooperatives and farmers or processors groups.
Working with these groups often resulted in lower service delivery costs
through economies of scale and easier access. This principle was borne out in
the case study of ASOMEX (Bolivia), where MEDA brought this in as a les-
son from previous experience, and in projects in Ghana and El Salvador,
where cooperatives received facilitative services and were the BDS providers
for small-scale producers. In Bangladesh, ITDG trained local partners in food
processing technologies in order that the skills transfer would continue after
the project ended. In the Ghana Inventory Credit Project, farmers' groups
were trained in crop treatment and storage as well as in accessing credit and
markets.
Each of the case study projects is following strategies for the sustainability
of specific benefits that they have generated. In five of the seven case studies,
sustainability is being pursued primarily through market mechanisms. The
various approaches to sustainability exhibit a high degree of innovation and,
in several cases, mark new departures for NGOs. Equity participation by
EnterpriseWorks in the manufacturing and distribution companies in
Zimbabwe and by MEDA in ASOMEX constitute important new dimen-
sions in risk-sharing and partnership between support agencies and their
clients. ITDG-Southern Africa's exploration of the potential for franchising
out the operation of the business shops and the service centres represents
another exciting new direction.
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In only two of the case study projects is a long-term role for the market not
being explored. The main reason is that in neither of these cases would the
market be able to sustain the services. In the case of small-scale food proces-
sors in Bangladesh, full cost recovery is not possible for the training,
networking and advocacy. In future, it is expected that training will be pro-
vided by two organizations - one governmental, one an NGO - while
advocacy will be undertaken by the newly formed Forum for Food Processing
Enterprise Development. Similarly, the group animation services that
TechnoServe provides in Ghana cannot be handled on a commercial basis.
Newly created farmers' organizations are seen as the best mechanism for
meeting the ongoing need for these services.
Absent from each of these sustainability strategies is an element that has
been central to discussions at the various recent Donor Committee forums:
namely, the payment by small enterprises of fees that cover the costs of the
BDS provided. In exploring why this is so, we return to the distinction raised
above between initiatives that promote the growth of individual enterprises
(that, it is hoped, will be able to pay fees for services) and those that promote
growth at the subsectoral level. With subsectoral interventions, many of the
beneficiaries may have little or no direct contact with the lead NGO. This was
the case with the end-users of the technologies disseminated by the ITDG-
Southern Africa light-engineering project; the food processors trained by the
agencies that ITDG-Bangladesh had initially trained; and the non-project
farmers who adopted cereal storage and treatment techniques introduced in
Ghana by the inventory credit project.
This calls into question the core justification commonly made for insisting
on payment of fees to cover the full cost of BDS: that BDS are private rather
than public goods. Many of the benefits accruing from the case study projects
appear to be distinctly public in nature.
Building BDS markets for the rural and urban poor
While there are a number of differences between these projects in terms of
both approach and performance, they share a number of important charac-
teristics. As subsectoral initiatives using BDS to increase the clout of
primarily rural producers, they represent interventions that involve a long-
term commitment on the part of both NGOs and donors, that are
multifaceted in nature and that are relatively expensive to implement.
This is in marked contrast to the Donor Committee guidelines, which give
priority to BDS interventions that are tightly focused, relatively short-term
and capable of rapid cost recovery. As noted above, such projects tend to be
appropriate primarily in addressing localized market failures, often in urban
settings. In such cases, demand for BDS services may be relatively easily stim-
ulated and short-term support effectively delivered to BDS providers.
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However, there are important segments of the economy where the prob-
lem could be described not so much as localised market failure but rather as
an inadequacy - in some cases, an almost total absence - of appropriate mar-
ket structures of any sort. This is particularly true for the rural poor, who are
often far removed from market opportunities, both geographically and cul-
turally. For this group, more comprehensive and longer-term interventions
are often required if effective and appropriate BDS markets are to be
developed.
It is clear that interventions attempting to engage in building of such mar-
kets pose formidable challenges. As we have seen, these interventions tend to
be relatively expensive and time consuming and to involve coordinated activ-
ities on several fronts.
BDS design and delivery principles derived from the projects profiled in
this volume have concentrated on interventions focused on subsectors with
growth potential. The analysis presented here suggests that such interven-
tions can result in substantial outreach and impact. The pioneering nature of
the BDS in these case studies points to the significant role of research and
development. NGO-initiated and donor-subsidized BDS activities can result
in the development of markets that did not previously exist, while also con-
sidering the need to balance developmental and business goals of BDS.
Above all, the case studies underscore the need for flexible and responsive
approaches. They establish that BDS 'good practice' is a relative concept,
dependent on context. Finally, they describe how difficult it is to try to assess
BDS performance across sectors and regions using common core indicators
of success.
Note
1 Although the authors jointly wrote this chapter, the comparative analysis presented
in it draws from discussions with and contributions by Anura Atapattu, Pamela
Fehr, Steve Londner, Julie Redfern, Andrew Scott and Sandra Yu.
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